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ABSTRACT 
Kieran W. Taylor: Turn to the Working Class: the New Left,  
Black Liberation, and the U.S. Labor Movement, 1967-1981 
(Under the direction of Jacquelyn Dowd Hall) 
 
 In the late 1960s and 1970s, thousands of young black, white, Asian, and 
Latino radicals from diverse class backgrounds concluded that a deep and long-
lasting transformation of the nation’s politics required them to concentrate their 
organizing efforts on worksites and within trade unions. They took jobs in steel 
mills, hospitals, auto plants, and truck barns. They rented rooms in working-class 
districts and immersed themselves in blue-collar community life. They organized 
workers from the salmon canneries in Alaska to the lumber mills of Mississippi 
and within unions as powerful as the United Autoworkers of America and as 
obscure as the United Glass and Ceramic Workers. They worked as union 
lawyers, organizers, and researchers, and they educated the public regarding 
strikes and around occupational health issues. Some of these radicals aimed to 
build labor support for the antiwar, African American, and women’s liberation 
movements. Some sought to reform corrupt and ineffective trade unions. Still 
others harbored more ambitious dreams of a worker-led socialist revolution.  
 Structured around case studies in Atlanta, Detroit, San Francisco, and 
Seattle, Turn to the Working Class offers the first scholarly account of their 
contributions to the American radical tradition. The efforts of labor radicals in the 
1970s were complicated and contradictory, and they ultimately failed to achieve 
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their most ambitious goals. Challenging the notion that the legacies of the 1960s 
protest movements were solely those of backlash and reaction, however, it 
argues that those who made the working-class turn advanced a spirit of 
militancy, promoted labor feminism and civil rights unionism, and reinvigorated a 
dormant tradition of international solidarity that had largely been extinguished 
from the labor movement during the anti-communist crusades. As workers 
continue to grapple with the impact of economic globalization, those traditions will 
be essential building blocks in ongoing struggles for democracy and economic 
justice. 
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Introduction 
 
While living in Northwest Indiana in the late 1980s and early 1990s, I 
served as a board member of the Calumet Project for Industrial Jobs—a coalition 
of labor unions, civic groups, and churches that had joined forces to fight the 
epidemic of plant closings and mass layoffs that plagued the Gary area’s steel 
industry. We enjoyed uneven support from union officials, including the 
conservative district director of the United Steelworkers of America, but among 
our most consistent backers were workers and community activists who had 
been politicized by their participation in the antiwar and civil rights movements of 
the 1960s. Some had entered the mills after high school only to be swept up in 
the era’s spirit of rebellion. Others had been college students sent to Gary by left-
wing political groups with instructions to secure manufacturing jobs and spark a 
rank-and-file worker rebellion directed at the steelmakers and ineffectual union 
leaders alike. Those who had retained their mill jobs through the 1980s had 
parlayed their organizational skills into positions of local union leadership from 
which they worked to build a more militant, inclusive, and democratic 
Steelworkers union in the face of tremendous challenges, including 
deindustrialization and the demands from the steel companies for contract 
concessions. Those working outside the mills were active in local politics, 
campaigning for progressive candidates, lobbying for the cleanup of polluted 
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rivers and brownfield sites, organizing the unemployed, and supporting groups 
such as the Calumet Project.1 
 At the time, I was struck by the presence of so many 1960s-era activists in 
the local labor movement, but I learned later that this was not unique to Gary. In 
the 1970s, thousands of young black, white, Latino, and Asian radicals from 
diverse class backgrounds concluded that a deep and long-lasting transformation 
of the nation’s politics required them to concentrate their organizing efforts on 
worksites and within trade unions. They took jobs in steel mills, hospitals, auto 
plants, and truck barns. They rented rooms in working-class districts and 
immersed themselves in blue-collar community life. They organized workers from 
the salmon canneries in Alaska to the lumber mills of Mississippi and within 
unions as powerful as the United Autoworkers of America and as obscure as the 
United Glass and Ceramic Workers. They worked as union lawyers, organizers, 
and researchers, and they educated the public regarding strikes and 
occupational health issues. Some of these radicals aimed to build labor support 
for the antiwar, African American, and women’s liberation movements. Some 
sought to reform corrupt and ineffective trade unions. Still others harbored more 
ambitious dreams of a worker-led socialist revolution.  
Turn to the Working Class represents the first scholarly account of their 
contributions to the American radical tradition. It highlights the long-term impact 
of the working-class turn on the contemporary labor movement and the American 
                                                 
1
 On the work of the Calumet Project, including its central role in organizing the successful 
campaign to stop the closing of LaSalle Steel in Hammond, Indiana, see Bruce Nissen, Fighting 
For Jobs: Case Studies of Labor-Community Coalitions Confronting Plant Closings (Albany: State 
University of New York Press 1995). 
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workplace, while exploring the internal and external forces that limited its 
success. Challenging the notion that the legacies of the 1960s protest 
movements were solely those of backlash and reaction, it argues that those who 
made the working class turn advanced a spirit of militancy, promoted labor 
feminism and civil rights unionism, and reinvigorated a dormant tradition of 
international solidarity that had largely been extinguished from the labor 
movement during the anti-communist crusades. 
 
 The activities, experiences, limitations, and legacies of those radicals who 
immersed themselves in working-class politics in the 1970s have remained 
largely unexplored by historians. The principal accounts of the 1960s social 
movements emphasize the unfinished agendas and internal failings of the major 
youth protest groups. These narratives often strike a note of defeat as they close 
with either the dissolution of the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) and 
the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), Martin Luther King Jr.’s 
assassination, the divisive National Democratic Convention in Chicago, Richard 
Nixon’s election, or perhaps the Woodstock or Altamont music festivals.2 Yet for 
many young radicals and intellectuals, the late 1960s marked not the end of the 
                                                 
2
 For a critique of the declensionist narratives that dominate the historiography of the 1960s, see 
the introductory essays in Van Gosse and Richard Moser, The World the Sixties Made: Politics 
and Culture in Recent America, eds. (Philadelphia: Temple University 2003) pp. 1–51. Jacquelyn 
Dowd Hall raises similar questions regarding the historiography of the civil rights movement. She 
identifies a dominant narrative of the movement that is often confined “to the South, to 
bowdlerized heroes, to a single halcyon decade, and to limited, noneconomic objectives.” These 
limitations prevent “one of the most remarkable mass movements in American history from 
speaking effectively to the challenges of our time” (see Hall, “The Long Civil Rights Movement 
and the Political Uses of the Past,” Journal of American History, Vol. 91, No. 4 [March 2005]: 
1233-1263). 
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movement, but the beginning of a new phase of the struggle. Frustrated by the 
slow pace of change, they groped for new strategies and forged new alliances.  
Martin Luther King, Jr., was only the most prominent activist to express 
the need for reformers and radicals to consider new methods of protest and new 
arenas of struggle. In October 1967, after offering testimony to the National 
Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders in Washington, King threatened to 
organize a “camp-in” of poor people in the Capital to provoke a federal response 
to poverty.3 The previous summer’s outbreaks of violence in dozens of cities 
pointed to the need for “a kind of middle road between riots and timid 
supplication of justice,” he explained to reporters, and a disruptive protest of the 
nation’s poor might serve as “a method of dislocating the functioning of a city 
without destroying life and property.” Looking toward another summer of violence 
and finding his leadership of the civil rights movement challenged by militants, 
King scored Lyndon B. Johnson for sacrificing the War on Poverty for an 
expanded war in Vietnam, and he expressed frustration that earlier civil rights 
victories ended legal discrimination, but did not guarantee true equality. He 
spoke more frequently and with greater urgency about the need for African 
Americans to develop their own economic and political resources. The 
organization of the Poor People’s Campaign—an interracial alliance of groups 
working for economic justice—became his primary political focus over the last 
five months of his life.4  
                                                 
3
 Joseph A. Loftus, “Dr. King Suggests ‘Camp-In’ in Cities,” New York Times, 24 October 1967.  
  
4
 On King’s efforts to organize the Poor People’s Campaign, see Michael K. Honey, Going Down 
Jericho Road: the Memphis Strike, Martin Luther King’s Last Campaign (New York: W.W. Norton 
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 By the fall of 1967, many other activists—including veterans of the 
Mississippi Freedom Summer, the Berkeley Free Speech Movement, and 
leaders of the growing antiwar movement, shared King’s belief that the American 
political system was largely impervious to moral suasion and nonviolent protests. 
Two days before King’s appearance before the National Advisory Commission, 
more than 50,000 antiwar protestors gathered for a peace demonstration at the 
Lincoln Memorial after which they marched across the Potomac River to 
“confront the warmakers” on the steps of the Pentagon. Some burned draft cards 
and hurled eggs and bottles at the federal marshals, the military police, and 
members of the 82nd Airborne, who responded by clubbing and arresting 
protestors throughout the night in order to clear the Pentagon parking lots. The 
pacifist antiwar leader David Dellinger told the New York Times that the 
confrontation marked a “new stage in the American peace movement” as the 
“cutting edge becomes active resistance.”5 A similar scene unfolded on the west 
coast the previous day when 10,000 protestors marched on the Oakland Military 
Induction Center to disrupt recruiting. A standoff with police erupted into a six-
hour melee. Frank Bardacke, who was indicted for his role in organizing the 
demonstration, later remarked that he and other antiwar activists had concluded 
that “there was no point any longer to going out for a Sunday afternoon and 
applauding a thousand different speakers saying the same thing.” By goading 
                                                                                                                                                 
& Co. 2007) and Thomas F. Jackson, From Civil Rights to Human Rights: Martin Luther King, Jr. 
and the Struggle for Economic Justice (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press 2007); and 
Gordon K. Mantler’s forthcoming dissertation, Black, Brown and Poor: Understanding Interethnic 
Relations in Post-World War II America, Duke University.  
 
5
 New York Times, 22 October 1967.  
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law enforcement officials and other authorities into violent street clashes “we 
were going to threaten chaos in the country, and by threatening chaos we were 
going to stop the war in Vietnam.”6 Journalist Andrew Kopkind captured the new 
mood when he observed that “to be white and a radical in America . . . is to see 
horror and feel impotence. It is to watch the war grow and know no way to stop it, 
to understand the black rebellion and find no way to join it, to realize that the 
politics of a generation has failed and the institutions of reform are bankrupt, and 
yet to have neither ideology, programs, nor the power to reconstruct them.”7 
 Radical activists experienced frustration, outrage, desperation, and 
despair in the late 1960s, but few were as immobilized as Kopkind’s observations 
might suggest. The antiwar movement’s largest demonstrations lay ahead of it. A 
few provocative and well-publicized protests by young feminists presaged the 
mass movement for women’s liberation, and under the banner of Black Power, 
African Americans undertook countless new initiatives for black political and 
economic empowerment. The turn to the working class was a response to the 
same political realities that gave rise to Black Power, second wave feminism, and 
the final phase of the antiwar movement.  
 The tremendous advances toward gender equality over the past thirty-five 
years have inspired a steady stream of studies that examine the enduring 
significance of the women’s liberation movement, and the ambiguous and 
                                                 
6
 Bardacke, quoted in Ronald Fraser, ed., 1968: A Student Generation in Revolt (New York: 
Pantheon Books 1988) pp. 151-152. The Pentagon protest and the Oakland demonstration were 
the key events of a loosely coordinated “Stop the Draft Week.”  
 
7
 Andrew Kopkind, “They’d Rather be Left,” The New York Review of Books, 28 September 1967. 
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contested legacy of the civil rights movement have led historians to begin taking 
a closer look at the rise of Black Power in the late 1960s and early 1970s.8 The 
labor movement’s steady decline and the presumed rightward political shift of the 
American working class, on the other hand, have contributed to a tendency to 
project these recent developments back onto the 1970s, thus obscuring the turn 
to the working class and its legacies. Two of the most popular images of 
American workers in the 1970s—television’s reactionary longshoreman Archie 
Bunker and the angry building tradesmen who pummeled antiwar demonstrators 
on Wall Street following the Kent State massacre—endure because they serve 
as prototypes for Nixon’s Silent Majority and predecessors to the Reagan 
Democrats, and most recently, George W. Bush’s Red State supporters. To be 
sure, the coupling of economic and social conservatism expressed in Republican 
electoral victories and the demise of the New Deal coalition have been central 
themes in American politics over the past thirty-five years.9 Nevertheless, the 
1970s were not solely an era of working-class reaction. Working-class politics 
                                                 
8
 Principal accounts of the women’s liberation movement include Sara Evans, Personal Politics: 
The Roots of Women’s Liberation in the Civil Rights Movement and the New Left (New York: 
Knopf 1979); Ruth Rosen, The World Split Open: How the Modern Women’s Movement Changed 
America (New York: Viking 2000); and Alice Echols, Daring to be Bad: Radical Feminism in 
America, 1967-1975 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1989). A growing body of 
scholarship on Black Power includes: William L Van Deburg, New Day in Babylon: the Black 
Power Movement and American Culture, 1965-1975 (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press 
1992); Peniel Joseph, Waiting ‘Til the Midnight Hour: A Narrative History of Black Power in 
America (New York: Henry Holt 2006); and Joseph, The Black Power Movement: Rethinking the 
Civil Rights-Black Power Era (New York: Routledge 2006). 
 
9
 On the rightward political shift, see Dan T. Carter, From George Wallace to Newt Gingrich: Race 
in the Conservative Counterrevolution 1963-1994 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press 
1996); Steven Fraser and Gary Gerstle, eds., The Rise and Fall of the New Deal Order, 1930-
1980 (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1989); Peter J. Schulman, The Seventies: The Great 
Shift in American Culture, Society, and Politics (New York: The Free Press 2001); and Lisa 
McGirr, Suburban Warriors: The Origins of the New American Right (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press 2001). 
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were more dynamic and complicated than the images of Bunker and the 
hardhats suggest.10 Triggered by rising unemployment, inflationary fears, and 
stagnating wages coming at the end of a long post-war boom, nearly 2.5 million 
workers went out on strike in 1970, including postal workers, General Motors 
employees, and coal miners. The number of unauthorized wildcat strikes in the 
early 1970s surged to levels unseen since the 1930s, and thousands of other 
workers, including members of the United Mine Workers, the Steelworkers, and 
the Teamsters, battled entrenched and corrupt labor leaders in order to 
democratize their unions.11  
 Moreover, the Archie Bunker narrative works only if we ignore the 
tremendous and growing diversity of the American working class in the 1970s. 
The 1965 Immigration and Nationality act and the vast expansion of the service 
sector brought millions of immigrants, youth, women, and ethnic and racial 
minorities into the workforce. On the job and in the courts, these workers 
challenged discriminatory hiring and promotions practices, while the public 
employee unions took in new members at levels unseen since the days of the 
                                                 
10
 For an incisive look at the complexities of 1970s working-class politics, see Jefferson Cowie, 
“‘Vigorously Left, Right, and Center at the Same Time:’ The Crosscurrents of Working-Class 
America in the 1970s,” America in the Seventies, Beth Bailey and David Farber, eds. (Lawrence: 
University Press of Kansas, 2004) pp. 75-106. 
 
11
 On the rise in labor militancy beginning at the tail end of the 1960s, see Aaron Brenner, “Rank-
and-File Rebellion, 1966-1975” (Ph.D. Dissertation, Columbia University 1996) and the 
forthcoming collection, Robert P. Brenner, Aaron Brenner, and Cal Winslow, eds., Rank and File: 
Labor Militancy and U.S. Politics during the Long 1970s (London: Verso Press). On the 
Teamsters reform movement, see Dan LaBotz, Rank-and-File Rebellion: Teamsters for a 
Democratic Union (New York and London: Verso 1990) and Robert Bruno, Reforming the 
Chicago Teamsters: the Story of Local 705 (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press 2003). On 
similar efforts in the United Mine Workers and the Steelworkers, see Paul F. Clark, The Miner’s 
Fight for Democracy Arnold Miller and the Reform of the United Mine Workers (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press 1981) and a forthcoming study of steel by Ruth Needleman in Brenner, Brenner, 
and Winslow, eds., Rank and File: Labor Militancy and U.S. Politics During the Long 1970s. 
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CIO.12 In short, the young labor radicals who made the turn to the working class 
found fertile ground for organizing, and had reason for optimism at the prospects 
of moving American politics to the left through the rejuvenation of its unions.  
 At the same time that radical labor activists looked hopefully to the future, 
their working-class turn represented the re-discovery of an age-old political 
strategy. Left-wing activists had a long history of implanting themselves among 
the working class and the poor as a strategy for bringing about social change. 
Beginning in the 1870s the Narodniks—young Russian intellectuals seeking the 
Tsar’s overthrow—left the comfort of their professional lives to work among the 
peasants, whom they saw as inherently revolutionary, but in need of leadership 
and guidance.13 Since its founding in 1919, the Communist Party USA, the 
largest American communist party, had sent waves of “colonizers” into industry. 
These factory-based activists, operating with the support of Party lawyers, 
journalists and community organizers, reached their peak of influence within the 
new industrial unions in the 1930s and 1940s. Virtually every socialist grouping in 
the United States had at some point used a similar strategy for building a base in 
the working class.  
                                                 
12
 On the struggle for workplace equality, see Nancy MacLean, Freedom is Not Enough: the 
Opening of the American Workplace (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 2006). 
Regarding the wave of public sector organizing in the 1970s, see Paul Johnston, Success While 
Others Fail: Social Movement Unionism and the Public Workplace (Ithaca and New York: ILR 
Press 1994).  
 
13
 The peasants found the Narodniks to be strange and turned them over to the Tsar’s police. 
Betrayed by the peasants, some of the surviving Narodniks turned to political terrorism. Others 
laid the groundwork for the Russian socialist movements of the twentieth century. Their tactic of 
“going to the people,” however, has been largely dismissed as meddlesome and naïve. For more 
on the efforts of Russian intellectuals to “go to the people,” see Vera Figner, Memoirs of a 
Revolutionist (Dekalb: Northern Illinois University Press 1991); Avrahm Yarmolinsky, Road to 
Revolution: A Century of Russian Radicalism (London: Cassell and Co. 1957); and Vladimir 
Lenin, “The Heritage We Renounce,” Lenin Collected Works, Vol. 2 (Moscow: Progress 
Publishers 1972) pp. 491-534. 
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 Many of the young labor radicals of the 1970s were familiar with parts of 
these traditions, and in many cases they were mentored by older Communists, 
Trotskyists, socialists, and liberals who had engaged in working-class organizing 
before the war. These relationships were complicated. As New Left and black 
movement activists sought to locate their labor activism within the context of an 
American radical tradition, they welcomed comparisons to the struggles of the 
1930s and 1940s. They listened to and learned from Old Left role models. At the 
same time, many younger radicals harbored resentment toward the Old Left—the 
Communist Party especially—for having supposedly succumbed too easily to the 
Red Scare and for failing to break free from Soviet domination.  
 Stronger intergenerational relationships might have prevented young labor 
radicals from repeating the same mistakes as their political forebears.14 For 
example, encouraged by the success of third world anti-colonial struggles, the 
surge of labor protest, and the staggering social and political changes they had 
witnessed within a few short years, labor radicals overestimated the American 
working class’s revolutionary potential. As a result, they sometimes failed to 
recognize their coworkers’ more pragmatic concerns, around which they might 
have built broader-based struggles for concrete reforms. At times, they were 
prone to dogmatism that alienated potential allies or attracted alienated workers 
who brought little to the task of movement building. The young labor radicals 
often operated most effectively when mobilizing workers to respond to immediate 
conflicts with employers, but they were less effective at developing new leaders 
                                                 
14
 On the relationships between the Old and New Lefts, see Maurice Isserman, If I Had a 
Hammer: The Death of the Old Left and the Birth of the New Left (New York: Basic Books, 1987). 
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from among the workers and they established few institutions that would allow 
workers to sustain their efforts over time.  
 Still, to understand the failings of the turn to the working class, we must 
look less to its internal weaknesses than to economic and political developments 
of the mid-1970s—including mass layoffs and plant closings, government and 
employer repression, and a resurgent conservatism in the broader political 
culture.15 Dozens of young radicals lost their jobs as wary supervisors and plant 
security personnel, working in tandem with local and federal law enforcement 
agencies, cracked down on dissent. Coworkers were often reluctant to come to 
their defense for fear of losing their own jobs. Due to their lack of seniority, 
hundreds of other activists were among the first to lose their jobs as the mass 
layoffs hit manufacturing in the mid-1970s. Finally, all manner of organizing 
within the labor movement became more difficult after the recession of 1973-
1974 when workers, squeezed by an increasingly volatile economy proved less 
willing to engage in protest activity than they had been just a few years earlier.  
 Turn to the Working Class, however, is not primarily a narrative of decline 
and defeat. Rather it joins more recent scholarship in seeking to balance an 
assessment of the left’s real weaknesses and losses with its persisting 
democratic legacies.16 As the following chapters reveal, labor feminists, black 
                                                 
15
 On deindustrialization and the economic crises of the 1970s, see Barry Bluestone and Bennett 
Harrison, The Deindustrialization of America (New York: Basic Books 1982) and Jefferson Cowie 
and Joseph Heathcott, eds., Beyond the Ruins: The Meanings of Deindustrialization (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2003). The Fall 2005 issue of Labor is devoted to labor in the 1970s, 
see Labor: Studies in Working-Class History of the Americas, Vol. 2, No 3.  
 
16
 Gosse argues that “the least-told story of U.S. history in the late twentieth century is how the 
social movements of the Sixties institutionalized themselves.” He identifies a “a pattern of 
irreversible democratization of political and personal life over three decades—the ‘new 
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nationalists, Asian radicals, and their white allies picketed, lobbied, and initiated 
lawsuits to win real victories that opened up new job opportunities for women and 
minorities. They led strikes and protests that revitalized moribund local unions 
and they organized and educated coworkers to resurrect traditions of labor 
internationalism that had been mostly dormant since the onset of the Cold War. 
Moreover, many labor activists and intellectuals who managed to survive the 
dislocations of the 1970s have found important niches as elected union leaders 
and staff members. Their presence has been especially notable since the 1995 
election of AFL-CIO president John Sweeney, who drew upon the energy and 
expertise of dozens of 1970s labor radicals to inform and guide his “New Voice” 
reform program.  
 On the evening of Sweeney’s victory, Peter Olney, a longtime labor 
organizer who left Harvard University in 1971 to work in factories, attended a 
celebration that took him back over twenty-five years of his political past. “I 
looked around the room and I swear I saw tons of my ex-comrades, people 
who’d been in other revolutionary organizations,” he recalled. “That was the vibe 
of the folks who drove” the Sweeney victory and resulting changes within the 
AFL-CIO. “They weren’t necessarily the top leaders, but they were . . . research 
directors, organizing directors. I mean the hands-on stuff that was making 
change in labor, a lot of those folks came out of the that New Left going to the 
                                                                                                                                                 
democratic order’” (see Gosse, “Postmodern America: A New Democratic Order in the Second 
Gilded Age,” in Van Gosse and Richard Moser, eds., The World the Sixties Made: Politics and 
Culture in Recent America, [Philadelphia: Temple University Press 2003] p. 25). 
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working class experience.”17 Those activists brought ideas, values, and 
strategies to the contemporary labor movement that had originated in 
discussions and activities at labor’s radical fringe in the 1970s.18  
 
 Chapter 1, “American Petrograd”, underscores the growing frustration of 
African Americans regarding the failed promise of the civil rights movement—
frustration that that in the late 1960s pushed young radicals and reformers to see 
organizing the working class as key to effecting social change. The narrative 
centers on Detroit, where a group of young black radicals labored for nearly ten 
years to build a movement to challenge racism and exploitation in the automobile 
plants, the UAW, and the city’s neighborhoods. Shortly after the Detroit Rebellion 
of 1967, these young men and women established Revolutionary Union 
Movements in several plants, as well as an umbrella group—the League of 
Revolutionary Black Workers—to coordinate their activities. A series of disruptive 
wildcat strikes and demonstrations led to reforms within the industry, and the 
League’s apparent success signaled the potential for an alliance of radical 
intellectuals and workers. Hundreds of black and white radicals from across the 
country moved to Detroit, believing that it would become the “American 
Petrograd”—the cradle of a working-class revolution. For the most part, they 
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were too late. The automakers and the union had accommodated some of the 
workers’ demands regarding employment discrimination, and the League had 
disintegrated under the weight of repression and its own internal weaknesses. 
The League experience, nevertheless, continued to inspire young radicals to 
organize among the working class for several years.  
 Chapter 2, “The New Left’s Southern Strategy,” traces the New Left 
origins of the turn to the working class through the history of the October 
League—a Marxist-Leninist group with roots in the Students for a Democratic 
Society and the Southern Student Organizing Committee. After sending 
members into factories to build a working-class revolutionary party in 1972, the 
October League led a seven-week strike of workers at the Mead Packaging 
Corporation in Atlanta. The October League activists successfully channeled a 
generalized spirit of dissent among the predominantly African American 
workforce, whose working conditions had been little changed by the civil rights 
victories of the previous decade. While the strike forced Mead to make changes 
in the plant, the workers, ultimately, had little use for the October League’s brand 
of communism and were motivated more by pragmatic concerns. The October 
League, too, eventually succumbed to the economic downturn that quelled 
broader worker militancy in the 1970s.  
Chapter 3, “A Working-Class Hero is Something to be,” traces the 
strategic adjustments labor radicals were forced to make in response to the 
changing political and economic realities of the late 1970s. The chapter also 
offers a close look at the day-to-day experiences of individual leftist activists and 
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intellectuals as they attempted to organize workers in a variety of settings, 
including a Buffalo auto glass plant, a Durham tobacco factory, and California 
vegetable field. How did they obtain factory work? How did they establish 
credibility among coworkers? To what degree did their radical politics coincide or 
clash with the workers’ more pragmatic concerns? How did they relate to union 
leaders? What sorts of personal changes did they experience moving to labor-
based organizing?  
Chapter four, “The New Left’s Labor Feminism,” highlights the work of the 
Women’s Alliance to Gain Equality (WAGE), a white feminist organization that 
fused labor politics with the women’s liberation movement in the San Francisco 
Bay area. WAGE emerged in the early 1970s because existing unions had 
ignored the needs of the growing number of women in the Bay Area’s rapidly 
expanding workforce. WAGE activists organized women workers into new 
unions, agitated for minimum wage increases, and fought to extend special labor 
laws protecting women and children to men. Several of the Bay Area’s largest 
and most powerful hospital, government employee, and clerical worker unions 
have been deeply shaped by the leadership of women from Union WAGE, who 
represented an alliance of labor feminists with connections to Old Left political 
parties and younger second wave feminists who had been politicized by the 
1960s social movements.  
 Chapter five, “Laborers in a Smaller Vineyard,” recounts the story of a 
group of Seattle-based Filipino activists who broke the grip of the gangsters 
controlling their union and built a base of opposition to the Ferdinand Marcos 
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dictatorship in the Philippines. These efforts were led by Silme Domingo and 
Gene Viernes, two cannery workers who had been politicized by the antiwar 
movement, Asian identity politics, and civil rights struggles over housing, jobs, 
and urban renewal in Seattle. Domingo and Viernes had family ties to the 
Alaskan canneries, and as young adults they chose to make the canneries and 
their union, Local 37 of the International Longshoremen’s and Warehousemen’s 
Union, the base for their political work. Though their victories came at a high 
price, the young reformers in Local 37 rediscovered and revived labor movement 
traditions of democracy, grassroots organizing, labor feminism, and international 
solidarity that many observers assumed had been destroyed by the Cold War.  
 The conclusion tracks recent developments in U.S. labor history and 
suggests that while the number of trade union members continues to decline, the 
labor movement is better positioned to take advantage of new organizing 
opportunities and more capable of addressing the challenges of the twenty-first 
century. These challenges include the increasing mobility of capital, mass 
migration and the growing diversity of the labor force, aggressive union busting, 
privatization, and the growth of contingent labor. That the labor movement is able 
to be more creative in facing these challenges is due in no small part to the labor 
radicals of the 1970s. The conclusion also includes some retrospective 
comments from several of those who dedicated themselves to working-class 
organizing in the late 1960s and 1970s. While each of them remains committed 
to working for economic and social justice, they find themselves organizing on 
very different terrain today.   
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At the outset of this project I feared that the archival records of the labor 
struggles of the 1970s had not yet found their way to the repositories. I also 
surmised that some of that material might never make it to the archives given the 
obscurity of the turn to the working class and the difficulties of categorization. An 
archivist can easily identify valuable civil rights papers, 1960s protest movement 
collections, and the records of individual trade unions. But 1970s labor 
radicalism? Where does it fit? I was nevertheless fortunate to find relevant 
records in nearly a dozen archives across the country. At the Reuther Labor 
Library at Wayne State, for instance, I found valuable material in the recently 
deposited personal collections of several Detroit movement activists. At the Rand 
Library of the International Longshore and Warehouse Union in San Francisco 
and at the University of Washington in Seattle, I found ample documentation for 
the events of the final chapter in the union’s official papers. At the Labor Archives 
and Research Center at San Francisco State University, I read through and 
photocopied numerous documents from the organizational papers of Union 
WAGE—the subject of the fourth chapter. Along the way, I also met several 
movement veterans who have held on to valuable personal papers related to 
labor radicalism and the 1970s. I suspect that much of that material will find its 
way to libraries as archivists begin to collect more regularly in the 1970s and as 
activists moving into retirement begin to assess their life’s work.  
I also relied on oral history interviews to fill in gaps in the documentary 
records. I took two approaches to identifying interviewees. I first contacted a 
number of people whom I knew to have been active in labor in the 1970s. These 
  
18 
were often personal friends, or friends of friends who were easily accessible and 
amenable to talking. My second strategy consisted of seeking out those activists 
who played key roles in each of the four focus studies. I found most movement 
veterans eager to talk about their activism in the 1970s. Many were also candid 
about the strategic mistakes they felt they had made and expressed an 
eagerness to share their experiences with young people and students who in 
recent years have shown an increased interest in the newly reenergized labor 
movement. Their hope, like mine, is that the stories of an earlier generation of 
labor radicals will instruct and inspire a newer group of young people confronting 
corporate globalization and its human costs to working people. 
Chapter 1: American Petrograd  
   
 One year after the Detroit Rebellion and four weeks after Martin Luther 
King Jr.’s assassination, a series of wildcat strikes rocked the Chrysler 
Corporation’s Dodge Main plant, leading to the formation of the Dodge 
Revolutionary Union Movement (DRUM)—a militant black worker organization. 
To jittery city leaders, plant managers, and union officials, the workplace protests 
and the emergence of DRUM appeared as a spontaneous outburst of rage, but 
they were the result of years of careful planning by a group of young African 
American intellectuals who believed that black workers—by virtue of their 
concentration at the heart of industrial production—held the key to ending racism 
and U.S. imperialism, and moving the country’s politics to the left.  
 This group of black radicals built their organization upon deep feelings of 
anger and desperation among African American workers in the Motor City. 
Beginning in the mid-1960s, the automakers responded to rising demand and 
foreign competition by maximizing productivity through assembly line speed ups 
that caused enormous strain on the workforce, particularly the young black 
workers who were relegated to the hardest, dirtiest, and most dangerous jobs. 
The United Auto Workers (UAW), while supportive of the mainstream civil rights 
movement, did little to challenge the industry’s racist employment practices, 
which kept most black workers out of managerial positions and the skilled trades. 
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The union’s staff and the leadership of many UAW locals also remained 
overwhelmingly white even though African Americans made up a fourth of the 
workforce and a majority in many of the plants located in the city. The unrest in 
the factories was mirrored by discontent in black neighborhoods where housing 
choices for African Americans were tightly constrained by discriminatory realty, 
banking, and insurance practices. For decades, white neighborhood associations 
also re-enforced rigid patterns of housing segregation through grassroots political 
organizing and acts of intimidation and terror. Moreover, in the minds of many 
young African Americans, the Detroit Police Department was “an army of 
occupation.”19 
 Within a few months, Revolutionary Union Movements sprung up at 
dozens of other plants and industries across the city. By 1969 these groups had 
formed an umbrella group—the League of Revolutionary Black Workers, which at 
its height gave voice to the demands of young African American workers for an 
end to job discrimination and unsafe working conditions, while it organized 
around issues well beyond the workplace. Propelled by a boundless sense of 
possibility, League members battled police brutality, advocated local control of 
schools, and provided legal counsel to defendants in several high-profile political 
trials. They also launched a publishing house and film production company to 
encourage the formation of Revolutionary Union Movements outside of Detroit, 
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and they attracted attention from some of the country’s most prominent radical 
activists. James Forman who was the executive secretary of the Student 
Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) during its heyday and had served 
briefly as the minister of foreign affairs for the Black Panther Party, was so 
impressed by what he had seen of the League of Revolutionary Black Workers 
that he moved to Detroit. In the work of the League, Forman saw an opportunity 
to develop a black revolutionary movement that would join black workers from 
the urban north with African Americans in the South. In a letter he wrote to 
colleagues in Atlanta, Forman argued that black radicals in the 1970s needed to 
concentrate their efforts on “those cities where black workers are strategically 
situated near the centers of mass production of the essentials of any 
industrialized society, steel, coal, automobiles and oil.” The civil rights movement, 
he asserted, had “concentrated too much on the middle class” and that “most of 
the gains except the long range political consciousness have resulted in the 
middle class of the black community entrenching itself further.”20  
 In his enthusiasm for the League, Forman was typical of many black and 
white radicals who had endured the demise of the Students for a Democratic 
Society (SDS) and SNCC and the fragmentation of the antiwar, civil rights, and 
student movements into an endless array of political tendencies, factions, and 
collectives who carried out an equally broad range of activities, including 
electoral campaigns, international solidarity work, and community organizing. 
The Detroit factory protests and the League’s legal defense campaigns captured 
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the American left’s political imagination as few other locally-based protest 
movements had done since the height of the southern black freedom struggle. 
Moreover, a renewed sense of militancy among American workers, who set 
records for numbers of strikes in 1969 and again in 1970, seemed to signal the 
potential for creating two, three, many Detroits. Though the League ultimately 
failed to transform itself into an ongoing labor-based organization, its brief 
existence represented the high point of a more than ten-year drive to fuse the 
energy of Detroit’s student and civil rights movements with the growing 
discontent of black workers. These efforts preceded the League’s formation by 
several years, continued well into the 1970s, and inspired hundreds of similar 
alliances of radical activists and workers.21  
 Young working-class African Americans with links to the full spectrum of 
the city’s vibrant left, stood at the center of the Detroit black workers’ movement. 
General Baker Jr. had deep ties to the black nationalist community and was a 
member of both the Garveyist African Nationalist Pioneer Movement and a rifle 
club inspired by the self-defense gun clubs of the fugitive black activist Robert F. 
Williams.22 Though Baker’s nationalist mentors fed his growing intellectual 
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curiosity with black history books and pamphlets, he came to regard them as 
“weekend militants who wanted to sit up and talk black shit on Saturday and 
Sunday and go kiss ass all week.”23 As a student at Highland Park Community 
College and Wayne State University—an urban campus with a strong tradition of 
radical activism—Baker joined protests against police brutality and the war. He 
also traveled to Cuba in 1964 with a delegation of radical youth. There, he played 
baseball with the heroes of the revolution—Fidel and Raul Castro and Juan 
Almeida Bosque—and he met with Che Guevara and dozens of other 
revolutionaries from around the world. Baker’s discussions with these radicals 
challenged the narrowness of his black nationalism and pushed him in the 
direction of multinational Marxism-Leninism. “I just had to go stay in a hotel a 
couple of days just trying to regroup,” he recalled. “Everything you thought you 
used to know was gone out the window.”24 Upon returning to Detroit in the fall, 
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Baker drifted away from the black nationalists, but continued to study and 
organize, while working a new job on the line at Dodge Main.25   
 Mississippi native and former U.S. Army sergeant Mike Hamlin brought to 
the movement a strong commitment to conflict mediation, organization building, 
and the development of outside allies. After attending high school in Ecorse just 
outside of Detroit and a stint in the army, Hamlin returned to the city in 1960 
“greatly frustrated, alienated, and disaffected by the conditions” facing African 
Americans.26 Were it not for his friendship with a precocious and eccentric black 
radical John Watson, Hamlin suspects he might have become a “suicidal 
revolutionary,” perpetrating acts of violence against white people or self-
destructing.27 Watson was eight years younger than Hamlin, but had attended 
Detroit’s preeminent public high school—Cass Technical High School—and 
developed contacts with intellectuals and left-wing activists as a teenager in the 
late 1950s. As they worked together in the distribution department at the Detroit 
News, Watson encouraged Hamlin to study Marxism and convinced him that 
through organizing the working class he could help make positive change. Both 
men were active with the mainline civil rights groups, including the NAACP and 
the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), and they were impressed by the 
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Socialist Workers Party’s and the Communist Party’s rhetorical commitment to 
class struggle. But ultimately they felt that neither the civil rights organizations 
nor the Old Left communist parties had developed a program to match the rising 
militancy of Detroit’s black workers.  
 Hamlin and Watson were joined at the Detroit News by Ken Cockrel, a 
charismatic law student who became the League’s best-known figure. Cockrel 
was born just outside of Detroit in 1938 and raised in the city by his aunt and 
uncle after his parents died when he was twelve. He dropped out of high school 
and joined the Air Force in 1955, but earned undergraduate and law degrees 
from Wayne State after his discharge. At campus rallies, Cockrel delivered fiery 
speeches against racism and the war in the early days of the antiwar movement. 
A smooth talker by all accounts, Cockrel quickly made a name for himself as an 
impressive orator and a combative debater.  
 Marian Kramer, who was one of just a handful of women among the 
leaders of the Detroit black workers’ movement, had a more traditional civil rights 
pedigree than her male counterparts. Born in Port Allen, on the outskirts of Baton 
Rouge and raised in Dallas, Kramer returned to Louisiana in 1962 to begin her 
college studies at Southern University. Her mother was active in efforts to 
desegregate white neighborhoods in Dallas and had encouraged her daughter to 
join the NAACP youth branch, but she warned her against becoming politically 
active in Louisiana. Other family members had suffered reprisals for their 
activism and she worried that Marian’s protest activities would interfere with her 
schooling. Her fears were well founded as Kramer was quickly swept up in the 
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momentum of the movement. By her second year in Louisiana, she was working 
full time as a CORE field worker, registering voters, teaching in freedom schools, 
and organizing demonstrations targeting segregated restaurants. Though 
committed to nonviolence, she was impressed by the work of the Deacons for 
Defense and Justice, an organization of armed black men who organized in 
Jonesboro to guard civil rights workers and protect the black community from Ku 
Klux Klan and other vigilante violence. The Deacons and a handful of black 
military veterans stood watch over the CORE Freedom House where Kramer and 
other civil rights workers slept and based their operations.28 Kramer’s work in the 
South came to an end in 1964 when she married a white CORE organizer. 
Believing it was too risky to live and work together in Louisiana, they moved to 
Detroit, where she found work as a secretary for the Hotel and Restaurant 
Employees Union (HERE). She also became deeply involved in the growing 
welfare reform movement and the West Central Organization (WCO), a 
community group that represented the interests of the poor and working-class 
residents of neighborhoods bordering the ever-expanding Wayne State. The 
organization was a locus for various groups of Detroit activists, including white 
organizers, black nationalists, neighborhood leaders, liberal clergy, and radical 
students and professors.29 
By the mid-60s this group of black radicals had attended college classes, 
campaigned to end the war, participated in Marxist study groups, and worked in 
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factories together. They had shared apartments and an occasional jail cell. 
Several of them had also attracted the interest of the FBI and the Detroit Police 
Department’s Red Squad—a special unit that had monitored the activities of 
“subversive” organizations and individuals since the 1930s. Baker’s and 
Cockrel’s Red Squad files, released as the result of a lawsuit, include detailed 
accounts of meetings and demonstrations they attended, information gathered 
from informants and spies, and their employment records. Though sometimes 
heavily redacted, the files indicate that the police had tracked Cockrel, Baker, 
and many of their comrades for several years, and that informants had 
penetrated even the most secretive radical groups to which they belonged. In 
some instances, law enforcement officials harassed protest leaders by 
intimidating their family members. FBI investigators questioned General Baker’s 
mother on several occasions in 1965, and after pressuring John Watson’s mother 
to reveal her son’s whereabouts in March of 1966, they went to the address she 
had given them and arrested him because of unpaid parking fines. The arresting 
officer reported that Watson allowed him to enter the apartment, but insisted that 
he was General Baker and even presented Baker’s draft and voter registration 
cards as proof. Only after the officer threatened to take him to the station did 
Watson acknowledge his true identity. Upon further inspection of the apartment, 
he found Baker “lying on a mattress in a bedroom.” The officer also observed that 
“the living room was papered from floor to ceiling with ‘hate’ posters, with pictures 
of Stalin, Lenin, Catsro, and several black Muslims,” and that there were “many 
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pictures of President Johnson with words of ‘Hitler’, ‘Negro Hater’ and ‘Murder’ . . 
. . All 4 walls were covered with this ‘hate’ material.”30 
While the young radicals were committed to the black freedom struggle, 
they were critical of the existing protest organizations and the unions, none of 
which seemed able to connect to black workers and youth. The Old Left political 
parties offered theoretical rigor, but had few activities beyond educational 
programs and had only casual ties to black workers in the late 1960s. The city’s 
white youth and student-based radical groups distrusted and at times disdained 
the working class and geared their efforts toward the swelling movement on 
college campuses. The black radicals dismissed the UAW as hopelessly racist 
and found president Walter Reuther’s reputation as a civil rights leader 
hypocritical given his unwillingness to confront racism within his union’s ranks.31 
Hamlin, Baker, and their associates agreed that they would have to “create the 
kind of thing we needed, a new avenue of struggle, a new method of dealing with 
oppression and exploitation.”32  
 Their formation of a black student group—UHURU (the Swahili word for 
freedom)—at Wayne State in 1963 marked one of their earliest efforts to create 
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such an organization. UHURU members published and distributed Razor for 
students and the worker-oriented Black Vanguard, which included essays urging 
readers to form a “League of Black Workers,” and featured excerpts from Robert 
Williams’s account of his flight from North Carolina and contributions from 
autoworkers describing their shop floor experiences with racism.33 Longer 
theoretical articles argued that because black workers were clustered at the 
center of basic industry, they would play a strategic role in a larger revolutionary 
struggle by disrupting capitalist production. This was a theme to which they 
would continually return over the next several years. The tone of the publications 
was deliberately provocative, frequently denouncing the “white crackers,” the 
“brutes in blue,” and Uncle Toms, who posed “the greatest menace to the black 
freedom struggle.” The editors believed the incendiary tone accurately reflected 
the anger and despair of young African Americans in Detroit.34   
 In addition to producing the publications, UHURU members protested 
Detroit’s failure to pass an open housing ordinance by disrupting a 1963 torch-
passing ceremony promoting the city’s bid to host the 1968 Olympic Games. 
Baker, Watson, and four others were arrested for booing during the national 
anthem and taunting the torch bearer—an African American medal winner.35 Two 
years later, Baker and his associates posted dozens of signs around Detroit 
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promising a major “smash the draft” protest at his upcoming draft hearing. The 
police kept close tabs on Baker in the weeks before the promised protest, and 
they were relieved when fewer than a dozen supporters showed up at the Fort 
Wayne Induction Center on the city’s southwest side. Baker attended his hearing, 
and was rejected by the draft board to whom he had issued a statement accusing 
the U.S. military of having on its hands the blood of Angolan and South African 
freedom fighters, Patrice Lumumba, Medgar Evers and the “defenseless women 
and children burned in villages from Napalm jelly bombs.”36 
 UHURU attracted relatively little attention beyond that of the Detroit Police 
Department, but the Detroit Rebellion opened up new possibilities for the kind of 
mass movement that the black radicals had envisioned. On July 23, 1967 vice 
officers raided an after hours party at Twelfth Street and Clairmount Avenue on 
the near west side. A crowd soon gathered and began hurling rocks and 
smashing windows. The incident spread quickly to the east side and erupted into 
a citywide rebellion, during which thousands of African Americans took to the 
streets, attacking the police and looting stores. The National Guard and the US 
Army 82nd Airborne Division quelled the violence, but after five days of fighting 
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more than forty people had been killed and more than one thousand were 
injured. According to many accounts, it was the most destructive urban upheaval 
of the 1960s.37  
 General Baker was among the seven thousand people, mostly young and 
black, who were rounded up and jailed in the midst of the turmoil. For two weeks 
he was held at Ionia State Penitentiary, where he witnessed generalized feelings 
of despair and anger transformed into political consciousness among the other 
prisoners.38 “People had seen the naked role of the state, and they hated these 
goddamned police,” he later remarked. “My cellblock looked like the damned 
assembly line. It had so many people I worked with that were arrested too.” As 
black workers returned to the plants after the Rebellion, the anger and militancy 
carried over into the factories. Workers fashioned the bullet casings that littered 
the city streets into necklaces and wore them as a symbol of resistance. Back at 
his job at Dodge Main, Baker recalled that “people came back in that plant with 
their hair grown out [in afros], and fifty caliber bullets around their neck and it was 
a sight to see. They weren’t taking any more shit.”39  
 By the time of the Rebellion, Razor and Black Vanguard had dissolved. 
Watson, Hamlin, Baker, and the other black activists who had been frequenting 
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the West Central Organization office, responded to the rising mood of militancy 
with a new newspaper—the Inner City Voice. They hoped the Voice, like the 
earlier publications, could serve as the tool around which they might “build an 
organization of black workers, black students both in high schools and colleges, 
and ultimately to create a black Marxist-Leninist Party.”40 Beginning with its 
inaugural issue in September 1967, Voice editors made it more accessible than 
its predecessors and it quickly found a wider audience. Like Razor and Black 
Vanguard, it included coverage of incidents of police brutality and discrimination 
in the plants, but the longer theoretical pieces gave way to articles on the 
national antiwar movement and local news of interest to African Americans.  
 Those involved with the new newspaper had held industrial jobs 
intermittently and had long discussed the need for organizing workers at the point 
of production, but, as Hamlin admitted, they “had never had a successful entrée 
into the plants with the workers” and “really didn’t understand how to go about 
it.”41 Nevertheless, by early 1968, General Baker had begun to attract a small 
following of black workers at Dodge Main, which employed about 9,000 mostly 
African American workers. For several weeks, Baker met with a small group of 
his co-workers to discuss Voice articles, racial discrimination, and conditions on 
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the shop floor. To prevent any participant from being fingered as a ringleader by 
company spies, Mike Hamlin, who was not a Dodge employee, chaired the 
meetings.  
 Their opportunity to move from discussion to action came unexpectedly a 
month after Martin Luther King, Jr.’s assassination. In May 1968 workers at 
Dodge Main carried out several spontaneous wildcat strikes over production line 
speedups. Though the strikes had been instigated by both white and black 
workers, the focus of the struggle shifted quickly when Dodge laid most of the 
blame for the strikes on the black workers. Baker and another worker were fired 
and dozens more black workers were suspended. The UAW declined to defend 
the fired workers.42  
 It was at this point that Baker and a group of about ten black workers 
vowed to fight the dismissals and suspensions. They adopted the name Dodge 
Revolutionary Union Movement to make it clear that theirs was not a reformist 
approach to change. As Hamlin put it, “we had certain radical ideas and a certain 
revolutionary line: that black workers would be the vanguard to the liberation 
struggle in this country.”43 Right away, DRUM leaders made two critical 
decisions. Because their point of unity was the company’s racist application of 
discipline and the union’s unwillingness to defend black workers, they decided to 
remain exclusively black. DRUM hoped “to prove to black workers that they alone 
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had enough strength to control the productive capacity inside the shop.” DRUM 
also committed to closing “the communications gap,” which had been an 
important barrier to organizing in the enormous ten-story facility. Workers seldom 
had access to reliable information regarding incidents and conditions outside of 
their own departments. By distributing leaflets at both ends of the plant, DRUM 
aimed to “consolidate the people around the same issues.”44   
  Over the next several weeks, DRUM issued a series of provocative 
newsletters and leaflets blasting Chrysler and UAW racism. These charges 
resonated with young black workers, who began looking to DRUM for leadership. 
“You can only agitate for so long that people start demanding that you do 
something because I guess you’ve done perked their consciousness enough so 
that they’ve moved further from where they used to be and now they want 
action,” Baker remembered. “By the time you put out leaflets about eight or nine 
weeks people started saying ‘you’re talking shit. Now what you going to do?’” As 
a test of strength, DRUM issued a flier urging a boycott of the convenience stores 
and restaurants across from the plant that had refused to hire African Americans. 
The surprising success of the boycott indicated to Baker that “these people are 
ready.”45  
 Those early efforts led to larger rallies and demonstrations and culminated 
in DRUM’s first strike. On July 8, DRUM called for a walkout of black workers at 
the plant. In order to avoid further retaliation against its leaders, DRUM arranged 
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for student and community supporters to distribute fliers at the plant gates.46 
DRUM later boasted that seventy percent of the black workforce stayed out of 
the plant, crippling Chrysler’s production for the better part of three days. Fearing 
additional wildcat strikes, Chrysler obtained an injunction against DRUM that 
prevented Baker and other leaders from further picketing. This proved to be a 
critical blow to the movement and its impact continued to be felt for months, as 
Baker was the DRUM leader with the most organizing experience and the 
strongest relationships to the workers.  
  With Baker no longer working at Dodge Main and DRUM leaders 
prohibited from picketing, some DRUM members began arguing that they should 
capitalize on the momentum of the strikes and shift focus to vying for power 
within Local 3. DRUM had initially viewed the union, UAW Local 3, as hopelessly 
compromised by its racism and complacency. Ron March was a DRUM activist 
who had supported an earlier multiracial reform caucus within Local 3, but he and 
other black radicals believed that the UAW had used their group to “unify black 
workers behind sell out candidates” for office who failed to confront Chrysler’s 
racist practices and the union’s racist culture.47 After considerable deliberation, 
DRUM launched a campaign to elect March union trustee in September 1968. 
His success in a preliminary election stunned UAW leaders, who responded 
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quickly to prevent his advance to the run-off. Local 3 members ripped DRUM 
literature from walls and solicited the help of the police, who spied on black 
workers and disrupted their political and social gatherings. On election day, black 
workers reported that they had been prevented from voting after being detained 
by the police for routine traffic violations.48 March lost in the run-off after Local 3 
mobilized a large numbers of white working members as well as retirees, many 
of whom did not normally vote in union elections. Local 3, often with UAW 
international support, used similar tactics to defeat DRUM candidates again in 
1969 and 1970.49   
 As news of DRUM spread, black workers formed Revolutionary Union 
Movements at other Detroit-area auto plants, as well as at Blue Cross and Blue 
Shield, United Parcel Service, Henry Ford Hospital, and the Detroit News. These 
efforts quickly outstripped DRUM’s organizational capacity, so Hamlin, Baker, 
Cockrel, and their comrades formed the League of Revolutionary Black Workers 
in early 1969 to coordinate the various workplace-based activities. Marian 
Kramer and other women were also instrumental in the formation of the 
League—a reflection of their growing importance within the movement. Women 
had performed many of the behind-the-scenes duties, including clerical work, 
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leaflet editing, and literature distribution, but they had also assumed leadership 
roles on picket lines and at demonstrations in order to shield male workers from 
plant discipline.50 Those responsibilities provided women a platform from which 
they pushed the League to include within its umbrella the grassroots community 
organizing many of them had been doing since before DRUM’s formation. The 
League’s culture, nevertheless, remained strongly masculine to the end. Kramer 
recalled that “male supremacy was rampant and we never got proper credit,” for 
fighting urban renewal and police brutality, and defending the rights of tenants 
and welfare recipients.51  
 Over the next year, the League and its various affiliates pulled off a string 
of audacious protest activities, including additional wildcat strikes, a year-long 
take over of the student newspaper at Wayne State University, electoral 
campaigns on behalf of black militants seeking union office, demonstrations at 
UAW headquarters, and high profile legal defense activities on behalf of black 
workers and other fellow radicals. Other activities included the operation of a 
book discussion club, an education reform coalition, a Black Student United Front 
for high school students, and a national outreach effort to establish Revolutionary 
Union Movements in other cities. 
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 The League’s efforts at Chrysler’s Eldon Avenue Gear and Axle—
representing its most sustained organizing at one worksite—illustrates some of 
the strengths and limitations of the organization’s factory-based work. In 
November of 1968, just four months after the formation of DRUM, black workers 
at Eldon Avenue—who made up about 60 percent of the plant’s 4,000 workers—
formed ELRUM and began distributing flyers and a newsletter. Within two 
months, ELRUM had built up enough support among black workers to launch its 
first action—a meeting at the union hall, where they confronted their union 
president and presented him with a list of grievances. The following day, dozens 
of these workers who had taken part in the meeting received written reprimands 
and suspensions of up to one month for being away from work without 
authorization.52  
 Shortly after 5am on January 27, ELRUM supporters—including students 
and other community allies to protect workers from further reprisals—formed 
pickets of between ten to thirty protestors at each of three plant entrances and 
asked black workers to stay home for one day to protest the suspensions. 
Hundreds of black workers honored the picket lines and the strike crippled 
production at the plant. As Eldon was Chrysler’s sole supplier of axles, the 
disruption had a ripple effect throughout Chrysler’s Detroit area plants. The 
company’s response was swift and severe. Twenty-six workers were discharged 
for their participation in the work stoppage, including an ELRUM cofounder and 
other key members. Nearly one hundred other black workers were suspended. 
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As at Dodge Main, the dismissals undermined the Revolutionary Union 
Movement’s ability to sustain momentum by separating the leaders from their 
base. Working ELRUM members, now reduced to a handful, kept a low profile for 
much of the rest of the year until a new round of shop floor conflicts erupted.53   
 In April 1970, a confrontation between a black worker and his white 
supervisor triggered another series of unauthorized strikes; ELRUM members 
again took a leading role in these wildcats, but this time they were joined in an 
uneasy alliance by other radical groups who had also been organizing within the 
plant. When Chrysler retaliated by suspending many of the union stewards who 
had called their workers out, ELRUM members formed the Eldon Workers Safety 
Committee along with white radicals and some of the stewards. After being 
instructed by their lawyers that workers were not obligated to work under 
abnormally dangerous conditions, Safety Committee members believed they had 
found a strategy for carrying out legal work stoppages without fear of violating the 
law or risking company injunctions. They initiated an extensive research program 
to document plant conditions and to force the company to make improvements 
by threatening safety strikes.54  
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 But events in the plant soon provided evidence of the poor safety 
conditions that was far more compelling than any list of unsafe practices and 
faulty machinery. On May 26, Gary Thompson died when his faulty jitney 
malfunctioned and he was buried under three thousand pounds of scrap metal. 
The twenty-two year old black veteran Thompson had survived Vietnam “only to 
be crushed” under a pile of steel at Eldon.55 Thompson was preceded in death by 
two black women on the line. Two weeks before Thompson’s death, Mamie 
Williams had been ordered to work despite her physician’s recommendation that 
she stay home and was rushed from the plant in an ambulance before dying that 
evening. A few months earlier, Rose Logan, a janitor, was struck in the leg by an 
overloaded jitney and developed a fatal blood clot.56 
 The day after Thompson’s death, the Safety Committee and ELRUM 
organized picket lines around the plant urging workers to stay out. This strike, 
while not as successful as the earlier wildcats, nevertheless crippled Chrysler’s 
axle production for a day. Once again in retaliation, Chrysler fired three key 
ELRUM leaders, as well as John Taylor, a white Appalachian worker on the 
Safety Committee who had worked closely with ELRUM members.  
 ELRUM never regained a solid presence within the Eldon plant due to the 
dismissals of key members, its inability to protect its leaders from company 
discipline, and its failure to develop a structure to support workers’ struggles over 
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the long haul. Eldon workers continued to battle for better union representation 
and safe working conditions but, for the most part, ELRUM remained on the 
sidelines, according to Taylor, who grew critical of ELRUM during this period for 
disregarding workers who could have been potential allies. Those ELRUM 
members still in the plant occasionally attended union meetings, but they were 
“into a program of disruption” that “was insulting to those workers who had come 
to the hall in good faith to take care of whatever business they thought 
important.”57 Older black workers, as well as white members who may have 
agreed with ELRUM’s criticisms, found their style and rhetoric alienating. The 
second issue of the ELRUM newsletter, for instance, explained that the exclusion 
of “stupid ass Honkies” was necessary due to “past traitorist acts and because of 
their present mental condition.”58 While that rhetoric may have attracted angry 
young African American workers and given ELRUM some early momentum, it 
arrested the organization’s growth when it needed to articulate a long-range 
strategy for change.   
 Those weaknesses became especially apparent as ELRUM ventured into 
union politics. In the spring of 1969 Jordan Sims, a black militant who had 
worked at Eldon since 1948, ran for the presidency of UAW Local 961. Over the 
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years, Sims had participated in various reform efforts within the Local and had 
built up a strong base of support among black and white workers. During the 
wildcat strikes of 1970, he was among the principals in the Eldon Workers Safety 
Committee and was among those fired for their leadership of the protests. Sims 
shared ELRUM’s critique of Chrysler and the UAW and he provided the 
organization with material for its newsletter. Though he was assumed to be an 
ELRUM member by management and many white workers, Sims never officially 
joined, believing that some of the group’s rhetoric and practices were 
counterproductive.59 Moreover, he disagreed with ELRUM’s blanket dismissal of 
the UAW and its disinterest in sustaining a radical caucus within the union. “I 
would tell them I got this union thing,” he recalled. “They would say, man, ‘hell 
with the union.’ I would say well give me something better.”60  
 By 1971 ELRUM’s power at Eldon had been reduced to such an extent 
that Sims considered their support more of a liability than an asset. In May of that 
year, Sims ran for union president and succeeded in advancing to the run-off 
before losing by 36 votes. Shortly before the election, he asked ELRUM 
members to refrain from publicly endorsing his candidacy, fearing their support 
would alienate him from whites and older black workers. “They promised me they 
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would,” Sims recalled to an interviewer the following year, “they didn’t, so I lost.”61 
Sims nevertheless challenged the election, contending that UAW armed guards 
had intimidated voters and that dozens of ballots had been improperly 
invalidated. The UAW belatedly agreed with some of Sims’s charges and ordered 
a new election, which Sims lost again before at last winning the union presidency 
in May of 1973.62  
 Just as their presence in the plants declined, however, League affiliated 
attorneys pulled off the organization’s most high profile victory—the successful 
legal defense of thirty-five-year-old James Johnson, an Eldon line worker who 
had murdered two foremen and a coworker shortly after being suspended in July 
of 1970. Just hours after his suspension over an allegation of insubordination, 
Johnson returned to the plant and shot and killed two foremen and a coworker. 
Leading Johnson’s defense, League attorney Ken Cockrel announced that he 
would “put Chrysler on trial for damages to this man caused by his working 
conditions.”63 Framing the murder in the context of a violent workplace culture 
created by Chrysler’s racism and callous drive for profits, Cockrel explained to 
the jury that Chrysler had failed to invest in updating the plant and equipment at 
Eldon, so that by the mid-1960s working conditions had deteriorated significantly, 
causing frequent injuries, and even deaths. Cockrel argued that as Chrysler’s 
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sole supplier of gears and axles, management had pushed Eldon workers, 
including James Johnson, to the breaking point.  
 Cockrel took the jury, which included several autoworkers and 
autoworkers’ wives, to Eldon Avenue so that they could observe for themselves 
the conditions that had driven Johnson to murder his coworkers. The trip was 
effective for the defense. Though Chrysler had shut down the line and cleaned 
and painted the walls for their visitors, jury members were moved by expressions 
of solidarity from Johnson’s former coworkers. The jury found him not guilty by 
reason of insanity.64 A year later, Ronald Glotta, a League-affiliated lawyer made 
a similar argument at Johnson’s workman’s compensation trial and won $75 per 
week dating from the day of the murder.  
 The League’s legal defense efforts—formalized in the spring of 1971 as 
the Labor Defense Coalition—grew out of the need to fight police brutality and to 
protect Revolutionary Union Movement members facing discharges, injunctions, 
and other legal reprisals stemming from their political activity.65 Cockrel and other 
Coalition lawyers believed that well-publicized and politically charged trials 
offered an opportunity to radicalize thousands of people beyond the factory 
gates, including the middle class. At the same time, good legal work could put 
the companies on notice and secure much needed reforms for workers. In the 
Johnson cases, Cockrel and Glotta transformed their courtrooms into 
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classrooms, using the trials to show how Chrysler’s policies had taken their toll 
on employees, even to the point of killing some of them. Cockrel later used a 
similar strategy to successfully defend a man accused of killing Detroit police 
officers from the elite anti-crime unit STRESS (Stop the Robberies, Enjoy Safe 
Streets). STRESS was feared in the black community because it had killed an 
astounding number of young black suspects and had a horrifying record of civil 
rights abuses. Just as he had done to Chrysler, Cockrel put STRESS on trial, 
exposing the public to its racist practices. Detroit’s first black mayor, Coleman 
Young, made the dismantling of STRESS a key issue in his 1973 election.    
 During a 1970 conference on police repression, Cockrel elaborated on the 
significance of the League’s legal work, boasting of its ability to keep members 
out of jail. He compared the League’s record favorably to that of the Black 
Panthers who had been destroyed by costly criminal trials and its inability to 
defend itself from government attacks. Cockrel argued that League leaders 
understood their “principle responsibility” and “obligation to conduct themselves 
in such a way as to avoid incarceration.” Moreover, the alliances that the League 
had so painstakingly developed with black high school students, and other black 
progressives served as an effective shield against numerous legal complaints 
and grand jury investigations: “We’ve got a highly sophisticated black community 
in the city of Detroit and . . . we relate in such a way as to make it impossible for 
the MAN to frame us on jive chicken shit charges.”66   
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 To solidify the support of the many white radicals who had backed the 
black workers’ movement from the time of the first protests at Dodge Main, Mike 
Hamlin joined with white civil rights activists Sheila Murphy and Frank Joyce to 
organize the Motor City Labor League. Sheila Murphy was a Detroit movement 
prodigy. Her parents were leaders in the city’s Catholic Worker movement and 
she began working at the West Central Organization in her late teens. After the 
Detroit police broke up a demonstration she had helped organize as part of the 
Poor People’s Campaign in 1968, she founded the Ad Hoc Action Group—a 
citywide organization to end police brutality.67 While most of Detroit’s young white 
radicals focused their political activity locally, Frank Joyce was one of the few 
who had a profile within the larger New Left. His introduction to protest politics 
came in 1960 when he spontaneously joined a picket line demonstration against 
segregation at Detroit’s Crystal Pool Room. He then helped found the Detroit 
chapters of the Northern Student Movement, a student-based civil rights group 
and its successor People Against Racism, a national antiwar and antiracist 
organization that collapsed just as the antiwar movement was peaking in the late 
1960s. Joyce also served as a staff member for the Chicago 8, who were on trial 
for conspiring to incite a riot during the 1968 Democratic National Convention.68  
 The Motor City Labor League’s principal activity was a book reading and 
discussion club—a format that proved attractive for busy professionals who were 
not full-time activists. At the club’s peak, some program sessions drew more than 
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four hundred attendees, who gathered downtown at Detroit’s Central Methodist 
Church to discuss topics such as “Tom Watson and the History of the Populist 
Movement” with southern labor and civil rights activist Carl Braden and “Workers 
and Struggles in the 1930’s,” with radical historian turned labor lawyer Staughton 
Lynd.69 Most Motor City Labor League members were graduate students, or 
worked in healthcare, law, or education. They were encouraged by the Labor 
League’s leaders to distribute radical literature at auto plant gates and to join 
picket line protests, but a handful took jobs in the factories in order to organize 
white workers and to be closer to the black workers movement.70   
 Outside of Detroit, thousands of young radicals discovered the League 
through “Finally Got the News,” a 1970 documentary film that featured jarring 
black and white footage of production and picket lines, rendered in a deliberately 
intimate and frenetic style.71 Others read about the League in the pages of The 
Movement, Radical America, or The Guardian, which devoted a special section 
to Detroit’s “black worker insurgency” in March of 1969. The Guardian 
correspondent declared that the city’s “black workers movement is the most 
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important revolutionary action in the country” and that “all the elements are here. 
The vanguard is here. The workers are here. The guts of monopoly capitalism’s 
production are here. And the conditions are worsening in Detroit’s auto plants.”72  
 The response to the flattering press and the film was immediate. Speaking 
invitations, requests for literature, and calls for film showings poured into the 
League offices from across the country. Graduate students at Pennsylvania State 
University who were in the midst of a union organizing drive requested “Finally 
Got the News” to show at their labor arts festival, noting that the failure of 
teaching assistants to identify with the working class had been one of their “major 
obstacles to organizing.”73 Leaders of the Oleo Strut, a GI coffeehouse near Ft. 
Hood, Texas, hoped to show the film to returning veterans.74 Members of the 
Mother Jones collective in Baltimore and the Haymarket collective in Los Angeles 
ordered League pamphlets for their bookstores and study sessions, while 
dissident workers in a Portland box factory requested guidance in establishing a 
rank and file caucus within their union.75  
 Cockrel, Hamlin, and Watson handled much of the outreach. Watson, in 
particular, spent increasing amounts of time outside of Detroit, meeting with 
sympathetic radical groups in the U.S., Europe, and the Middle East. During trips 
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abroad to sell copies of “Finally Got the News,” Watson established ties to 
Palestinian liberation groups, Italian extra-parliamentary organizations, and other 
European supporters of the black freedom movement. Sympathetic academics 
and high-profile friends such as actress Jane Fonda provided additional links to 
her network of radicals all over the world. Fonda, for instance, forwarded a 
message from French director Jean Luc Goddard, who reported that “organizers 
in Paris” had expressed an interest in showing “Finally Got the News.”76 She also 
encouraged League leaders to contact her associates in Japan and Guyana and 
provided helpful advice for negotiating the complex politics of the international 
left. In facilitating a relationship with left-wing opposition leaders in Guyana, 
Fonda explained that the country’s black people “form a conservative and pro 
North American element; hence, the importance of expressing the racism here 
and the other realties of life for blacks in the US.” She reported that Cheddi 
Jagan, the Guyanese independence leader who had been repeatedly ousted 
from power by the British and the U.S., hoped that “a group of black 
representatives could come there to speak” and she promised to help get “Finally 
Got the News” shown in Guyana. A proposed film project with Fonda and actor 
Donald Sutherland, however, never materialized after long discussions.77  
 But even as the organization’s international reputation grew, and Cockrel 
continued to boast publicly of the League’s superior legal defense capabilities, its 
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base among Detroit workers was disintegrating, due in no small part to the 
dismissals of most of the key leaders in the plants.78 League leaders recognized 
these weaknesses, but their personal and strategic differences grew almost as 
rapidly as their programs, which by 1971 included the operation of a bookstore, a 
publishing company, and printing press. The establishment of three separate 
League headquarters—each with a different organizational emphasis—also 
caused considerable confusion for rank-and-file members. In an effort to impose 
much needed discipline and structure on the organization, Mike Hamlin 
persuaded civil rights leader James Forman to relocate to Detroit to assist with 
some managerial, fundraising, and educational needs. Forman, had a reputation 
within the movement as a talented administrator and political tactician. He also 
had connections to many elements of the American left and had recently secured 
financing from several mainline protestant churches.79 Forman, however, was a 
gadfly, whose demanding travel schedule prevented him from developing close 
ties to all but a few League leaders and he had almost no relationship to the 
group’s base. 
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 Despite the fissures within the organization that were becoming obvious to 
local movement activists, hundreds of young radicals from across the country 
were nevertheless inspired by the League’s reputation to relocate to Detroit, 
which they referred to only half-jokingly as the American Petrograd—the city in 
which workers and their intellectual allies would lead a socialist revolution. In 
1969 David Riddle, an SDS-affiliated journalist, moved from Berkeley to Detroit 
after hearing of the city’s political movements. “I was part of that generation of 
‘60s radicals who saw Detroit as a very significant place,” said Riddle, who 
worked in several Detroit auto plants before becoming a Teamsters union 
activist. “People looked at themselves, almost consciously, as Narodniks—the 
young Russian student intellectuals who wanted to bring the world of revolution 
to the peasant masses.”80 
 In 1970 Richard Feldman arrived in Detroit with thirty five University of 
Michigan comrades from nearby Ann Arbor. Their decision to move to Detroit 
followed weeks of intensive study and discussion regarding how to make their 
campus-based politics “more real, where you could make a revolutionary 
movement or be part of one because that’s where the real people lived.”81 Before 
choosing Detroit, they sent members to various industrial cities to scout out the 
organizing terrain and meet with local activists. They settled into a large old 
house not far from Wayne State University. Though the group quickly split over 
various political and personal differences, many of them continued to organize in 
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Detroit, focusing their energies on the labor, antiwar, and women’s liberation 
movements.82    
 That same year the International Socialists (IS), a small Trotskyist student 
group based in Berkeley and New York, relocated their headquarters to Detroit—
a decision that coincided with their plans to refocus their activity from organizing 
on college campuses to building rank-and-file caucuses within industrial unions. 
IS activists took jobs in the city’s auto plants in hopes of working with the League, 
but they were soon disappointed to learn that it had ceased to have any 
meaningful presence in the auto plants.83 
 Strategic differences and an unrelenting hostility toward the UAW had 
undermined the League leadership’s ability to transform the Revolutionary Union 
Movements into a viable labor organization. In June of 1971, Cockrel, Watson, 
and Hamlin resigned from the League and issued a thirty page polemic detailing 
their differences with the organization’s “petty bourgeois opportunists” and 
“backward reactionary-nationalist lumpen-proletarians.”84 They explained that 
their strategy for the League—the necessary and correct broadening of the 
factory based struggle—had been undermined by constant criticism and even 
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sabotage from those who felt they were diverting resources from the workers. 
Cockrel, Watson, and Hamlin argued that far from being diversionary efforts, their 
recruitment of allies from among the black middle class, white radicals, and 
supporters outside of the city, had accrued critical resources to the League and 
built up its defensive capacity. The legal defense work, the book club, the 
publishing house, and the documentary film drew additional resources into the 
organization and helped protect workers from reprisals.   
 Beyond the strategic differences, they also raised strong objections to 
anti-white tendencies within the organization and the behavior of some members 
that they believed was “wholly inconsistent with continuance in the ranks of a 
revolutionary organization.” They asserted that some League members had 
chased away white film crew members during the filming of “Finally Got the 
News,” and had sometimes rejected the assistance of white lawyers, journalists, 
and other supporters. For Mike Hamlin, who was the key to keeping the core 
group of leaders together, the League’s continuing failure to reign in the 
“outrageous acts” committed by some of its members represented the final straw. 
Reflecting on the experience over thirty years later, Mike Hamlin acknowledged 
that DRUM’s achievements in the summer of 1968 required “some pretty 
reckless folks” to stand outside the factory gates, facing harassment and 
intimidation from “reactionary workers” and the police: “To stand up against them 
and say that you are a revolutionary and you were a communist. You had to be 
willing to stand there and be prepared to do battle with them.”85 Many of those 
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initially attracted to the League were also drawn by the opportunity to fight white 
workers, but as the leadership began thinking about a long range strategy for 
change, those “undisciplined elements in the organization” became a liability. 
They alienated too many potential supporters and put the organization even 
further on the defensive.86 Hamlin, Watson, and Cockrel pledged to continue their 
efforts through the Black Workers Congress, a national organization intended as 
an extension of the League and a vehicle through which other cities might 
establish their own Revolutionary Union Movements. Representing the Black 
Workers Congress during a 1971 meeting of southern activists gathered in 
Atlanta, Hamlin observed that the emergence of DRUM and other militant black 
worker groups indicated that the “objective conditions are right” for similar extra-
union organizations across the country, and that the Black Workers Congress 
would provide overall coordination. “It wasn’t enough simply to organize a Dodge 
and an Eldon, but . . . we had to move long term,” he explained. “We had to think 
in terms of protracted struggle and organize Black workers across the country 
and across industry.” The congress managed to pull together several hundred 
supporters across the country largely on the strength of the League’s reputation 
and James Forman’s SNCC networks, but it was plagued by internal divisions 
and was short lived.87  
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 Those who remained in the League of Revolutionary Black Workers, 
including Baker and Kramer, considered the departures an opportunity to 
consolidate their work around the “organization of black workers” and to “remedy 
the erroneous tendency . . . to consider it only a part of our general activities.”88 
From their perspective, the “splitters” had become too removed from the worker 
base; Watson’s filmmaking and foreign travel, Hamlin’s unceasing networking 
and organization building, and Cockrel’s speechmaking had diverted resources 
from the factory struggles. By refocusing the League’s resources on the worker 
organizing they hoped to reestablish their base within the auto plants.  
 The League loyalists also viewed the split as an opportunity to develop 
new leadership for the organization from among the workers—a task that they 
had largely failed to accomplish. According to Baker, that flaw was built into the 
League at its inception:  
It was built out of duress. It was built as a defensive mechanism 
under attack. Therefore it wasn’t ever really built right. It should’ve 
had worker representatives from each one of those groups on it. It 
didn’t have that. It had a group of us around Inner City Voice on it 
as its leadership, which was improper. But we were the most skilled 
political people at that time to help consolidate and keep the rest of 
it together.89  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
provided counseling and crisis management services in the auto plants. Drawing upon his strong 
reputation in the black community, as well as his support from white radicals who had been 
associates of the Motor City Labor League, Cockrel was elected to the Detroit City Council in 
1977. His name was often raised as a possible successor to Mayor Coleman Young, but he died 
suddenly in 1989 at age 51. Unlike most of the League leaders, John Watson did not remain 
politically active. He died in 2001.      
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In the rush to sustain the protests and protect black workers from further 
reprisals, the League founders had failed to cultivate rank-and-file leaders. The 
decision-making powers within the organization rested largely with the 
intellectuals and activists who had founded the group.    
 As a corrective measure, the Baker and the others still loyal to the League 
embarked on a program to educate members and promote new workers to 
leadership positions. In January of 1972, following a meeting of the policy 
committee, the League decided to “go into an organizational strategic retreat.” 
This would allow members to engage in intensive study, while the leadership 
restructured the League along Leninist principles of democratic centralism. They 
believed this shift was necessary to control the breakdown in organizational 
discipline.90 The League, however, never really re-emerged from the retreat. 
Individual activists, notably Baker and Kramer, continued to organize within the 
labor movement and in a host of other political struggles.91 Periodically, Detroit 
area workers assumed the Revolutionary Union Movement mantle, but these 
groups usually had little or no connection to DRUM or the League.92   
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 Significant changes in Detroit and in the auto industry within a few short 
years obviated the need for a League of Revolutionary Black Workers, at least as 
it had been originally established. Black autoworkers in the 1970s continued to 
face racism, line speedups, and treacherous working conditions, but they had 
more resources at their disposal for battling racism and exploitation on the job. A 
growing body of civil rights law gave black workers “a different framework to 
fight,” while both the automakers and the UAW managed the League’s 
disruptions with a combination of brutal opposition and tactful accommodation.93 
As ambitious as the DRUM and ELRUM demands had been in the late 1960s, 
the automakers and the unions quietly adopted many of them within the first few 
years of the new decade. Chrysler and the other automakers began opening 
hundreds of skilled and managerial positions to African Americans; the UAW 
hired and appointed new black representatives and officials, and dozens more 
were elected to union offices. “Who would’ve thought?,” asked Baker many years 
later. “We asked for fifty black general foremen. We were just blowing shit out. A 
black on the board of directors of Chrysler Corporation. You know, they gave us 
all of that.”94  
   
 The years of careful planning, close personal relationships, and resource 
development could not save the League of Revolutionary Black Workers from the 
same splits that plagued much of the left in the 1960s. In the final analysis, the 
League, like many of the 1960s protests movements, proved to be more effective 
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as a disruptive force and less successful as an ongoing organization. League 
leaders never achieved a method for harnessing the dynamism, optimism, and 
spontaneity of a strike or demonstration, while simultaneously developing an 
institution to provide stability, resources, and leadership for a continuing struggle 
to build workers’ power. 
 Beyond their ability to secure reforms within the UAW and the industry, the 
League of Revolutionary Black Workers and its host of constituent groups alerted 
New Left and civil rights movement activists to the potential for an alliance 
between young radicals and the working class. Over the course of the 1970s 
thousands of these activists shifted the focus of their organizing from campus 
and community to the factories. Some secured industrial jobs, while others 
worked as union staff members or in labor support organizations. But it would be 
left to each of the individuals and radical groups who made this turn to the 
working class to resolve important unresolved issues—to define their relationship 
to their unions; to develop a means of sustaining their efforts over the long haul 
without losing their sense of movement; to be deliberate about the centrality of 
gender and race; and to nurture new leadership from among the working class. 
These were among the unfinished tasks of the League of Revolutionary Black 
Workers. 
Chapter 2: The New Left’s Southern Strategy  
 
 No group of radical activists found more promise in the late 1960s rise in 
labor militancy and the emergence of the League of Revolutionary Black Workers 
than those attempting to organize a new American communist party. Proponents 
of the New Communist Movement, as it came to be known, believed that the 
establishment of a new party was paramount for radicals in the 1970s.95 SDS, 
SNCC, and other 1960s protest organizations had proven themselves 
inadequate to the task of defeating racism, capitalist exploitation, and U.S. 
imperialism. The struggles of the new decade would require tightly disciplined 
organizations that were structured along Leninist principles of democratic 
centralism and headed by leaders who were grounded in communist theory. The 
New Communists rejected the Soviet-backed Communist Party USA, which they 
accused of betraying communism during the Cold War and of being controlled by 
Moscow. Instead, the New Communists looked to Third World liberation 
movements and the Chinese Cultural Revolution for inspiration, as well as the 
1968 global disruptions that had rocked western democracies and Soviet-bloc 
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nations alike.96 Moreover, mounting evidence of hostility toward the nation’s 
political and social institutions, especially among youth and African Americans, 
fueled the New Communist’s hope for the viability of their movement.97  
 Each of the early-1970s wave of New Communist organizations sought to 
build a base in the working class by “proletarianizing”—sending members to take 
jobs in factories—in order to recruit new supporters, provide leadership for on-
the-job struggles, and move the labor movement to the left. But few groups were 
as committed to working within existing trade unions and engaging in workers’ 
struggles as the October League, a small communist group formed by veterans 
of the student movement in Los Angeles and Atlanta.98 With its Atlanta base, 
October League leaders aimed to establish a new southern front composed of a 
broad alliance of black workers and radical youth that would resemble the 1930s 
and 1940s-era coalition of intellectuals, students, trade unionists, and civil rights 
groups. A revitalized southern front, they believed, would help mend the labor 
movement’s Achilles’ Heel—the non-union South that provided a safety valve for 
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corporations seeking to avoid the higher labor costs, taxes, and environmental 
restrictions they faced in the Northeast and Midwest.99 Moreover, October 
League leaders hoped that a southern front could counter the growth of right-
wing extremist movements and the racist appeal of George Wallace, who until 
his shooting in the spring of 1972 was the top vote getter in the Democratic 
primaries—attracting white votes with his “savage attacks on antiwar 
demonstrators and busing and ‘forced integration.’”100 The October League 
leaders viewed Atlanta, with its large, restive black working class and strong 
tradition of civil rights protests, as the lynchpin of their “southern strategy.” Like 
the labor activists who had organized low-wage black workers in Charleston and 
Memphis in the late 1960s, the October League “had come to believe that the 
joining of ‘union power’ and ‘soul power’ had unlocked the secret to a whole new 
tide of labor organizing among America’s poor and unskilled.”101  
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 The October League arose from the ashes of the two major white student 
protest groups—SDS and the (SSOC) Southern Student Organizing Committee. 
The largest and most influential campus-based radical organization of the 1960s, 
SDS split and fractured just as it was enjoying its strongest support at the peak of 
the antiwar movement. After a contentious convention in Chicago in June of 
1969, many of the organization’s national leaders grouped into two factions: the 
Revolutionary Youth Movement and the (WSA) Worker Student Alliance, which 
was affiliated with an early 1960s offshoot of the Communist Party USA—the 
Progressive Labor Party (PL).102 The Revolutionary Youth Movement soon split 
into two factions—the more famous of the two being Weatherman, which carried 
out a string of bombings and other violent acts intended to spark an uprising that 
would lead to the overthrow of the U.S. government.103 The remaining RYM 
members (known as RYMII), advocated the establishment of a national Marxist-
Leninist party and embraced a program of organizing working-class students in 
support of the black freedom movement and third world liberation struggles.  
 That direction was outlined by SDS national secretary and RYM leader 
Mike Klonsky in a late December 1968 article that appeared in the SDS journal 
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New Left Notes. Klonsky, who was the son of Communist Party members, had 
begun organizing poor whites and Mexicans in the Silver Lake area of Los 
Angeles. It was there that he and his colleagues developed a critique of SDS’s 
focus on “student-power.” He argued that any effort to defeat capitalism would 
require students to “reach out to new constituencies both on and off campus and 
build SDS in to a youth movement that is revolutionary” and “integrated into the 
struggles of working people.” In order to achieve this goal, he warned: “Many of 
us are going to have to go through important changes, personally. As students, 
we have been indoctrinated with many racist and anti-working class notions that 
in turn have produced racism and class-chauvinism in SDS and [were] 
responsible largely for the student-power focus which our movement has had for 
many years.” He urged young activists to focus on organizing at working-class 
colleges, technical and trade schools, and high schools, and to “destudentize” 
fellow students by attacking their privileges, such as draft deferments. They 
should also build alliances with non-academic employees on campus and expose 
the universities as “arm[s] of the corporations that exploit workers.” Other 
activists, he proposed, “should move into factories and shops as well as into 
working-class communities, to better understand the material oppression of 
industrial workers, as well as to eradicate prejudices against workers.”104 
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Klonsky and his wife Susan Eanet organized a small, but robust group of 
RYMII activists into a collective in the Los Angeles area. They opened a workers’ 
center and bookstore, and adopted the name October League in honor of the 
October, or Bolshevik revolution in Russia. Some members obtained jobs at 
Uniroyal where they formed a radical caucus within the United Rubber Workers 
Local 44 and distributed a shop floor newsletter—Blowout.105 Other comrades 
went to work at Chrysler and other Los Angeles-area factories. Collective 
members allied themselves with radical trends within the labor and black 
liberation movements, while Klonsky traveled the country working to build the 
October League into a national organization through the extensive network of 
associates he had met as an SDS leader.106  
Among Klonsky’s strongest supporters were a handful of Atlanta-based 
activists who had been leaders of SSOC, which had been initiated in 1964 to 
provide white support for SNCC’s civil rights work. Before SSOC’s own 
acrimonious ending just days prior to SDS’s fateful Chicago convention in 1969, 
it had served as a gateway for southern students seeking to become active in the 
civil rights and antiwar movements. SSOC leaders believed that the South’s 
history and regional distinctiveness demanded a unique organizing strategy, and 
that activists needed to approach young southern white liberals with an 
appreciation for their backgrounds and the social pressures they faced from 
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family, peers, and neighbors. “A populist feeling infused the group,” according to 
one SSOC member. “The northern militants saw the ‘red-neck’ only as the 
enemy, but these students knew him as uncle, cousin, and neighbor. They could 
reach their fellow southerners with new ideas. For some, this concept of going to 
the white people offered a dramatic way of serving the movement.”107  
At SSOC’s peak, forty paid organizers coordinated diverse educational 
and protest activities on dozens of college campuses. In deference to SSOC, and 
as an expression of its “fraternal” relationship with the group, SDS limited its 
presence on southern campuses.108 But tensions mounted as the Progressive 
Labor Party established a foothold in both organizations. SDS leaders, headed 
by Mike Klonsky, feared that Progressive Labor would takeover SSOC and use it 
as a base to gain control of SDS. As a pre-emptive strike directed at Progressive 
Labor, Klonsky and other SDSers began advocating SSOC’s dissolution in the 
spring of 1969. They argued that SSOC was too moderate and insular, and that it 
had failed to work with radicals outside the South. Some SSOC leaders echoed 
these SDS criticisms and began attacking the group’s belief in southern 
exceptionalism—or the notion that the region’s unique history and culture 
required radicals to take a different approach to organizing the South. During an 
April meeting at Emory University in Atlanta, a popular SSOC organizer Lynn 
Wells criticized herself and the group for having accepted the “old SNCC theory 
that an organizer is someone who sits in the back of the room, finds out what 
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people want to do, and helps them do it. The do-your-own-thing philosophy.” 
While SSOC had reached many people that way, she had concluded the 
approach was flawed: “I built on anti-Yankeeism. Even though foremost in my 
mind has been link-ups with the working class, development of a working class 
ideology in the student movement, I still used an individualist approach to 
organization and that’s a bad position.” An observer at the meeting noted 
sardonically that “perhaps the best organizer SSOC ever had was denouncing 
the crime of her virtue, openness, and reciting a radical confession of faith before 
all.”109  
At a June 5-8 conference in Mt. Beulah, Mississippi, the tensions came to 
a head. Members of the “pro-SDS” caucus sharpened their criticisms, citing a 
litany of SSOC shortcomings, including its insufficient radicalism, advocacy of 
southern exceptionalism, failure to build a membership base, disconnection from 
the larger movement, and weak relations with the black liberation struggle. These 
were bitter pills to swallow for many SSOC members. They had worked hard to 
establish ties to African American radicals, and in many instances those 
relationships were deeper and more substantive than those of their northern 
counterparts. Moreover, SSOC’s decentralized organizational structure allowed 
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for a range of grassroots activities on white college campuses that often 
represented the “first voice of protest at some schools,” according to a historian 
of the organization. SSOC protests helped to “legitimiz[e] dissent” among 
southern white students just as SDS had done outside of the South.110 
Nevertheless, when confronted by SDS, even SSOC’s staunchest supporters 
proved unwilling or unable to defend SSOC against the charges. Reflecting a 
national trend toward movement fragmentation, some older SSOC leaders no 
longer viewed the group as their primary organizational affiliation, and those who 
did could not agree on whether to focus primarily on the war, black civil rights, 
worker organizing, or university reform. A five member liquidating committee was 
appointed to close the Nashville office and dispose of its records.111 
The SSOC split divided Atlanta’s white left. A pro-SDS faction led by Lynn 
Wells and David Simpson attempted to unite all of the city’s SDS supporters 
under the banner of the Atlanta Revolutionary Youth Movement, aligning 
themselves with Klonsky and other RYMII forces nationally. From their storefront 
office and print shop in Little Five Points—a working-class, though soon to be 
lively bohemian enclave on Atlanta’s east side—they made plans to educate their 
members through a series of internal study sessions and sketched out a program 
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of action focused on organizing white workers and staging antiwar 
demonstrations.112 
In October 1969, Wells and more than two dozen protesters disrupted a 
meeting of the World Trade Council at the Marriot Motor Hotel, where David 
Rockefeller, chairman of Chase Manhattan Bank, was the featured speaker. 
Accusing Rockefeller of exploiting Latin American countries for the benefit of his 
oil interests, the demonstrators tossed gravel and eggs at the doors and gained 
entrance to the hotel. Once inside they upset a waiter’s tray, and “maul[ed] a 
police lieutenant before they were brought under control,” according to a press 
account. An arresting officer explained that the police “started out to arrest them 
(the pickets) but we ended up having more trouble trying to protect them” from 
the angry crowd. 113 Wells and thirteen others were found guilty and sentenced to 
serve several weeks at Atlanta’s prison farm.114 Jim Skillman, an Atlanta RYM 
member, recalled that the protest was undertaken because the group was 
“feeling very defensive about Weatherman” and wanted to prove themselves “as 
serious and as committed” as the highest-profile radical organization. But the 
protest alienated Atlanta RYM from much of the local left. The liberal lawyers 
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who had supported civil rights and antiwar protesters in the past declined to 
represent RYM as did nearly every one of the city’s bail bondsmen. Upon their 
release from jail, the protestors acknowledged that their actions had been a 
major misstep. The protest did little to raise awareness about conditions in South 
Africa and it “separated us from people inside the movement.”115 Future activities 
would require strategic planning and stronger community support.     
 A year later, Atlanta RYM supporters formed the Georgia Communist 
League, which they hoped would be a preliminary step toward the establishment 
of an independent communist party. Like Klonsky’s Los Angeles group, with 
whom they would soon affiliate, the Georgia Communist League members 
focused their organizational efforts on civil rights and antiwar work, as well as the 
struggles of Atlanta’s black workers.116 
 Atlanta in the early 1970s showed promise of developing a mass 
movement similar to the one that had energized Detroit a few years earlier. The 
presence of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) and SNCC 
headquarters provided a steady flow of talented organizers through the city, and 
beginning in the early 1960s, a robust local civil rights movement had begun to 
dismantle segregation in public accommodations, schools, and housing. With 
African Americans approaching a majority in the city, black activists forged a 
political power base within the Democratic Party that culminated in Maynard 
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Jackson’s 1973 mayoral victory.117 Yet working conditions for most of Atlanta’s 
black workers had remained largely unchanged since the 1940s. Well into the 
1970s African American workers suffered from discriminatory hiring and 
promotions practices, earned lower wages than their white counterparts, and 
suffered from unsafe health and safety standards, as well as arbitrary dismissals 
and discipline at the hands of racist supervisors.  
 Though it was overshadowed by the high profile student-led protests, 
African American workers in Atlanta had their own protest tradition.118 In 
December of 1964, Martin Luther King, Jr. walked the picket line with striking 
workers at the Scripto, Inc. plant just blocks from King’s Ebenezer Baptist 
Church. Scripto workers had recently joined the International Chemical Workers 
Union, but had failed to reach an agreement with management over pay raises 
for African Americans, who were relegated to low-skilled jobs.119 In 1968 and 
again in 1970, black sanitation workers struck for higher wages, better working 
conditions, and an end to discrimination. Several of King’s aides assumed active 
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roles in those strikes, the second of which left Atlanta without regular garbage 
pickup for thirty-six days.120    
 The labor protests reached new heights in 1972 when the city witnessed 
more than one dozen major job actions beginning with a strike at Fulton Bag and 
Cotton Mills in January and a walkout at Holy Family Hospital the following 
month. Subsequent protests included strikes at Church’s Fried Chicken, the 
Regency Hyatt Hotel, Sears Roebuck and Company, and Nabisco. In nearly 
every one of these situations, black workers complained of being excluded from 
skilled jobs reserved for white workers or of being unfairly disciplined. Because 
the existing white-led unions were slow to respond to black demands, African 
American workers turned to SCLC, black churches, black students, and white 
sympathizers for strategic assistance and donations of money and food.121   
 The Georgia Communist League viewed the strike wave as an opportunity 
for expanding the organization and directed many of its fifty or so members to 
take jobs at the Atlantic Steel Company, General Motors, the Fulton Bag and 
Cotton Mills, and other Atlanta manufacturing companies. Others devoted 
themselves to the production and distribution of the group’s monthly newsletter, 
The Red Worker, each issue of which included news of the black freedom 
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struggle, economic analysis, and reports on the conditions in various local 
factories.122 
 The earliest members of the Georgia Communist League were 
predominantly white, and drew heavily from the ranks of former SDS and SSOC 
members and other student activists. In his activist trajectory, Georgia 
Communist League member John Fletcher was typical of the college radicals 
who became factory workers. Fletcher had been a Duke University student and 
was a Nelson Rockefeller delegate to the 1968 Republican National Convention 
in Miami. But like many Duke students that year, his politics swung to the left by 
the Tet Offensive, the assassinations of King and Kennedy, and a week-long 
silent vigil in support of union recognition for campus workers. In 1969 he 
dropped out to pursue activism full time. With five other students Fletcher moved 
fifty miles west of Durham to Greensboro to work in the textile mills there. The six 
young radicals remained for a year, operating as a cell, gaining working-class 
experience, meeting regularly to read Marx, and searching for a larger formation 
with which to affiliate. At the end of 1970, Fletcher headed to Atlanta with some 
friends where he was quickly drawn into Georgia Communist League circles and 
began working at a shipping company.123 
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Lynn Wells was the central figure in the transition from SSOC to RYM to 
the Georgia Communist League. She was the daughter of a labor organizer and 
had gained a high profile within the civil rights movement before she was twenty. 
As a ninth grader in Maryland, she organized classmates to donate their lunch 
money to southern Freedom Schools and she soon began working at SNCC’s 
Washington, D.C. office. Still in her teens, Wells was among a handful of youthful 
demonstrators arrested in March of 1965 in what may be the only sit-in protest 
inside the White House; the protestors had joined a regular White House tour 
and stayed for seven hours, demanding that the federal government intervene on 
behalf of civil rights workers in Selma, Alabama. Wells later went to work for 
SSOC and served as a North Carolina organizer for the Vietnam Summer 
project, an effort to move off campus to build opposition to the war.124  
Sherman Miller was one of the very few African Americans in the Georgia 
Communist League. Miller joined the organization after taking part in civil rights 
protests in his native state of West Virginia and in Atlanta. A dynamic orator and 
talented organizer, Miller’s charisma was essential to establishing the Georgia 
Communist League’s credibility among black workers in Atlanta. As one 
coworker later put it, black workers would have followed Miller until “hell freezes 
over.”125   
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In the early weeks of 1972, Miller and several white comrades began 
working at Atlanta’s Mead Packaging Corporation where they found no shortage 
of issues around which to organize. The Dayton, Ohio company, which supplied 
paper-based containers for food and beverage packagers, operated a 
manufacturing plant and warehouse facility just northwest of downtown. Workers 
complained of the poor ventilation system that chilled the plant during the winter 
and made it swelter in the summer. A thick and ever present fog of paper dust 
caught in the workers’ mouths and noses. The seven hundred black workers, 
who made up about sixty-five percent of the workforce, complained of being 
denied heat breaks and forced to stay on the production line by overbearing 
white supervisors. Several women who passed out were denied compensation 
for lost time. Moreover, the plant was abuzz from the recent conviction of Melvin 
Crawford, a black line worker who was sentenced to fourteen years in prison for 
shooting a shift manager, a floor superintendent, and a union steward during a 
meeting to discuss working conditions.126 According to coworkers, as Crawford 
was being led off to jail, he exclaimed: “I’m not sorry for what I’ve done. Even if I 
have to go to jail this will help keep the bosses off of the backs of the other 
workers.”127  
As tensions mounted that spring, black workers began threatening to shut 
down Mead just as the workers had done to Sears and other employers in the 
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city.128 Miller and several white Georgia Communist League comrades who had 
developed rapport with the workers, spearheaded the formation of the Mead 
Caucus of Rank and File Workers. They arranged for the Mead Caucus to meet 
each week at Emmaus House, a community center south of downtown, where 
the workers could share information and develop a strategy for having their 
grievances addressed. The caucus members also elected Sherman Miller 
chairman, though he had only been on the job at Mead for a few months.  
Among the earliest supporters of the Mead Caucus was Gary Washington, 
a twenty-one-year-old African American worker who had been involved with the 
Black Panther Party in New York City and whose participation in campus protests 
had led to his expulsion from Morehouse College and Georgia State University, 
both in Atlanta. According to Washington, Miller and the Georgia Communist 
League members attempted to persuade the black workers to build up the 
caucus as a voice for black workers and to eventually vie for power within the 
conservative and white-dominated Local 527 of the Atlanta Printing Specialties 
and Paper Products Union. Though black workers outnumbered whites in the 
plant by a nearly 2-1 ratio, nearly every union steward and elected officer was 
white, including two union stewards who headed up rival factions of the Ku Klux 
Klan.129 The Georgia Communist League wanted the Mead Caucus “to take over 
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the union,” and “straighten [it] out,” but the black workers expressed little interest 
in a union reform campaign, Washington recalled. Having lost patience with the 
union and with Mead, they demanded immediate action. “There was just so much 
discrimination that the blacks wanted to go out on strike” and the Georgia 
Communist League “ended up going along with the program.”130  
To avoid the almost certain disaster of an unplanned strike, the Georgia 
Communist League members within the Mead Caucus persuaded the group to 
methodically gather unresolved grievances and shape them into a set of more 
than forty demands that came to be known as the Black Manifesto. Much of the 
Manifesto centered on health and safety issues, including the installation of a 
proper ventilation system, an end to compulsory overtime, and the employment 
of a full-time nurse. Other demands focused on the historical impact of Mead’s 
discriminatory employment practices. The Manifesto called for the dismissal of 
white managers, supervisors, and clerical workers and their replacement with 
black workers until the balance equaled that of the city’s racial makeup. To 
prevent the company from pitting black and white union workers against one 
another, caucus members added that “there must not be any benefits granted to 
Black hourly employees that will discriminate against or repress the White hourly 
employees.” The caucus also demanded that Martin Luther King’s birthday be a 
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paid holiday and that supervisors using profane and racist language be subject to 
disciplinary action.  
Other, more far-reaching demands, reflected workers’ desires for a radical 
re-visioning of the employer-employee relationship. The caucus proposed that 
any supervisor be released if two-thirds of the workers in his department voted 
for his firing. They asked that labor contracts be renewed every year, and that 
workers be given two weeks notice of layoffs. Finally, they demanded a new 
grievance policy in which union stewards in each department and on each shift 
would meet with company officials to resolve disputes on the spot.131 Before 
unveiling the Manifesto publicly, caucus members circulated the proposals 
among sympathetic Mead workers, refining and adding to the document. 
Through this process, they guaranteed that the document reflected the workers’ 
needs, while expanding their base of supporters.  
The caucus also enlisted the assistance of civil rights leader Hosea 
Williams, an associate of Martin Luther King, Jr. and longtime leader of the 
Southern Christian Leadership Conference. Williams had been involved in 
several other black workers’ struggles in Atlanta, including the Atlanta sanitation 
workers strikes, and within SCLC he had been among the strongest proponents 
of workers’ issues.132 In the summer of 1972, he began holding weekly “Saturday 
People’s Rallies” to serve as “a forum for people to advocate various causes,” 
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most of which centered on issues of employment discrimination.133 Due to his 
association with King, Williams enjoyed a strong following among some elements 
of Atlanta’s black community, including many workers at Mead. Even among the 
SCLC circle of tremendous orators, Williams stood out for his ability to deliver a 
stump speech and to articulate the hopes and frustrations of the city’s poor black 
masses. But Williams also had a prickly personality that made working with him 
difficult. Earlier in the year, he had split from SCLC and formed the Metro 
Atlanta/Dekalb SCLC as a vehicle that would allow him to focus on local civil 
rights and economic justice issues.  
As Mead Caucus members honed their demands, the Georgia Communist 
League joined Klonsky’s October League, and adopted the latter group’s name in 
May 1972. Following a meeting in Texas, where the Atlanta and Los Angeles 
groups were joined by representatives from a handful of other radical collectives, 
the newly constituted October League (Marxist-Leninist) issued a statement 
explaining that this merger represented an important step “towards the 
construction of a new communist party in the U.S. based on the guiding 
principles of the revolutionary theory of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung 
Thought.” Such a vanguard organization was necessary, they argued, to prevent 
“the spontaneous struggles of the masses” from being “confined within the limits 
of reforming capitalism and . . . brutally crushed.” The groups pledged “to go 
deep among the working masses at the factories and in the communities in order 
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to unite with the advanced workers and to keep clear of idealism and all types of 
thinking which do not coincide with objective reality.”134  
Following the announcement of the new organization, a five-member 
delegation with Klonsky and Wells as its leaders visited China to discuss the new 
development with Chinese officials.135 Since the late 1960s, China had held a 
strong appeal for some American radicals because of its support for Vietnam and 
other anti-colonial movements. Moreover, the Great Proletarian Cultural 
Revolution—with its populist and anti-authoritarian rhetoric—seemed to offer a 
more robust and democratic alternative to Soviet communism.136 As they 
proceeded with their efforts to establish a communist party in the United States, 
the New Communists looked to the Communist Party of China for a model and 
adopted some of its rhetoric, ideas, and organizational practices. While Chinese 
communism was attractive and sometimes useful to the New Communist 
intellectuals, it was no draw for American workers.   
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With Hosea Williams acting as their spokesman, Mead Caucus members 
met with company officials as well as the officers of Local 527 on the morning of 
August 16. Asserting that they had tried the “existing channels” for settling 
grievances “without success,” the caucus members presented their Manifesto. 
Acknowledging that many of their complaints centered around racism at Mead, 
they insisted that they viewed the situation not as “a dispute between Black and 
white workers, but rather one between workers and management.” They gave 
the company until 10am on August 18 to meet the demands—all of two days.137 
Mead’s response reflected its understanding of the urgency of the 
situation and its need to contain the spread of dissent, while allowing as few 
concessions as possible. Company president Robert M. O’Hara, who had been 
out of town and missed the meeting with the caucus, dashed off a memorandum 
to the employees explaining that the company was prohibited by labor law and 
the existing union contract from bargaining “with individual employees or groups 
of employees, or outsiders.” O’Hara noted, however, that he had agreed to a 
request for a meeting from Local 527 to discuss some of the workers’ concerns. 
That meeting had already been held, he wrote, and because of it the company 
would soon provide “a better way for employees to voice their complaints and 
concerns.” He also pledged that he would work hard to eliminate gender and 
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racial discrimination at Mead and promised to do everything he could to “resolve 
every legitimate complaint and problem and . . . do everything we can to continue 
our operations and provide uninterrupted employment for all our employees.”138  
O’Hara issued a second letter to the employees that day, in which he 
unveiled the new “expanded labor-management committee” and announced that 
it would begin meeting Monday morning. “This group will try to find out what our 
employees are concerned about,” he explained. “It will try to resolve those 
reasonable concerns quickly. We want you to know that we are determined to 
attack problems with action. Not just words. We think this way will solve 
problems. We do not want solutions which are just for today. We want solutions 
which will last a long time. We want Mead to be a better place to work. For 
everyone.”139 Speaking for the caucus, Sherman Miller dismissed the company’s 
pledge to expand the union-management committee because it had failed to 
involve black workers. He complained that the committee was the “same kind we 
have had in the past” and that it was arranged by the company and the union.140 
The following day, Friday, August 18, more than four hundred black 
workers walked off the job. Workers on subsequent shifts followed, and within a 
day, seven hundred of Mead’s 1,100 employees, including nearly the entire black 
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workforce, had walked out in support of a strike. When about one hundred of 
them formed picket lines at the plant gates, Mead officials shut the plant down at 
the end of the first shift with plans to reopen Monday. They then worked phone 
trees all weekend in an effort to coax employees back to work, while company 
lawyers obtained an injunction prohibiting pickets from interfering with normal 
business operations by “force, violence, intimidation, coercion or threats.” Strike 
leaders brushed off the injunction, and the phone calls largely failed to persuade 
black workers to return to work.141 
A reporter visiting Mead on Monday spoke to picketers who explained that 
the few workers inside were “country white folk” from outlying areas who “think 
that the working conditions and the pay are good cause they haven’t had 
anything better. They don’t have to pay but maybe $80 a month rent while we 
who live in the city must pay $130 to $180 in rent each month.” Inside the plant, 
company officials asserted that nearly half of the workforce had returned to work, 
and they boasted that the new union-management committee had been 
expanded to include some of the picketers. The committee had already met that 
morning and they expressed confidence that a quick settlement could be 
reached. But Sherman Miller told reporters that any talk of an end to the strike 
was premature until Hosea Williams was permitted to participate in the meetings 
with Mead. He put the number of workers who had crossed the line at a few 
hundred, or less than a third of the workforce.142  
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At the strike’s peak, perhaps seventy-five white workers stayed home from 
work, but these workers were generally not strike supporters. Rather, they 
wished to avoid the inconvenience of crossing the picket line. In some cases, 
their department had been idled. Few white workers aside from October League 
members appeared on the picket line. The strike was largely an expression of 
black grievances, and the Mead Caucus’s manifesto and its steady stream of 
public statements and leaflets reflected that reality by emphasizing the civil rights 
dimension of the struggle. At the same time, the October League members within 
the Mead Caucus consistently cast the strike in a larger political framework 
aimed at forging unity across racial lines, such as in this flier: 
In the South, Black people face greater poverty, oppression and 
lack of basic democratic rights than anywhere else in the country. 
The oppression of this great nation of people is the basis of 
discrimination against Black people both in the South and the rest 
of the country. It is the basis for discrimination at Mead. It is also 
the basis of the extreme exploitation of all Southern workers. Ninety 
per cent of the Afro-American people are workers. This oppression 
of one section of our class weakens our whole class. As the 
Manifesto points out: This is not a struggle between Black and 
white workers, but a struggle between workers and management. 
 
Other language in the flier targeted white workers more directly: “White 
racism, which divides workers and leaves white workers neutral or fighting on the 
side of their enemies, must be sharply struggled against. The company puts 
forward these ideas for one reason—to divide and weaken us and to strengthen 
themselves.” At the same time, the October League also warned black workers 
to “guard against the view that being white means being the enemy” because 
both racism and a blanket dismissal of all white workers “divide and weaken our 
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struggle and strengthen the enemy.”143 Racial harmony proved to be a tough sell 
in the context of a strike built largely on black grievances, and white Mead 
workers were largely immune to the appeal. They may have shared some of their 
black coworkers’ complaints concerning working conditions, but they were 
unwilling to join what they viewed as a black civil rights protest led by black 
leaders.  The October League’s sensitivity to the attitudes of white workers, 
however, was undercut by their proselytizing. Mead Caucus members operating 
as open communists and members of the October League limited most of their 
public comments to issues that reflected concrete realities in the plant. October 
League literature, however, was often abstruse and ideological. For example, in 
encouraging strikers to “take our struggle to others in the Atlanta community—
especially to our fellow workers in other plants,” the October League predicted 
success because “our cause is just and, as Mao Tsetun, leader of the Chinese 
people has said, ‘A just cause enjoys abundant support.’” Other Maoist 
references would have been even more obscure for anyone not already familiar 
with Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought: “Mead, like all reactionaries, 
appears to be a powerful man-eating tiger—swallowing whole its workers. But we 
will prove that Mead Paper Co., like other imperialists, is in reality a paper tiger, 
which in the long run is doomed!”144 That these appeals were not more 
immediately damaging is a credit to Sherman Miller and the other in-plant 
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October League members and the intense relationship building and careful 
organizing they had carried out. Black workers respected the October League 
activists, but only because they were able to separate their commitment to the 
struggle from their communist ideology. 
The October League walked a similar fine line in negotiating its 
relationship to Local 527 and its white leaders. Mead Caucus members 
maintained that they had first attempted to address their issues through the 
union’s official channels, but that union indifference had forced them to form their 
reform caucus. While white October League activists within the caucus had 
hoped to identify some progressive members within Local 527, they were also 
constrained by the majority of the black workers who had given up on the union. 
The tensions rose to a new level when union president Ralph Meers endorsed 
the joint labor-management committee’s initial list of proposed reforms. These 
included the formation of a human relations council to handle unresolved 
discrimination complaints; faster processing of grievances involving suspensions 
and dismissals; the purchase of new dust handling equipment; monthly meetings 
for employees, union officials, and supervisors to discuss individual job or 
personnel problems; and an independent survey of two key plant areas to gauge 
if they were adequately outfitted with safety equipment.145 Caucus members 
again dismissed the proposals and the committee as an extension of the old, 
                                                 
145
 “Mead Grievance Solutions Listed,” Atlanta Journal, 25 August 1972 and “Give Changes a 
Try—Mead,” Atlanta Constitution, 25 August 1972.  
 
  
86 
ineffective union. Moreover, they demanded that Mead remove the injunction that 
limited their ability to picket the plant.146  
But as the strike moved into its third week and with the plant operating 
only one shift, Fulton County Superior Court Judge Elmo Holt continued the 
injunction. He limited the number of pickets at each of three plant gates to five—
with two picketers permitted to stand on each side of the gate while one paraded 
in between, and prohibited demonstrations from within fifty yards of the of the 
main gates. The new restrictions, nevertheless failed to deter protestors.147 The 
following week, Mead lawyers returned to court with a list of demonstrators who 
had violated the injunction several times in the previous week by crowding near 
the gates at beginning and end of the day shift. One protestor reportedly wore a 
holster with a revolver, and after police asked to see his permit, “the crowd jeered 
and another demonstrator shouted, ‘Gun Power!’”148 
The strikers also continued to hold rallies near the plant gates and began 
taking their case to the larger community, enlisting the support of African 
American students, workers at other area factories, and local white leftists. Black 
church members also provided food and money for a strike fund. Mead Caucus 
members visited other Atlanta union halls and picket lines, and encouraged 
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consumers to boycott products packaged in Mead materials, including Coca 
Cola, Pepsi, Budweiser, Black Label, Schlitz, and Morton Frozen Foods.149  
Mead managers countered with their own efforts to sway the black 
community. They hired a black-owned public relations firm that purchased 
advertisements in black newspapers urging workers to return to their jobs. 
Commercial spots on black radio stations offered a similar message. At a press 
conference in front of the firm’s office, Sherman Miller dismissed the public 
relations campaign as “sweet talk.” He accused the firm of “trying to brainwash” 
the workers, and labeled the black owners “traitors to the people.” State 
Representative Ben Brown, a co-owner of the firm and a civil rights movement 
veteran, denied that the company would “engage in any activity that would be 
detrimental to anybody, black or white,” and explained that their contract with 
Mead predated the strike.150 
 On Monday September 18, a contingent of about three hundred workers 
and their supporters walked north from the Atlanta University Center with two 
mules at the lead. The mules had powerful resonance for Atlanta’s black 
community. Two had pulled the wooden cart carrying Martin Luther King, Jr.’s 
casket during his funeral march in 1968. A few weeks after King’s funeral, they 
passed through the city again at the head of a caravan of pilgrims and wagons 
from Mississippi on their way to the Poor People’s protests in Washington D.C. 
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The mules underscored the humble origins of the poor and mostly black 
protesters and connected their plight to that of their slave and sharecropping 
ancestors. They also symbolized hard work and even the federal government’s 
broken promise to the freedmen of forty acres and a mule. The Mead marchers 
snaked their way through the city streets singing “We Shall Not be Moved” and 
other civil rights songs, and inviting onlookers to join them. By the time they 
reached the plant gates the caravan included about 500 protesters, according to 
press accounts.151  
 The tension climbed as rows of police faced off against the protestors. 
Hosea Williams taunted the police and security guards through a megaphone: “If 
you tell me I’m under arrest I’ll go to jail, but if you hit me with that black jack, I’ll 
tear your ass up.”152 At shift change, strikers began rocking the cars of those 
trying to exit the plant, and rocks, sticks, and bottles flew from the lines toward 
the policemen. Three policemen and two strikers sustained minor injuries, though 
police made just seven arrests. Among those taken to Fulton County Jail were 
several white October League members, including the seventy-two-year-old 
Nannie Leah Washburn, who was arrested after she lay down on the street in 
front of the plant gates before being hauled off by Atlanta police.  
Washburn was one of several senior members in the October League—an 
organization that was dominated by young adults in their 20s and 30s. She and a 
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few other Communist Party veterans from the 1930s and 1940s provided the 
October League with a link to a rich tradition of labor and anti-racist struggles.153 
Born in Douglasville, Georgia in 1900 to a family of sharecroppers, Washburn 
began working in textile mills as a child. During the Depression, she joined the 
Communist Party through which she organized textile and WPA workers, as well 
as the unemployed. She also participated in the party’s campaigns to free 
political prisoner Angelo Herndon and the Scottsboro Boys, nine African 
American teenagers wrongly accused of raping two white women in Alabama. In 
the fall of 1934, Washburn and her sister were snatched from a picket line in front 
of Exposition Mill in Atlanta and thrown in Fulton Tower Prison for “circulating 
insurrectionary literature.”154 While she drifted away from the Communist Party, 
Washburn had remained active in labor and civil rights activities in Atlanta, and 
she was a fixture at political demonstrations into the 1990s.155  
                                                 
153
 Harry Haywood was the most prominent October League member to have been in the 
Communist Party. He had joined the party in 1925, and held leadership positions in both the 
American and Soviet communist parties before leaving in the late 1950s. One of the Communist 
Party’s leading black members, Haywood helped develop the party’s “black belt” thesis—the 
notion that African Americans in the South represented a separate nation and were entitled to 
self-determination. The black belt thesis provided the ideological basis for the party’s organizing 
efforts among southern African Americans in the late 1920s and early 1930s. For more on his life, 
see Haywood, Black Bolshevik: the Autobiography of an Afro-American Communist (Chicago: 
Liberator Press 1978). Haywood protégé Odis Hyde was born to a family of Louisiana 
sharecroppers in 1908, and spent much of his young adulthood searching for work. Like 
Washburn, Hyde was radicalized during the Great Depression, when he joined the Communist 
Party in Chicago. As an October League member, Hyde was an invaluable older comrade and 
mentor to his comrades. For more on Hyde, see Odis Hyde, autobiography, Box 7, Folder 12, 
Komozi Woodard and Amiri Baraka Papers, Archives Division, Auburn Avenue Research Library 
on African American Culture and History, Atlanta-Fulton Public Library System.  
 
154
 “Let’s Don’t Put up With This,” Labor Defender, December 1935.  
  
155
 For more on Washburn’s life, see October League, 75 Years of Struggle! The Life of Nanny 
Washburn, (Chicago: Liberator Press 1975) and Ellen Howle, “Nannie Washburn, 95, Crusader 
for Civil Rights,” Atlanta Constitution, 4 May 1996. 
 
  
90 
With their leaders now out on bail, the Mead strikers launched a second 
mule train march just three days after the first. A documentary film crew 
sympathetic to the strike captured the event as the protestors left from the 
Atlanta University Center, walking slowly behind a wagon pulled by mules before 
reaching the plant at about 6:30pm. In front of the entrance to the Mead offices, 
they unloaded a coffin on the front steps of the building. Sherman Miller and 
other strike leaders mounted the wagon and began to lead chants and to make 
speeches. Miller delivered a version of “I am Somebody,” a poem that the Rev. 
Jesse Jackson had recently written and had begun reciting at demonstrations. As 
he concluded, Miller raised his fist as the crowd delivered an increasingly loud 
crescendo of “Soul Power.” The Mead strike film captured the rising tension as a 
black police officer waded through the crowd before mounting the cart and 
standing over Miller’s left shoulder, who continued with his chants. Mead Caucus 
leader and October League member Wayne Draznin, wearing a head bandage to 
cover wounds he had received at the previous protestk, stood over Miller’s right 
shoulder and helped lead the cheers. With little resistance, outside of some 
jostling of an officer’s hat, the police arrested Miller, Draznin, and three other 
October League members and charged them with violating the court order 
against picketing. Nannie Washburn grabbed Miller as he was being led to the 
police wagon, but she was brushed aside by the officers as the crowd continued 
its “Soul Power” chant.156  
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With the key October League activists in jail, Hosea Williams and his 
SCLC staff members assumed the leadership of the demonstration. Williams 
reminded the assembled demonstrators that “Martin Luther King said if you 
haven’t found something you’re willing to die for you’re not fit to live.” To which he 
added a corollary: “If you’ve found something you’re willing to die for, you 
certainly should be willing to go to jail for it.” Williams then directed those 
protestors willing to go to jail to move to the plant gates where they joined arm in 
arm and attempted to block traffic moving in and out of the entrance. Police 
issued a warning before pulling protestors from the driveway and depositing them 
in police vans to be transported to jail. Sixty-six protestors were arrested, 
including at least five Mead workers. As Williams was hauled off to jail he 
instructed his supporters to make arrangements for another protest for the 
following day. Instead, many of the protestors made their way to the police 
station, where they kept vigil through the night. The following day fifty marchers 
walked from downtown with the mule train to the jail demanding that jailers “Free 
Hosea.” A short time later, all of those who were jailed had posted bail.157  
Hosea Williams’s role in the strike was an increasing source of tension for 
the October League and the members of the Mead Caucus. They appreciated his 
willingness to support the strikers and they recognized that he and his SCLC 
branch provided immediate access to a base of support among Atlanta’s black 
poor due to his tireless efforts on behalf of civil rights dating back to the early 
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1960s.158 He also gave the strike a higher profile by virtue of his affiliation with 
King and his reputation as a strong advocate of nonviolent resistance. Publicly, 
October League members praised Williams’s leadership and brushed aside 
suggestions of divisions among the strike leadership. In private, however, 
October League members bristled at Williams’s tendency to draw attention to 
himself, believing that it inhibited the development of grassroots leaders. They 
also felt that he was too willing to negotiate with the company without the 
approval of the strikers and they took issue with his profession of nonviolence, 
which they rejected and believed was out of step with the growing militancy of 
black workers.  
Williams, for his part, never hesitated to use the October League’s 
communism to strengthen his hand with the company and the negotiators from 
the City’s Community Relations Council, who had entered into the dispute to 
facilitate a settlement. Facing a barrage of criticism from the press for allying 
himself with young communists, Williams distanced himself from the October 
League and downplayed their contributions to the strike. “They’re just trying to 
ride the back of the SCLC (Southern Christian Leadership Conference) to 
respectability,” he told reporters. “They’re only some kids who started reading 
philosophy and caught up on the first thing they read and don’t know what in the 
hell they’re talking about.”159  
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Ultimately it was the Mead workers’ pragmatism that kept Williams and the 
October League from reaching a breaking point. Jim Skillman, an October 
League member who worked to solicit community support for the strike, 
acknowledged that the black workers “were more all-sided about” Hosea 
Williams than his comrades. They knew “he wasn’t just an opportunist. He was 
an opportunist, but he wasn’t just an opportunist. He was also a leader, someone 
who could bring something to the struggle. When Hosea would try to tell these 
people that we were bad news. They would say ‘no, no, no.’ And if we . . . had 
tried to tell them that Hosea is an opportunist. They’d say, ‘maybe he is, but we 
need this.’”160  
Three days after the mass arrests, the Atlanta Constitution reported that 
the Atlanta Police Department had been investigating the October League and its 
ties to area strike activity and to Williams. A special investigator from Fulton 
County District Attorney’s office, H.G. Bailey labeled the October League “a well-
educated, well financed militant group that has just filtered into Atlanta in the past 
year.” Bailey tied them to recent bomb threats and asserted that the police had 
“been equating them as the Weatherman portion of the new Communist party.”161 
Hosea Williams rejected Bailey’s allegations that his work was being financed by 
communists. He admitted that “not too long ago somebody offered us around 
$1,000 in contributions from an anonymous source, but I told them I had to know 
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where any money came from that I was going to touch.” He suspected that the 
money may have been from an October League source and went on to state that 
“they almost ruined [the strike] by trying to take over the show themselves. . . . 
they never do any work, all they do is sit around and philosophize. . . .I don’t think 
those folks could raise ten people this afternoon if their lives depended on it.”162 
The October League quickly moved to counteract the impact of the 
Constitution article, but refrained from responding publicly to Williams’s charges. 
On the day of the article’s publication, Sherman Miller called the strikers together 
for a discussion and a vote on the presence of the October League within the 
Mead Caucus. He made the case for the October League’s continuing support, 
but promised to follow the wishes of the workers. Twenty-five workers addressed 
the meeting and reiterated their support of the October League’s presence within 
the strike. When the vote was tallied, 100 workers affirmed the October League’s 
efforts and Sherman Miller’s caucus leadership. Three workers voted to sever the 
relationship.163  
In the pages of the Great Speckled Bird, Atlanta’s leftist underground 
newspaper, the October League issued a response to the Constitution’s “vicious 
attack.” They accused the newspaper of “trying to isolate the October League 
members in the Mead strike and split them away from the other workers who 
they have been fighting side by side with.” After failing to break the strike using 
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injunctions and police force, “these greedy exploiters, who have their backs to 
the wall, have stooped to the low tactic of red-baiting.” The statement also 
acknowledged that “ideological differences do exist between the October League 
and S.C.L.C. on the question of achieving a final solution to the problems of the 
masses of poor and oppressed of all nationalities,” but noted that “a working 
relationship has been built on the basis of common support for the Mead 
workers’ struggle.”164 
Despite these apparent cracks between the caucus and their supporters, 
the continued refusal of black workers to return to their jobs and the pressure 
created by the demonstrations forced Mead to bargain with the strikers. Serious 
discussions began in early September, and by the end of the month the caucus 
presented a company proposal to their supporters. On September 26 the strikers 
voted to reject a Mead offer because it did not include back pay for hours lost 
during the strike, nor did it include a guarantee that all of the strikers would be 
rehired. Following the vote, company and union officials as well as caucus 
members agreed to meet at Central Presbyterian Church and allowed Andrew 
Young of the Community Relations Council to facilitate the continued 
negotiations. Young, a close associate of Martin Luther King who was then 
running for Congress, brokered a deal that included a promise to purchase 
equipment to remove dust from the finishing area; the establishment of a new 
grievance procedure; and a permanent union-management committee to address 
employee problems. The company additionally agreed to work to end 
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discrimination in hiring, training, and promotions, to open up supervisory and 
salaried positions to all interested workers, and to combat the use of racist 
language. No back pay was included, but the strikers gained a $250 no-interest 
loan for any worker in need. Finally, the company agreed to allow a federal 
mediation board nominated by the Community Relations Council to hear the 
cases of those workers who had been fired during the strike.165 Mead Caucus 
leaders, knowing that they could not sustain the strike indefinitely, also moved to 
accept the agreement. On the evening of Tuesday October 3, the remaining 
strikers voted 124-36 to accept the company’s proposals. Two days later, the 
strike officially ended as the union and the company signed the agreement at the 
office of the Atlanta Community Relations Commission. Local 527 president 
Ralph Meers defended his union’s refusal to support the strike, explaining that 
more could have been achieved “if the illegal strike had never occurred.” 
Nevertheless, he pledged to represent all of the returning workers and to “make 
every effort to soothe the wounds that have resulted from the illegal strike.”166 
During a press conference at the Wheat St. Baptist Church Education Building, 
Hosea Williams acknowledged that “we did not gain everything sought, but we 
gained a whole lot more than we had when we began.”167 
As word spread of the strike’s end, October League national chairman 
Mike Klonsky, who had been spending increasing amounts of time in Atlanta, 
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held a press conference to address the mounting criticisms of his organization 
and the attempts to smear the strikers as communist dupes. According to one 
press account, the audience was mainly composed of government investigators 
who listened as Klonsky rejected the claims that the strike had been instigated by 
the October League:  
The truth is that Mead and the companies like them are to blame 
for this unrest—unrest which will never cease until the real causes 
are changed. It is not the October league which has been forcing 
workers to work in air that is so filthy and polluted with dust that 
several women have passed out, only to be immediately sent back 
on the line when they were revived. This crime has been done by 
Mead. It is not the October League which has practiced racial 
discrimination in their policies of hiring and promotions, reserving all 
or most of the better paying, skilled jobs for the white workers, while 
Black workers are kept in the dirtiest, lowest paying jobs.168  
 
Klonsky reminded the audience that “it was Mead and not the October 
League who directed the Atlanta Police Department to attack the Mead workers 
on September 21, jailing more than 100 workers and brutally clubbing the 
arrested workers to the ground, possibly blinding one black worker. . . . To the 
charges of fighting to put an end to these conditions and to this oppressive 
system, we in the October League plead ‘guilty’!”169 
Fully one month after the strike, the Great Speckled Bird reported that 
forty members of the Mead Caucus were still out of work. Following the 
arbitration hearings, that number was whittled down to a handful of Mead Caucus 
leaders, including Wayne Draznin and Sherman Miller, who never returned to 
                                                 
168
 Carroll Crawford, “October League and Mead,” Great Speckled Bird, 16 October 1972. 
  
169
 Jim Stewart, “New Mead Disorders Predicted,” Atlanta Constitution, 9 October 1972.  
 
  
98 
their jobs and were eventually forced to leave Atlanta to find work.170 Capitalizing 
on the publicity surrounding the Mead strike, Miller went on a nationwide 
speaking tour and the October League expanded, absorbing dozens of small 
Marxist study and action collectives made up of veterans of SDS, SNCC, SSOC, 
women’s liberation, black freedoms struggle and other assorted radicals. The 
documentary film “Wildcat at Mead” made the rounds among radical groups, 
serving as an effective recruiting tool just as had the League of Revolutionary 
Black Workers’ “Finally Got the News” two years earlier. 
The Mead Caucus of Rank and File Workers continued to meet, but it had 
been badly weakened by the dismissals of its strongest members. Some within 
the October League came to believe that their decision to pull their white 
members out of the plant during the strike was a tactical error. At the time, they 
thought that the presence of white workers on the picket line would encourage 
other whites to join the strike. That did not happen. In retrospect, those workers 
might have been more effective by agitating from within the plant, and they would 
have kept their jobs. “Organizationally, for us it was a defeat in the sense that 
you had no one left because we had pulled our white workers out in solidarity,” 
October League member Jim Skillman later recalled.171  
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The October League attempted to revivify the caucus by sending new 
cadre into the plant, but they found organizing tough going in the months after 
the strike. The workers involved themselves in the union and pursued other 
avenues for voicing their grievances that had been opened up by the strike. Just 
after the strike, John Fletcher, a white October League member, took a job in 
Mead’s print shop, where the League hoped to build support among white 
workers. But the print shop workers had strong representation from the union, 
according to Fletcher, and the workers there were still mostly unwilling to ally 
themselves with black workers. After a few years in the plant, Fletcher accepted 
an assignment to go to Birmingham to launch an October League cell in the steel 
industry.172 After returning to his job following a year-long suspension for strike 
activity, Mead Caucus member Gary Washington noticed strong improvements in 
the working conditions. Still working at Mead as of this writing and serving Local 
527 as a union steward, he notes that the labor-management committee that 
emerged from the strike is still active serves as an important source of 
information for workers and a vehicle for problem solving at the plant.173   
 Less than a year after the Mead strike’s conclusion, October League 
national leaders assessed the state of their “labor work” and presented their 
findings in the form of a “resolution on labor work” at the organization’s second 
congress in the summer of 1973. The resolution demonstrated the group’s ability 
to be self-critical and to develop new strategies based on their members’ 
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organizing experiences. They observed that over the past year they had become 
a “proletarian organization” as the vast majority of their base of students and 
intellectuals had become factory workers, some of whom had “become 
indispensable leaders in many areas of the working class movement.” Members 
had been active in distributing shop floor newsletters and in supporting the 
struggles for the rights of women and minority workers. A few, like Sherman 
Miller, had been recognized as leaders and some were even elected to office in 
unions, caucuses, and other worker organizations. These positive developments, 
they noted, came about as a result of having corrected earlier errors that had 
isolated the October League from workers, including a purist refusal to “work in 
the reactionary trade unions” and “an over-emphasis on communist propaganda 
work.” The resolution urged members to guard against these errors and to 
rededicate themselves to rooting their work in the concrete realities of their 
coworkers.174 
 The October League’s plans to deepen their involvement in the labor 
movement never came to pass. Events in the world of the New Communist 
Movement diverted members’ energies from shop-floor activism toward an 
increasing emphasis on party building and ideological rigidity. As the October 
League leaders competed with other Marxist-Leninist groups to establish the first 
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national New Communist Party, they pressed cadre into recruiting new members 
through expansion of their study circles and wider distribution of The Call (El 
Clarin), their weekly national newspaper. Campaigns to root out “white 
chauvinism” and other personal and ideological defects demonstrated an 
admirable deliberateness with which the organization confronted racism, sexism, 
and elitism among its members. But the mechanical application of ideological 
litmus tests reduced human frailties to slogans; the required “self-criticisms” often 
turned into counterproductive breast-beating rituals, during which comrades 
exorcised guilt regarding their “bourgeois world outlook,” “petit-bourgeois class 
origin,” and “basic contempt for the masses.”175 As the October League’s 
program ran up against the realities of plant closings, mass layoffs, and the 
decline of worker militancy, members turned on one another in frustration.  
Among all of the New Communist groups, the October League allied itself 
most closely with the Communist Party of China, parroting the CPC’s consuming 
opposition to the alleged “revisionist” errors of the post-Stalin Soviet Union. The 
Chinese eventually rewarded the October League for its unswerving support by 
extending fraternal recognition to it during a state visit to Beijing by Mike 
Klonsky.176 The Chinese “franchise” drew some unaffiliated communists into the 
October League, but the party- building campaign diverted energy from 
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grassroots activity. Moreover, its opposition to the American “revisionists” in the 
Communist Party USA made it next to impossible for the October League to 
function within the labor movement or any other broad alliance on the left.  
Nowhere was the October League’s sectarianism and unyielding 
opposition to the Communist Party USA more destructive to their ability to 
establish a presence in the South than in their work in the Southern Conference 
Educational Fund (SCEF), an interracial Louisville-based group that had worked 
for racial and economic justice since its founding in 1946.177 Since the late 1950s 
two left-wing journalists, Carl and Anne Braden, had worked as SCEF organizers 
and devoted their lives to creating the kind of southern front that the October 
League professed to support. The Bradens had survived unrelenting attacks from 
racist and right-wing forces, including charges of sedition for which Carl Braden 
served eight months in a federal prison. They had also frequently been accused 
of being members of the Communist Party, though they refused to answer 
whether or not they were members. By the late 1960s, the Bradens and SCEF 
were enjoying a resurgence due to the changed political climate and the infusion 
of new energy from young southern radicals, many of whom were mentored by 
Anne Braden.    
In the fall of 1972, three October League members rejoined SCEF after 
having resigned from the organization the previous year. Upon returning, the 
October League members acknowledged that they had mistakenly dismissed the 
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organization as a front group for the Communist Party and they pledged to “again 
be a part of SCEF in order to build a strong movement against oppression in the 
South.” Internally, the October League admitted that they had failed to appreciate 
SCEF’s ideological diversity and that it had been a mistake to “[hand] the 
organization and all these people over to the revisionists without even a 
struggle.”178  
A few months later, mounting tensions between a Louisville chapter of the 
Black Panthers and SCEF led to the Panthers kidnapping SCEF’s executive 
director, Helen Greever, and her husband, Earl Scott, and holding them hostage 
overnight.179 The couple escaped when Scott faked a heart attack and convinced 
one of the Panthers to call an ambulance. Once freed, SCEF members called the 
police and two of the assailants were arrested. Various SCEF leaders protested 
the decision to involve law enforcement given that both SCEF and the Panthers 
had been constant targets of state repression. Over the next year, the October 
League cadre used the incident and the turmoil it had caused within SCEF to 
consolidate their hold on the group and to drive out those they accused of being 
unduly influenced by the Communist Party USA.  
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Carl Braden resigned from SCEF in October 1973, lashing out against the 
“atmosphere of political hysteria” that “reminded him of a hearing before HUAC at 
which” he had appeared in the early 1960s: “I pointed out to the board that I had 
gone to prison for resisting such an inquisition, and I didn’t intend to put up with it 
in an organization that had been fighting such hysteria for 35 years.”180 Anne 
Braden echoed her husband’s criticisms and denounced the SCEF board for 
engaging in “red-baiting from the left.” She observed that while many of her 
younger colleagues professed to reject anti-communism, they nevertheless grew 
up in the “saturated atmosphere” of the Red Scare, which had “seriously 
crippled” their ability to deal “honestly and frankly” with real ideological 
complexities: “You still carry with you a view of the CP as a conspiracy instead of 
a valid organization that you can deal with, discuss with, struggle with.”181 She 
resigned a short time later, and under the October League’s leadership, SCEF 
changed the name of its newspaper from Southern Patriot—with its “connotations 
of patriotism to this system of exploitation and to the white supremacy of the Klan 
and the confederacy”—to Southern Struggle.182 Subscriptions declined, 
additional board members and staff resigned, programmatic work fell off, and 
SCEF faded into oblivion.   
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As late as December 1976, Atlanta business groups and law enforcement 
agencies continued to fear disruptions by communists in the city’s factories. The 
Georgia Business and Industry Association announced that they had gathered 
evidence of a communist presence in seven area companies, and that the FBI 
and GBI were investigating reports of industrial sabotage. The Association 
warned human resource professionals to watch out for articulate applicants in 
their twenties looking for low level jobs that offer mobility within the plant.183  
The threat was wildly overstated. The vast majority of October League 
members and other radicals who had entered the plants in the early 1970s had 
moved on with their lives. Some returned to school, others pursued professional 
careers that had been interrupted by their foray into factory work. Many others 
involved themselves in electoral politics, or became full-time community 
organizers, teachers, and human rights advocates. Those individual activists who 
remained in the factories and hoped to be politically relevant after the economic 
dislocations of the 1970s were more willing to work within the trade union 
bureaucracies than they had earlier. Among the veterans of the October League 
with whom I spoke were labor educators, a UAW staff member, and a teachers 
union activist. All of them had to varying degrees found some niche within the 
larger tent of the labor movement.  
The October League—remade as the (CPML) Communist Party Marxist-
Leninist in 1977—had no significant presence in Atlanta’s factories after the 
strike wave of 1972. Though they had been among the most flexible and 
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ecumenical of the New Communist groups of the early 1970s, their growing 
sectarianism marginalized them from most workers and most of the left. Most 
importantly they misread the shifting political undercurrents and assumed that the 
era of mass action of the late 1960s would continue into the 1970s. In the face of 
mounting evidence that contradicted their hope for an impending upsurge of 
grassroots militancy, they pursued increasingly sectarian, dogmatic, and 
ultimately marginal strategies that prevented them from building a base among 
the working class. The bit of creativity and flexibility that they had exhibited in 
Atlanta was an un-sustained flash. Their commitment to identifying and nurturing 
grassroots labor leaders was overwhelmed by the organizational demand to 
focus on “party building”—or the recruitment of “advanced workers” into the 
October League. Too much of their energy was directed at exposing and 
opposing “labor misleaders” and “revisionists”—some of whom had strong 
followings among the workers—rather than the employers.  
In Chicago and Northwest Indiana, for instance, October League/CPML 
steelworkers sat on the sidelines and sometimes actively opposed the most 
successful and broad-based reform movement in the history of the United 
Steelworkers of America. They derided militant steelworker Ed Sadlowski and his 
“Fight Back” supporters as “union bureaucrats . . . the main promoters of racism 
in the labor movement, using it to try to split any opposition that develops to their 
anti-worker policies.” Sadlowski’s program had much in common with the 
October League’s notion of class-struggle unionism, but in its eyes, his support 
from the Communist Party made him more dangerous to the working class than 
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the capitalists because he threatened to divert the workers toward reform and 
away from their true class interests. To their credit, the steelworker members of 
the party eventually repudiated the organization’s sectarianism and began 
working closely with other progressive elements in the union.184  
The October League/CPML’s ability to react and respond to the changing 
realities on the shop floor were undermined by a rigid overemphasis on 
ideological purity that left workers feeling alienated or at best perplexed. The 
constantly changing political lines and political infighting left many members 
badly bruised and sometimes bitter for years to come. Under mounting pressure, 
Klonsky quit the Central Committee in 1980, acknowledging that his “methods of 
work have increasingly been singled out for criticism and have been closely 
connected to the ultra-‘Left’ deviation in our work.” Those errors had “increased 
division in the ranks and weakness in understanding the need to root out every 
aspect of the ultra-left line which I helped promote.”185  
With few exceptions, black and white workers rejected the October 
League/CPML’s Marxism-Leninism in favor of their own more pragmatic 
strategies and goals. Even the militant black workers at Mead who found the 
group valuable during the strike ultimately had little use for the October 
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League/CPML’s communist ideology. Though at its peak they had several dozen 
energetic and committed young comrades organizing in Atlanta, Mississippi, 
Louisville, Birmingham, and North Carolina, they left no institutional legacy. Their 
southern strategy joined a long list of failed attempts to organize the South.186  
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Chapter 3: A Working Class Hero Is Something to Be 
 
 On his first day of work as a longshoreman on the San Francisco 
waterfront, Bruce Hartford, a veteran of the civil rights movement in Alabama and 
Mississippi and antiwar activist, climbed down a long grimy ladder in to a ship’s 
hold. As he landed he was surprised by an older worker in the shadows who 
introduced himself as the gang boss and proceeded to explain the job 
expectations: “Now here’s the way it is. You see them guys up top? Them 
looking over us? They got those white hats on? They’re the bosses. Down here 
in the hold, we are the workers. They are your enemy. We are your allies. You 
don’t have no loyalty to them. Your loyalty is to us down here. . . . Now, at any 
time, two of our six people are sleeping over there in the wings where they can’t 
be seen. So you . . . go take a nap for a half-hour, and then you’ll work. And of 
course you don’t tell nobody about this.” Hartford worked part-time on the 
waterfront for several years to support himself through school. During the long 
student strike at San Francisco State College, he had no trouble finding 
longshoremen sympathetic to the strike’s anti-racism, anti-war, and anti-authority 
themes—those themes resonated strongly with the rank and file of the leftist 
ILWU who had been fighting similar battles on the waterfront for three decades. 
Defying the New Left’s stereotypes regarding either their presumed conservatism 
or their readiness for revolution, the longshoremen taught Hartford that they had 
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their own traditions of resistance and protest shaped by their day-to-day work 
realities.187  
 As young radicals immersed themselves in their new jobs and 
communities, they met workers—like Hartford’s gang boss—whose politics were 
complex and sometimes contradictory. Borrowing a phrase from socialist-activist 
Michael Harrington, historian Jefferson Cowie has described the political culture 
of blue collar workers of the 1970s as being “vigorously left, right and center.”188 
How else to describe American workers’ paradoxical support for wildcat strikes 
and Spiro Agnew’s appeals to law and order, or their opposition to the Vietnam 
war and hostility toward the antiwar protestors? While the mass strikes and on-
the-job protests of the early 1970s suggested a high degree of labor militancy 
and a renewed openness to radical politics, white workers especially exhibited a 
growing conservatism demonstrated by their support for George Wallace and 
Ronald Reagan. That conservatism was only reinforced by the economic events 
and trends of the mid-1970s, including the energy crisis, deindustrialization, 
inflation, and an emerging cynicism regarding the role of the federal 
government—a sensibility best summed up in Ronald Reagan’s 1981 inaugural 
address in which he pronounced that “government is the problem.”189  
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 Those who made the turn to the working class had to negotiate these 
contradictions and complexities whether they were organizing against racist 
hiring practices, building the peace movement, forming dissident union caucuses, 
or identifying leaders for a new communist party. They succeeded to the extent 
that they were able to establish trust and credibility through their hard work on 
the job and by being dependable coworkers. They succeeded when they listened 
to coworkers and when they were attentive to their new work cultures. They 
succeeded as they learned to eschew theoretical polemics and talk to workers 
about radical politics in language that was relevant to workers’ experiences. 
Those radical intellectuals who committed to working-class politics over the long 
haul, particularly those who persisted beyond the economic dislocations of the 
mid-1970s, reconciled themselves to the reality that long-term social change 
sometimes required compromise and the sacrificing of revolutionary goals for 
reformist victories.  
  
 SDS’s annual summer work-ins served as a gateway to factory work and 
working-class politics for thousands of young white radicals. During the 
program’s first year in 1967, students were encouraged to take manufacturing 
jobs for the summer to talk to workers about the Vietnam War in cities such as 
Chicago, Boston, Newark, and Rochester.190 Subsequent summer work-ins 
emphasized the importance of exposing middle-class students to working-class 
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realities, though students were also expected to talk to their coworkers about the 
war, the black freedom struggle, and the student movement. The work-ins were 
initiated by the Progressive Labor (PL) faction within SDS and represented an 
extension of PL’s efforts to forge a worker-student alliance. While Progressive 
Labor was reviled by its opponents within SDS and has often been dismissed by 
historians of the New Left for its unrelenting dogmatism and divisive political 
tactics, its influence on student politics in the 1960s and the turn to the working 
class was nevertheless considerable.  
 The Progressive Labor Movement emerged in the early-1960s as a 
splinter group from the New York state Communist Party. Its founding members, 
who numbered no more than two dozen, sided with the Chinese in the Sino-
Soviet split and believed that the Communist Party USA had fallen prey to 
“revisionism.” In the eyes of PL, the CPUSA had betrayed Lenin and Stalin by 
endorsing the Soviet Union’s policies of peaceful coexistence with capitalism.191 
The organization coupled an Old Left trade union orientation, as represented by 
its early support for striking miners in Hazard, Kentucky, with an aggressive 
critique of U.S. imperialism that was becoming increasingly attractive to students 
as the war in Vietnam escalated. In a bid to wield influence within the growing 
student movement in the spring of 1966, PL dissolved its antiwar organization, 
the May 2nd Movement, renamed itself the Progressive Labor Party, and 
dispatched its cadre into SDS. Over the next three years, PL vied for control over 
SDS within the organization’s National Committee—a contest that turned 
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increasingly disruptive and ultimately left the student movement without national 
leadership just as it was reaching its broadest level of popularity and influence. 
Despite the growing friction within SDS, PL secured the organization’s 
sponsorship of work-in programs for three straight summers.192 
 Business and media leaders quickly realized that student radicals were 
using the factories as a staging ground to advance left-wing politics. After the 
1968 SDS work-in, nationally syndicated columnist Victor Riesel warned of 
imminent student-led labor disruptions “in transit, steel, auto, on the rails, 
waterfront, and in city commerce” that would “catch fire like confrontations at 
Columbia or Berkeley.” Riesel explained that SDS’s goal was to “catch the spirit 
of Paris in the spring,” reminding his readers ominously that “no one thought it 
could happen there either.”193 The following spring, Berkeley Chamber of 
Commerce leader Rene Jope alerted local businesses to an “insidious plan to 
disrupt our national economy [that], if successful, will have an ugly impact on 
your business and the business community of Berkeley.” He accused left wing 
activists of aiming for “a complete disruption of this country similar to that which 
paralyzed France in the recent past—which caused havoc in world money 
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markets—which brought French President de Gaulle crashing to defeat and has 
left France in a state of economic jeopardy.”194  
 The corporate high alerts and the growing sophistication of human 
resource professionals forced radicals to take increased precautions. Whether 
she was a sociology major or a black militant, a young radical’s attempt to secure 
an industrial job posed immediate logistical problems. A previous arrest record, 
unexplained gaps in a candidate’s work history, or the inclusion of college 
classes or advanced degrees on an application raised suspicion and often led to 
rejection. SDS recommended to its work-in students that they omit their college 
background and solicit friends to supply phony employment references. The 
1967 work-in manual also advised students to stress that “whatever you did on 
your ‘previous job’ involved some kind of manual heavy work,” and warned 
against showing off on aptitude tests: “If there are 100 questions and it’s a time 
test, don’t answer more than 50. That’s a rule of thumb. If you do too well, they’ll 
either be suspicious or want to use you in the ‘front office.’”195  
Despite the growing alarm, the students for the most part kept a low-
profile during their summer work experiences in the late 1960s. More than 350 
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students participated in the summer of 1968. They provided picket line support 
for striking garment workers in New York City and truck drivers in Chicago, some 
of whom they invited to a showing of the radical labor film—Salt of the Earth. 
Forty work-in students and eight drivers sat in silence after the film until one 
driver broke the ice by drawing parallels between their strike and the movie. “It 
was really a new and exciting experience on both sides,” the students later wrote. 
“The students came to understand the struggles of workers, and their political 
potential, in a real and different way. The workers came to see a potential ally in 
a force usually used as grounds for getting scabs—the students—and at the 
same time began to understand what the student movement is all about and how 
in a very real way it relates to them.”196  
 Employers continued in their vigilance even after SDS’s demise, but 
radicals found work where jobs were abundant. Despite his public notoriety and 
an activist history well-documented by the FBI and the Detroit police 
department’s anti-subversive unit, General Baker returned to the automobile 
industry in 1973 using an assumed name and a new social security number. He 
successfully avoided detection for nearly two years until he was discovered and 
fired for falsifying his employment application at Ford’s River Rouge plant. It was 
another sixteen months before the case was arbitrated in his favor; Ford had 
taken too long to discover the discrepancy and to take action against Baker.197  
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 The American Tobacco Company in Durham, North Carolina, hired Ray 
Eurquhart not realizing that he had been distributing political literature and 
shouting slogans through a bullhorn outside the factory gates for weeks. His 
political associates had told him he had no chance of being hired, to which 
Eurquhart predicted correctly that the white managers could not distinguish him 
from hundreds of other black job seekers. Even before the end of his 
probationary period, Eurquhart risked attending union meetings and raising 
issues about conditions in the plant. Only after his probation period ended did his 
supervisor realize his mistake, leaving Eurquhart to conclude that “we give the 
boss too much credit that the boss has his or her ducks in a row. It isn’t always 
that case.”198   
 Once on the job, young activists had to earn the respect of their 
coworkers. That required them to blend in as smoothly as possible and to 
downplay any mistrust that might arise when coworkers discovered they had 
motivations for working that extended beyond making money. Mathematics 
graduate student turned longshoreman Thurman Wenzel recalls the tension he 
experienced when he went to work on the docks in Baltimore in the early 1970s 
to “organize more effective unions and combine that with efforts against Vietnam-
like interventions by the US military.” As a student, Wenzel had been part of a 
small group of antiwar activists clustered around an alternative newspaper in 
Charlottesville, Virginia. In 1972, he and several comrades set out to join the 
working class. Wenzel took a job at the post office before moving to east 
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Baltimore, enrolling in a night welding class, and finding work in a shipyard in 
1974. In an unpublished memoir, he recalled feeling that on the docks “it was 
important to me that I ‘fit in,’ so sometimes I was uncomfortable distributing our 
union paper openly—instead leaving it anonymously in break rooms.” On some 
“lifestyle and cultural” issues, however, he “refused to try to fit in.” For instance, 
following a trip to study Spanish in Mexico, Wenzel’s coworkers quizzed him 
about his sexual adventures during his vacation. “I objected and told my 
coworkers that I’d be glad to talk about the language school and the about the 
students I had met there,” but they were not interested in his desire to improve 
his Spanish and or to learn more about Central American politics. Ultimately, 
Wenzel never resolved whether he was “a ‘visitor’ on the docks, as opposed to a 
‘real’ worker.” On one hand, he and other young leftists “were perceived as 
‘outsiders’ in an environment where people tended to vote for their friends in 
union elections.” On the other hand, Wenzel and three other associates spent 
more than 8 years on the docks, they “regularly attended union meetings, voiced 
our opinions and found a small but receptive audience.”199 
 Those radicals who came from a working-class background or with factory 
experience made the adjustment most easily. Others sometimes relied on 
romanticized images of the working class—“On the Waterfront,” Woody Guthrie 
songs, and labor murals from the Popular Front—to guide their behavior. More 
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current stereotypes of workers, embodied by the television longshoreman Archie 
Bunker and the New York hard hats who beat up anti-war protestors, reinforced 
strong New Left sentiments that the white working class was reactionary and 
racist.  
 When the Progressive Labor Party sent its members to distribute literature 
at factory gates they encouraged members to shave their moustaches, keep their 
hair short, and dress conservatively so as not to alienate workers. The 
organization frowned upon rock music and the free-wheeling sexuality of the 
counterculture, which they believed American workers disdained. Over the 
course of the 1970s, other socialist groups hoping to make inroads among 
workers adopted similar guidelines for their members. They discouraged 
unmarried couples from living together and forbade homosexual relationships 
that might alienate or offend workers. These constraints—what new communist 
movement historian Max Elbaum refers to as a strain of “cultural conservatism” 
on the left—may have forced activists to be sensitive to the ways in which they 
were perceived by their coworkers, but they also defied sweeping cultural trends 
challenging traditional sexual mores and gender roles. The policies were also 
often applied so mechanically and clumsily that they alienated activists, 
especially feminist women and gays and lesbians.200  
 Moreover, the left’s cultural conservatism badly underestimated the 
growing diversity of the American workforce over the course of the decade. 
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Young American workers of all political tendencies were embracing the fashions, 
music, language, and lifestyles of the counterculture and of the Black Power 
movement just as the students were. Working-class southern white men listened 
to the long-haired “rebel rock” of Lynryd Skynryd and the Allman Brothers, just as 
moderate African American workers began wearing afros in the 1970s. After 
women gained wider access to steel jobs following a 1975 consent decree, the 
Steelworkers District 31 Women’s Caucus from Northwest Indiana and South 
Chicago attracted middle-class socialist-feminists, as well as lesbian, straight, 
black, white, and Latina working-class women who bonded one night a week at 
Gary’s Blue Room Lounge and at disco dance fundraisers.201 The very makeup 
of the working class underwent tremendous changes in the 1970s, and new 
workers adopted an ever increasing range of cultural identities. 
 Progressive Labor Party activist Yonni Chapman remembers encountering 
this cultural dissonance as he was selling copies of his organization’s newspaper 
outside of the Ford factory in Hapeville near Atlanta in 1971. When he and a 
female comrade were approached by one of the plant’s few long-haired white 
workers, they thought they had a sure sale and possibly a new recruit to the 
movement. The worker requested a copy of the newspaper from Chapman’s 
comrade, held it aloft and lit it with his lighter, as Chapman was physically 
attacked by several other white workers who were thwarted only by the 
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intervention of a worker who had been a member of the Black Panthers. 
Chapman later learned that the white attackers were Klansmen and union 
officials.202  
 A more serious barrier to making inroads among the working class was 
the dismissal by some elements of the New Left of the trade unions as either 
irrelevant or reactionary. These New Left suspicions had their roots in the AFL-
CIO’s historical failure to confront discrimination in its member unions, its erratic 
support for the black freedom struggle, and its endorsement of Johnson’s war in 
Vietnam.203 As early as May of 1965, George Meany had pledged AFL-CIO 
support for the war “no matter what the academic do-gooders may say, no matter 
what the apostles of appeasement may say.”204 Hostility to the labor movement 
only grew as activist-scholars uncovered the AFL-CIO’s foreign policy ties to the 
CIA, and its role in overthrowing popularly elected regimes in Brazil, Guyana, 
Chile, and the Dominican Republic under the guise of promoting free trade 
unions.205 While the criticisms of the AFL-CIO were on the mark, the blanket 
dismissal of the labor movement failed to take into account its breadth, diversity, 
and its dissidents. It was only as radical activists engaged in local struggles and 
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involved themselves with working-class communities that they realized that the 
labor movement offered substantial room for carrying out political work.   
 San Francisco Bay Area antiwar protestor Frank Bardacke, who has spent 
much of his adult life working as a labor activist, admits that in the 1960s he and 
other New Leftists saw the “the working class as hopelessly compromised,” and 
believed “that it was a mistake to think of them as any kind of revolutionary 
vanguard or revolutionary force.” That changed as he immersed himself in the 
struggles of the United Farm Workers (UFW) in California’s Central Coast region. 
At the age of thirty in 1971, Bardacke was facing a severe case of movement 
burnout, the breakup of his marriage, and his third suspension from graduate 
school. Following his acquittal on felony charges related to the highly publicized 
protests that shut down the Oakland Military Induction Center in the fall of 1967, 
Bardacke grew increasingly dispirited about the state of the movement.206 While 
working at a GI coffeehouse near Santa Cruz, Bardacke stopped for a hitchhiker 
who said he had been picking vegetables in the nearby fields of the Salinas 
Valley “salad bowl.” The hitchhiker reported that the money was good and he 
explained how to get a dispatch from the United Farmworkers union hall. If he 
was looking for a break from politics, Bardacke had picked the wrong time and 
place for work. The fields were filled with strife in the summer of 1971. “It was a 
little like walking into Detroit into an automobile plant in 1937 the year after the sit 
downs,” Bardacke recalled. The previous fall the UFW had won contracts after 
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one of the most successful agricultural strikes in California labor history. The 
workers were jubilant in victory, but unsure as to how much they had won. A 
system of disciplinary warnings replaced arbitrary dismissals, leaving foremen 
especially confused and frustrated by the new policies. Everything was contested 
and everything was political, and Bardacke was delighted to be re-immersed in 
politics. “There it was before my very eyes,” he remembers. “Daily struggle. 
Refusing to work. Refusing to accept warning tickets.” Bardacke learned 
Spanish, served as a union steward, and became deeply involved in UFW 
politics for most of the next ten years.207  
 While hundreds of intellectual-activists joined the UFW staff and served 
Cesar Chavez’s union as organizers, regional boycott coordinators, writers, 
lawyers, and advisors, only a few followed Bardacke’s route into the fields. Part 
of what kept him there for seven seasons between 1971 and 1979 was that the 
work appealed to his masculinity. “Piece work in the fields is about as macho as 
you can get,” he admits. “You’re proud of your ability to work hard and earn a 
decent wage.”208 Moreover, working in the fields allowed him to talk to coworkers 
as they chopped vegetables and to practice some level of control over the pace 
of work. His later stints inside factories proved to be short-lived because of the 
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noise, the speed of the machinery, and a regimentation that he found 
unbearable.209  
 Many other young radicals similarly found the physical demands, the 
dangerous conditions, and the dirty environment of the factory to be an 
insurmountable barrier to working-class organizing. In 1969 the San Francisco-
based radical newspaper The Movement featured an anonymous account of one 
radical’s struggles at work in a Midwest factory. He reported that the work “was 
the hardest physical labor I had done in ten years,” and that after his first day he 
was sure he would either lose his fingers from heavy lifting or “die of exhaustion.” 
More important, he worried that the work demands left him precious few 
opportunities for political work: “Sometimes you feel you spend 8 hours in the 
fucking place and lots of times you only get to talk to people on your half hour 
break and ten minutes of your lunch hour. You figure you’re wasting 8 hours plus 
the time it takes you to get there, learning and doing nothing, when you could be 
doing political work.” While he and the members of his radical collective had 
been discussing these problems, they had not reached any conclusions about 
how to deal with the tensions between meeting the job’s demands and finding 
enough time to organize.210 
 As long as activists chose their factory jobs and exercised some control 
over where they worked, the personal risks were relatively low. Facing excessive 
boredom or fatigue, an activist could quit a job after a few weeks or a few months 
and return to school, find a different job, or serve the movement in another 
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capacity. However, as various socialist organizations attempted to 
“proletarianize” their members—sending them into industry en masse to establish 
a radical base in the working class—they sometimes exerted pressure on their 
comrades to take jobs for which they were ill-suited. Peter Olney, who left 
Harvard in 1971 to work in Boston-area factories, remembered one situation in 
which a highly sensitive friend was sent into a kosher sausage plant, where she 
was exposed to extreme heat and cold and brine: “You’re in the rough-and-
tumble world of a meat packing plant and somebody looks at you cross-eyed and 
you break down in tears, that was what was happening to her.” Olney believes 
that one of the great failings of the socialist organizations that sent members into 
industry in the 1970s was that they sent too many people into factory work “who 
just shouldn’t have been there” because “physically it was too taxing for them.” 
The organizations’ overemphasis on placing members in industrial jobs drove 
away recruits who might have made valuable contributions as writers or 
community organizers outside of the factories. Moreover, many of those who 
worked as community organizers or in professional jobs in healthcare and 
education, reported feeling that their work was devalued by their “proletarian” 
comrades.   
 Before Mike Parker took a job as an autoworker, he had watched dozens 
of his comrades in the International Socialists leave California to work in various 
industries in the Midwest, including transportation, auto, steel, and 
communications. He was finally persuaded to go to Detroit in 1975, but he 
insisted that he be allowed to take a job as a skilled autoworker even though the 
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organization concentrated its forces among production workers. Parker, who had 
training as an electrician, knew that he would not last on the assembly line and 
that he would have more longevity in the plant as a skilled tradesman. That was 
a personal decision, though it proved to be fortuitous as many of the IS members 
who had been sent to the auto industry earlier were directed to the plants where 
the League of Revolutionary Black Workers had been active. Not coincidentally 
those were older plants at the end of their lifespan. As those factories closed in 
the late 1970s, many of Parker’s IS comrades were turned out of the industry and 
were unable to find new auto jobs.211 
 Despite receiving guidance from wiser and more experienced comrades, 
as well as warnings from the SDS manual to avoid “storming the plant like a 
preacher and abstract college know-it-all,” radical activists were frequently 
undermined by their own revolutionary enthusiasms.212 The summer rebellions in 
the cities, campus unrest, the failure of Vietnam, and the bombing of Cambodia 
all contributed to a sense that the nation was headed for a cataclysmic change. 
According to sociologist Seymour Martin Lipset, seventy-five percent of all 
students in May of 1970 “endorsed the need for fundamental changes,” and on 
the left many hoped for and predicted a socialist revolution.213 Into the early 
1970s many of them, especially those on the left, shared Frank Bardacke’s 
sense that “capitalism was on its last legs.” Bardacke thought at the time that by 
                                                 
211
 Mike Parker, Interview by author, 15 May 2005.  
  
212
 SDS, Work-in Organizers Manual, [1969], Box 64, Folder SDS, New Left Collection, Hoover 
Institution Archives, Stanford, CA. 
 
213
 Seymour Martin Lipset, Rebellion in the University (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 
1976) p. 58. 
 
  
126 
1990 “everyone in the world would be some kind of socialist” and that “the big 
debates would be over the type of socialist you were.”214 Believing that the 
revolution was just around the corner, radicals in the factories could be 
overzealous in their pronouncements, “ultra-left” in their practice, and 
condescending and dismissive toward moderate workers.   
 Just before his freshman year at Harvard, Peter Olney worked as a janitor 
at Boston’s Charles River Park apartments, where one summer evening in 1969 
he gathered with a group of coworkers in the break room. The crew leader from 
South Boston offered a curse-laden litany of job-related complaints and remarked 
that he would be unable to make his rent for the coming month. As the other 
janitors voiced agreement, Olney thought this would be the perfect the moment 
to explain why America needed socialism. He jumped on a table and began his 
oration, but before he could proceed too far, the crew leader cut him short with a 
sharp “‘shut the fuck up, kid,’” which “was the end of my discourse on that,” he 
later recounted.215 The SDS student reports from their summer work-in 
experiences are filled with similar stories of radical activists misjudging their 
coworkers—revealing to them that they were communists in their first days of 
work, offering lectures on socialism, and calling for strikes over slight violations of 
the union contract.216   
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Most of these incidents were innocuous or humorous and only 
underscored the distance between the left-wing activists and the workers. But 
those revolutionary enthusiasms could sometimes damage reform efforts and 
democratic movements within the unions. Marty Nathans was a member of the 
North Carolina branch of the Workers’ Viewpoint Organization, which carried out 
vigorous campaigns for workers’ rights and black civil rights in the 1970s. In the 
small Eastern North Carolina town of Whitakers, for instance, they organized a 
campaign to bring to justice a white store owner who murdered a young black 
man in a dispute over change. Workers’ Viewpoint also spearheaded opposition 
to the implementation of a state-wide exam for high school students that would 
have prevented thousands of poor white and black North Carolinians from 
graduating. The organization’s New York leadership recognized the North 
Carolina cadre’s successes, but it also pressed them to more aggressively 
promote communism in their organizing. That proved to be a significant barrier to 
working within broader progressive coalitions. “When we openly advocated 
revolution in the trade unions, it was a disaster,” Nathans recalled years later. 
She and other comrades had been conducting health screening clinics for rubber 
workers at the Kelly Springfield Company, who were in the midst of a union 
organizing drive. During an educational meeting, Nathans made some remarks 
advocating socialism, which an international union representative then used to 
redbait the local union leadership and organizers. The organizing drive suffered 
due to Nathan’s “naïve mistake,” and she later acknowledged that she and her 
  
128 
fellow Workers’ Viewpoint Members had not been “sensitive to the immediate 
potential harm that could happen.”217  
In other instances, the dogmatism of left-wing activists kept them on the 
sidelines of some significant progressive movements. Beginning in the mid-
1970s, dissident Steelworkers in the Chicago area spearheaded a national 
reform campaign—“Fight Back”—to end corruption in the United Steelworkers of 
America (USWA), oppose concessionary bargaining, and elect new union 
leadership. Their leader Ed Sadlowski was a handsome third-generation 
steelworker from South Chicago who articulated the frustrations of the old-timers 
“who’d fought to establish the union and felt something was missing from the old 
days, when the rank-and-file used to mass on the street and get contract 
demands settled themselves instead of relying on Pittsburgh.”218 But “Oilcan 
Eddie” also appealed to young idealists inside and outside of the USWA as he 
quoted Eugene Debs, critiqued American materialism, and spoke of the need to 
re-evaluate the very meaning of work. “There are workers there right now who 
are full of poems and doctors who are operating cranes,” he said of the mill 
workers. “A doctor is more useful than a man with the capacity to be a doctor 
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spending his life on the crane.”219 Sadlowski’s forthrightness—together with 
thousands of dollars in campaign money for the incumbent and a good deal of 
election fraud—cost him the USWA presidency, though he was able to forge a 
coalition that included a majority of the union workers in the largest steel mills, 
the Communist Party, at least two Trotskyist groups, and several new communist 
organizations, who agreed to put aside their differences for the sake of Sadlowski 
and the “Steelworkers Fight Back” movement.220  
At least one left-wing group nevertheless refused to support Sadlowski, 
arguing that his reformist program contained, rather than promoted working-class 
militancy. While they failed to do any substantial damage to the campaign, they 
were an irritant. “I had a confrontation with three of them while going into a drug 
store,” he later recalled. “One guy threw chocolate milk on me, and I nailed him 
good in the mouth. Another guy started in, and I nailed him and kicked him. The 
store manager called the cops, and they came with a paddy wagon. I knew the 
cop, and he arrested them for assaulting me. Which they did; they threw milk on 
me.” Sadlowski remains convinced that they worked for either the steelmakers or 
the FBI.221 
Not all of the young radicals who committed to organizing workers as a 
strategy for social change came from outside of labor’s ranks. Steelworker Mike 
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Olszanski was infected by the same spirit of rebellion in the 1960s and 1970s 
that politicized so many students and black activists, but his politics developed in 
the mill. Shortly after graduating from high school, he followed many of his male 
friends to Inland Steel in East Chicago, Indiana. With a few years of experience 
under his belt, he was invited to get involved in USWA Local 1010, and he was 
quickly swept up into the national steelworkers reform campaign and the political 
ferment within the local. Olszanski recalls that delicate negotiations were 
required to balance the demands and ideologies of various political tendencies 
within the union caucus he supported. One Trotskyist group supported the 
positions of the caucus, but declined to engage in caucus work or attend its 
meetings. “The Maoists were in and out. They’d come, make demands, go off in 
a huff, and be back in six months,” he recalled. “They’d support us in elections 
sometimes, and other times would get in a tiff and be gone. They were erratic.” 
While they could be difficult to work with, Olszanski acknowledges that “the guys 
in the mill really respected them. A Maoist in the coke plant was always wanting 
to go out on wildcat strikes. He was crazy but had the workers’ interests at heart.” 
Olszanski never saw fit to join a radical group outside of the union, but as 
a second generation steelworker with left-wing politics and a following in the mill, 
Olszanski was much sought after by various socialist groups. He was open to 
their appeals “until they started telling me what was wrong with every group 
except their own.” Olszanski remembers one persistent recruiter who called his 
house and lectured him for hours: “He didn’t speak in sentences where you could 
stop him. There was never a pause. He’d preach and preach and preach. He had 
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all this knowledge to impart to the working class. Finally, I’d say, ‘I have to go.’ 
He’d say, ‘We’re talking world revolution here.’ I’d say ‘the Revolution is going to 
have to wait ‘til tomorrow.’”222  
 Twenty-year-old Paul Krehbiel was a Buffalo glass factory worker whose 
on-the-job experiences, like those of Olszanski, served as his gateway to the 
world of left-wing politics and a lifelong commitment to organizing workers. In the 
summer of 1968, he began working as a fine grinder operator on the second shift 
at Standard Mirror in south Buffalo. Krehbiel was apolitical and initially had no 
strong feelings about unions or his union, United Glass and Ceramic Workers 
Local 44. That quickly changed. “When I first started to work in the glass factory, 
I was struck by the environment—the loud noises, the hard physical labor, the 
fast and steady pace of work, the screaming abusive bosses, and the finely 
ground up glass that we breathed in the air,” he later recalled in an unpublished 
memoir.223 As company managers attempted to implement a production 
increase, Krehbiel and many of his coworkers witnessed a popular steward “rip 
into the personnel manager on the shop floor, screaming that the workers in the 
beveling department were NOT going to go over their quota.” Deeply impressed, 
Krehbiel decided to attend a union meeting where he “learned that we didn’t just 
have to take whatever management dished out to us; we could stand up and fight 
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back.” Over the following weeks, Krehbiel and his coworkers successfully 
coordinated a work slow-down that put an end to the company’s effort to increase 
production. He credits those events for being “the beginning of my 
radicalization.”224  
That same year, Krehbiel began attending classes at the University of 
Buffalo where he met student radicals who further encouraged his political 
development. Over the next several years, he left the factory, became a full-time 
student, and joined the Buffalo Draft Resistance Union, SDS, and the Student 
Strike Committee which shut down the university in the spring of 1970. After 
twelve Buffalo student protestors were shot around the same time as the Kent 
State killings, Krehbiel and a small group of male and female working-class 
students decided to return to the factories to organize. After much discussion, the 
group agreed on three principles of unity: to encourage workers on the job to 
assume more control over their lives through direct action as a means of 
revitalizing the Buffalo area labor movement; to build links between the labor and 
civil rights movements; and to build alliances between labor and the anti-war 
movement. Krehbiel acknowledges that it “was quite a lofty agenda for a group of 
young workers in our twenties in 1970. But that was an era of massive social 
turmoil and rebellion, and there was great hope in the air.” As a first step they 
focused on worker education and outreach through the publication of New Age, a 
monthly labor newspaper that promised to “help build a new age in America” 
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during which “workers and their families control their own lives.”225 In its year of 
existence the paper highlighted news of local strikes, the antiwar movement, and 
the black liberation struggle. The February 1971 issue, for example, included an 
interview with a shop steward at Bethlehem Steel’s Lackawanna Plant, reports 
on pollution in Lake Erie and a strike by the local news broadcasters and 
technicians at WGR-TV and Radio, and a first-hand account of a “Free Angela 
Davis” rally in New York City.226 The paper was distributed widely throughout 
Buffalo area factories, peaking at 10,000 copies, and the group succeeded in 
recruiting a handful of new members to their project. Their more ambitious plans, 
however, were never realized. A rebellion on the part of the women in the group, 
who contended that the newspaper slighted women workers, effectively ended 
the publication of New Age in September 1971.227 Many of those most active in 
New Age remained active in their unions and a number of them joined other left 
wing political groups. Nevertheless, Krehbiel believes that in its brief life the 
newspaper had a positive impact on Buffalo’s labor movement based on 
feedback he received from coworkers at Standard Mirror and other area workers. 
Since the 1960s, Krehbiel has continued as a labor movement activist as a rank 
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and file union member, organizer, staff representative, and writer. After stints as 
a staff representative for the United Furniture Workers Union in Nashville, and as 
a legislative aide to a congresswoman, he worked for SEIU Local 660 in Los 
Angeles from 1998 until 2007. 
Other young workers who were radicalized on the job in the late 1960s 
and early 1970s included women, who were new to the workforce and facing 
sexual harassment and job discrimination, and African Americans, who were 
frustrated by their limited opportunities for advancement and by racist 
supervision. Vietnam Veterans, still smarting from the sting of betrayal and 
suspicious of all authority, proved to be especially militant. For some of these 
young workers, the spark was the corruption and stagnation of their local unions. 
Others were driven by job instability and mass layoffs to take part in efforts to 
stop plant closures. Still others were motivated by traditional trade union goals. 
They simply sought a mechanism for responding to overbearing supervisors, 
unfair treatment, and brutal working conditions.  
 Nurse Pat Hendricks’s frustration with her union and her experiences with 
gender discrimination triggered her lifelong commitment to labor activism. In 
1967 she moved from Iowa to San Francisco to be closer to her sister and aging 
parents. While she had had some contact with the counterculture in Chicago, and 
had read about the growing antiwar movement, she was not involved in protest 
politics in the 1960s. After taking a permanent nursing job at Presbyterian 
Hospital in 1970, Hendricks began paying dues to Local 250 of the Service 
Employees International Union, but felt that the union was unresponsive to her 
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needs and those of most hospital workers. Shortly before the union contract was 
due to expire, Hendricks suggested to Local 250 leaders that they contest 
Presbyterian’s requirement that female nurse attendants wear green uniforms, 
while allowing male nurses to wear the standard white. Hendricks felt this would 
be a popular bargaining issue because she knew many women resented that rule 
and the hospital’s policy of laundering the men’s uniforms. The union disagreed, 
but Hendrick’s assessment was correct. She quickly spearheaded a petition drive 
protesting the uniform policies. Three years later, the Equal Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC) ruled in her favor.   
 Her leadership of the petition drive put her in touch with other Local 250 
members who were dissatisfied with the union’s leadership. Over the next twenty 
years, Hendricks worked closely with opposition caucuses, the most successful 
of which was the Committee for a Democratic Union. CDU eventually succeeded 
in pressing SEIU to put the local into receivership to rid it of corruption. The CDU 
was part of a national wave of union reform efforts carried out by rank and filers 
to rid their unions of corrupt and incompetent leaders. The best known of these 
efforts included the Teamsters for a Democratic Union, Steelworkers Fight Back, 
the Miners for Democracy, and New Directions in the UAW. In addition to her 
work in CDU, Hendricks was involved in the women’s movement and she was 
active in Central American solidarity work opposing U.S. foreign policy in Latin 
America. She never separated this work from her identity as a rank and file union 
member.228  
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 A number of leftists who chose to go to the factories were first exposed to 
working-class politics abroad. Due to the increasing popularity of study abroad 
programs as well as the mass mobilization for the war in Southeast Asia, many 
American students witnessed first hand the political and social upheavals that 
taking place across globe beginning in 1968. In May and June of that year 
student demonstrations in Paris turned into a general protest of workers and 
students that nearly brought down the government of Charles De Gaulle. As a 
French major at the University of Southern California, Wendy Thompson kept 
close track of the events in Paris as she prepared for her year in Aix-en Provence 
near Marseilles beginning in the fall of 1968. The daughter of a liberal Methodist 
minister, Thompson had marched for open housing and was active in the Urban 
League as a high school student in Evanston, Illinois. She was sorely 
disappointed by the conservative climate on campus when she arrived in 1966, 
but nevertheless joined the Young Democrats and collaborated with the SDS 
chapter in staging the first Vietnam teach-in. By the time she arrived in France, 
De Gaulle had reestablished control through the brutal suppression of the strikers 
and student groups, as well as a June election victory, but there was lingering 
discontent on the campuses and in the factories. It was also a time of 
tremendous intellectual ferment on the left as activists debated lessons learned 
and plotted future directions. Radical students believed that the movement had 
been sold out by the Communist-led labor unions of the CGT (Confederation 
Generale du Travail), which had discouraged its members from participating in 
wildcat strikes in support of the students and ultimately accepted the 
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government’s offer of wage and benefit hikes in exchange for labor peace. In 
response, students formed new organizations independent of the French 
Communist Party and the traditional students union. Some participated in 
etablissement, the French equivalent of the turn to the working class whereby 
students took jobs in factories to connect intellectuals and workers.229   
 As an American student, Thompson worked hard to find the French 
movement. She tested out of her classes at the American institute so that she 
might attend a French university. She also insisted on having a French 
roommate, who fortuitously was politically active and whose best friend was the 
daughter of an exiled Spanish anarchist. By Thompson’s second term her French 
friends had invited her to participate in their groupuscule, a small circle of 
radicals who studied together and planned political actions. Thompson’s 
experience with the French movement shifted her perceptions of the white 
working class back home, which she had previously associated with the politics 
of George Meany and reactionary construction workers. She recalled campus 
rallies in France on behalf of striking workers “where the whole hall would be 
jammed with people.” She and her young student friends went to the plants 
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where they were warmly received by the workers: “I remember once a whole bus 
of workers stopped and somebody ran out to get a pile of leaflets from us to take 
into the factory. I thought that was real impressive.”  
Thompson returned to USC in the fall of 1969 with a strong desire to join a 
socialist organization. In part, because of her positive encounters with French 
Trotskyists, Thompson joined the (IS) International Socialists, a newly formed 
group with deep roots within the American Trotskyist tradition. The International 
Socialists had formed that year from the merger of a dozen campus-based 
International Socialist Clubs, the strongest of which was at Berkeley where 
veterans of the Free Speech Movement clustered around socialist intellectuals 
Hal and Anne Draper.230  
 Not long after the establishment of IS, the Drapers left in part in opposition 
to the majority’s decision to “Bolshevize” its student members, sending them into 
trucking, steel, communications, public service, teaching, and auto. Once inside 
these industries, cadre were expected to build militant “struggle groups” around 
workplace issues. They were also encouraged to promote rank and file 
democracy and to remain independent of the union bureaucracy. Though IS 
never had more than a few hundred members in its fifteen year existence, it had 
a lasting impact on the labor movement—laying the groundwork for reform in the 
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Teamsters Union, while having a considerable influence on labor educators and 
intellectuals through its publications and conferences.231   
 As she completed her studies at USC, Thompson organized labor 
solidarity rallies for striking autoworkers at General Motors Southgate plant. With 
her husband, who was an IS leader and GM worker, she moved to Detroit in 
1971 to help establish an IS colony there and publish the group’s labor paper, 
Workers Power. After taking jobs as a nurse and other service jobs, Thompson 
began working at Chevrolet Gear and Axle plant. Women had worked in the plant 
for two years, but she was among the first to hold a production job in her plant. 
She later recalled that on her first day of work she was one of four women who 
walked down the line “to a big cheer that came up from the male workers . . . like 
they had been on a desert island for ten years and hadn’t seen a woman in all 
that time.” As more women came into the plant, however, the tension increased 
dramatically as men perceived that women were taking the easiest, best jobs. 
“There was a reality to that,” Thompson acknowledged. “The work here is very 
heavy and difficult, so they were looking specifically for lighter jobs to place 
women on. Men would just come up and say to you that you shouldn’t be working 
there. Sexual harassment was a real issue.”232 
 Within months of her hiring, she became involved in union politics, and 
with a small group of coworkers, several of whom were IS members, they began 
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distributing a shop-floor newsletter Shifting Gears to fight “speed-up, pollution, 
forced overtime . . . the harassment from foremen” and “all the things that can 
drive us nuts and destroy our health.”233 Within weeks of launching the 
newsletter, she was fired for falsifying her job application, though she believed 
she was targeted for filing “harassment and discrimination grievances” against 
her foremen, one of whom had once explained to her “how nice he had been to 
put us women on easy jobs.” She clashed with a second foreman who was 
unsuccessful in his efforts to date her. The union secured her reinstatement after 
eight months and Thompson continued to be involved in the politics of the local 
over the next three decades. Until her recent retirement, she served as the 
president of UAW Local 235, but she remains active in union politics.234   
 Other American students witnessed similar upheavals that rocked West 
Germany, Northern Ireland, Great Britain, and Italy over the next several years. 
Harvard student Peter Olney’s commitment to organizing workers crystallized 
during his study abroad year in Florence. Olney had prior exposure to working-
class politics through his summer jobs and his contact with the Worker Student 
Alliance at Harvard. Olney remembers the Worker Student Alliance as “very 
clumsy” and “faulty on many levels,” but he credits the Progressive Labor Party 
with making him and many other students more aware of class and worker 
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issues. His experiences in Italy in 1971 brought this understanding to a new 
level. Almost as soon as he arrived at the University of Florence the country 
erupted in a series of student and labor strikes that challenged his presumptions 
about workers and student-worker alliances. “Oh, this isn’t just a couple of guys 
yelling over a megaphone in an empty square,” he remembered thinking. “This is 
like hundreds of thousands of workers marching with red carnations on May Day, 
or marching against the war in Vietnam in their Sunday suits.” With no classes to 
attend Olney divided his time that year between playing rugby with an Italian 
rugby team and “participating in Italian extra-parliamentary working-class 
politics,” an experience that made him view his further studies as “irrelevant and 
kind of petty compared to going into the working class and trying to organize for 
revolution, which is what I was about at that point.”235    
 Upon returning to Boston Olney moved into a communal house in 
Cambridge and began working at the New England Confectionary Company 
(Necco) as a means of connecting to the working class. Over the next decade 
Olney took jobs in Boston area electronics factories, food production plants, 
metal fabricators, machine shops, and hospitals with the intention of organizing 
workers into militant trade unions. He later organized community-labor coalitions 
to respond to plant closings in Los Angeles in the 1980s, worked as a labor 
educator, and is currently director of organizing for the International Longshore 
and Warehouse Union. 
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Ray Eurquhart developed an orientation to working-class politics as an 
American serviceman stationed in England, where he became active in both the 
antiwar movement and the struggle for black GI rights. His extraordinary activist 
experiences underscore the interconnectedness of black liberation, labor 
struggles, and antiwar protests, as well as the international dimensions of the 
turn to the working class. The son of a Durham, North Carolina waitress, 
Eurquhart enlisted in the Air Force in 1966 as an alternative to the certainty of 
being drafted in the Army. Almost immediately after being sent to Chimea, a US 
Air Force base near Siberia, eighteen-year old Eurquhart experienced racism 
within the military. Racial epithets flew freely from the lips of white GIs and 
commanding officers, who constituted a large majority within the Air Force. On at 
least one occasion Eurquhart was subjected to a racist attack by soldiers 
disguised in white sheets. With fellow black soldiers, Eurquhart began isolating 
racist commanding officers by giving them “the silent treatment,” and threatening 
retaliation. He also soaked up politics like a sponge, listening to the experiences 
of servicemen who had witnessed the Free Speech Movement in Berkeley and 
others who identified as Black Panthers and Black Muslims. Some African 
American GIs had also witnessed race riots on bases in Oakland and New 
Jersey and had been sent to Chimea for their alleged participation. Black old 
timers shared advice and their own stories of discrimination in the service.  
As the end of his one-year stint at Chimea drew near in 1968, Eurquhart 
lobbied for an assignment to Vietnam or Thailand, where he hoped to “witness all 
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this racism on the front lines” and to “organize.”236 But the Air Force sent 
Eurquhart to Croughton, one of eight U.S. Air Force bases in England, where he 
quickly immersed himself in efforts to improve living and working conditions. 
Among African Americans, Latinos, “hippies, potheads that are working class 
who don’t conform to authority” there was a clear sense that “we’re all getting 
screwed,” recalled Eurquhart. They were “all trying to get a handle on why we’re 
having such a bad experience in the military.237 A loose group of soldiers pooled 
their money to hire private lawyers for servicemen facing court martial rather than 
relying upon official representation. His fellow soldiers began calling Eurquhart 
“the attorney” because of his mastery of the military justice system and his 
willingness to assist those who were facing sanctions. On more than one 
occasion he used his skills on his own behalf. After receiving a reprimand for 
wearing his Air Force fatigue shirt with civilian clothing at the officers club, 
Eurqhuart filed countercharges against Sergeant John O. Raney for using 
“provoking speeches or gestures” and charged “cruelty and maltreatment” 
because Raney cited him in the presence of two other soldiers and the wife of 
one of the servicemen. In his complaint to Raney’s superior, Eurquhart asserted 
that his actions “make one wonder or question his being able (capable) to 
function as a Commander that would reflect favorable upon the United States Air 
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Force,” and charged the sergeant with racism and violation of Article 133 of the 
UCMJ, referring to conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman.238   
Eurquhart’s commitment to social change deepened after meeting black 
Airforceman John Adkins at a bookstore in London. Realizing they shared a 
passion for books and radicalism, they met frequently to investigate the city’s left 
wing political movements and counterculture. During one visit they stumbled 
upon a protest of Cambridge students returning their Rhodes scholarships.239 
Adkins and Eurquhart approached the students who were elated to learn that 
they were American GIs. The Cambridge students belonged to a budding peace 
organization centered around the publication of an antiwar newspaper and had 
been looking to establish connections with American servicemen. Adkins and 
Eurquhart began contributing articles to the group’s newspaper and coordinating 
distribution of PEACE—People Emerging Against Corrupt Establishment at all 
eight US Air Force bases in England. Eurquhart used his participation on the 
military’s boxing team as an opportunity to distribute the paper to across England 
and to solicit material from other GIs. A traveling football team smuggled PEACE 
to bases as far away as Stuttgart.240  
 On May 31, 1971 Eurquhart helped organize a protest in London during 
which more than two hundred American GIs presented the US Ambassador to 
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Great Britain with petitions demanding an end to the war signed by more than 
one thousand members of the United States Air Force and Navy stationed in 
England. To avoid violating the military’s definition of an illegal demonstration, 
the GIs divided into groups of six before presenting the petitions to an embassy 
official. Before the presentation the protestors gathered at Speakers’ Corner in 
Hyde Park, where a representative of each base read a statement. “The US Air 
Force is probably the most powerful organisation in the world, and we feel that in 
Indo-China it is being used amorally and irresponsibly,” one of the GIs said. “We 
are therefore sceptical of current policies towards ending the US involvement 
there.” The protestors then traveled by bus to Victoria Park and attended an 
antiwar rally featuring theater performances by Vanessa Redgrave, Mia Farrow, 
and Barbara Dane.241 Back on base Eurquhart received a formal reprimand; 
Major Samuel J. Greene reminded Eurquhart that he had been “made well aware 
of the prohibition against such demonstrations,” and that his “deliberate violation 
of same raises a question in my mind as to your fitness to continue to serve” in 
the Air Force.242 The following day, Greene placed Eurquhart on the Airman 
Control Roster making him ineligible for a promotion or raise for ninety days.243  
An even more important intellectual connection for Eurquhart came 
through his involvement with the Black Panther Movement, a growing collective 
of East Indian nationalists and Marxists unaffiliated with the American group of 
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the same name. The Panthers frequented the Mangrove Café in London’s 
Notting Hill and were loosely centered around Trinidadian writer Darcus Howe 
and Howe’s uncle, the anti-colonial writer and activist C. L. R. James. Born in 
Trinidad in 1901, James was a historian, novelist, Trotskyist theoretician and 
activist in the anti-colonial and the pan-Africanist movements. While living in the 
United States between 1938 and 1953, James led the Johnson-Forrest 
Tendency, a small group of US labor radicals and Marxist theorists who took jobs 
in American factories, mostly in Detroit’s auto plants. Johnson-Forrest rejected 
the need for vanguard parties and celebrated spontaneous worker revolts and 
nationalist uprisings, believing that revolutionary activity prepared workers for 
assuming power in a transformed society.  
James, Howe, and their followers fed Eurquhart’s growing interest in 
nationalist politics, anti-imperialism, Marxism, African culture, and the labor 
movement. There were poetry readings in the evening, radical films and theater, 
and courses on capitalism with James on Saturdays. Visitors from anti-colonial 
movements across the globe came to Notting Hill to publicize their causes. 
Eurquhart met dissident Iraqi, Iranian, and Pakistani intellectuals, and he learned 
about the anti-Apartheid movement and the Algerian independence struggle. 
BPM members also provided support for striking miners and following James’s 
lead, they made special efforts to make alliances with other trade unionists. 
Following an August 1970 demonstration to protest government harassment of 
black radicals in Notting Hill, police raided the Mangrove Café and jailed nine 
leaders of the Black Panther Movement for possession of marijuana. Eurquhart 
  
147 
threw himself into the campaign to free the Mangrove Nine, attending their trial 
each day at Old Bailey and building support for the cause among his growing 
network of activists.  
The Panthers represented Eurquhart’s first official membership in a 
political organization and he was very eager to please. It came as a bitter 
disappointment a year and a half later when he was suspended from the 
organization for participating in a march that had not been sanctioned by the 
group. It was January 1972 and the British Army’s 1st Parachute Regiment had 
just massacred thirteen peaceful demonstrators in the Bogside, Derry, Ireland. 
Eurquhart joined an IRA-sponsored protest in London during which police barely 
kept protestors from the doors of 10 Downing Street. He later recalled “trying to 
turn over horses and fighting and total nonsense, I lost it.” For this breach of 
organizational discipline, Eurquhart was suspended by the Panthers, who 
believed that support for the IRA would jeopardize their own program and risked 
alienating white workers with whom they hoped to work in coalition.244 Following 
his term of duty, Eurquhart returned to Durham in 1972, where he joined the 
Progressive Labor Party and began organizing tobacco workers. He later led the 
union representing Durham’s municipal employees and has been in the thick of 
nearly every major left-labor cause of the past thirty-five years.245  
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 The economic dislocations of the 1970s had a devastating impact on the 
turn to the working class as a political project, and the rapidly shifting political 
landscape posed new challenges for radical activists organizing within the labor 
movement. As inflation rose and wages stagnated, Americans weathered two 
energy crises and the onset of a wave of plant closings and mass layoffs due to 
automation and foreign competition. The labor left attempted to meet these 
challenges by organizing the unemployed and fighting plant closings and 
concessionary bargaining, but American workers had largely lost the rebellious 
spirit of the early 1970s. The number of major labor strikes dropped considerably 
as the 1970s came to a close, and the American labor movement as a whole 
emerged from the decade badly weakened.246 Also gone were the days of the 
mass antiwar demonstrations and high-profile civil rights protests. Even student 
activism waned. At the close of the 1974 school year, Time magazine heralded 
the return to campus in large numbers of business recruiters after being met with 
hostility over previous years. “When I started college, I wanted to help people,” a 
Syracuse University senior told a reporter. “Now I want to help myself.”247  
 As the last hired and first fired, hundreds of radicals who had taken 
manufacturing jobs in the early 1970s soon found themselves on the outside 
looking in. Many took part in labor and community coalitions that fought plant 
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closings and for the rights of displaced workers.248 Others gravitated to the 
environmental movement or community organizing, or resumed their education 
or professional careers. Those who were able to hold on to their jobs faced the 
reality that real change would require a long haul struggle and a careful program 
of base building. Their white coworkers were as likely to be followers of George 
Wallace or Ronald Reagan as they were Jimmy Carter or the Democratic Party 
of the New Deal. Committed labor radicals, many of whom began to rise to 
positions of leadership within their unions, learned how to push progressive 
politics without alienating coworkers. 
 Autoworker Shelley Kessler remembers the struggles she faced in 
confronting sexism at work and within the labor movement in the late 1970s. 
Kessler had left law school to organize in factories in the San Francisco Bay area 
in the mid-1970s. After holding a series of manufacturing jobs, she began 
working on the line at the General Motors plant in Fremont, California in 1977. 
She was among the first group of women hired after the company and union 
settled a sex discrimination lawsuit. Male coworkers were less than welcoming 
and their harassment drove one woman who was hired the same day as Kessler 
to leave before lunchtime. Other men openly bet on how long each new hire 
would last. Before the plant’s shutdown in 1982 Kessler was the first woman 
elected to a plant-wide union position despite intense harassment that included 
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rumors regarding her sexual orientation. Her nickname—“committee cunt”—
revealed deep insecurities male coworkers felt regarding her participation in 
union politics.249 Addressing sexism proved to be especially tricky and required a 
good deal of tact, humor, and clever alliance building. Kessler first turned her 
attention to ridding men’s lockers of pictures of naked women. She learned to 
confront men with humor, asking to see the pictures and inquiring whether they 
were of daughters or wives or sisters.  
“Some guys would say go put up pictures of nude men. And I would 
say, ‘no, I’m not going to do it on the other side because to me it’s 
all wrong anyway. It objectifies people. But I wasn’t going to have 
that whole objectification conversation with these guys because 
that was going nowhere. So we had to find ways of conversing with 
people so that they got what the issue was without them feeling like 
I was on the attack. And using humor. So when I said let me see is 
your daughter or your mother in there. They started to get it. Your 
sister or whatever.” 
 
 What began as Kessler’s individual effort to shape a more tolerable work 
environment eventually led to changes within the AFL-CIO. During a regional 
union trade show, Kessler raised objections to the distribution of sexist posters 
and calendars  by various AFL-CIO affiliated union. During a heated meeting at 
the trade show, Kessler argued that the materials were every bit as sexist as 
Little Black Sambos and Frito Bandito were racist. But she made her points in 
vain with various AFL-CIO officials, including the head of the union label 
department. When Kessler removed her jacket one of the men made a sexist 
wisecrack that proved to be decisive with the head of the Alameda Labor 
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Council. He said, “I get your point and we’re out of here.” He invited Kessler to 
write a resolution that passed in Alameda County, then went to the state labor 
federation and eventually the national AFL-CIO eliminating sexist material at the 
trade shows.250  
 Kessler succeeded in challenging her coworkers’ sexism and changing the 
culture of the union by being persistent and strategic—choosing her battles and 
adopting a style and language that would resonate with the men whose behavior 
she hoped to change. Given the increasingly bleak economic and political 
realities of the late 1970s, every labor radical who hoped to make change 
through the labor movement was forced to make similar strategic adjustment. As 
levels of labor militancy fell and the overall power of the labor movement waned, 
left-wing caucuses and progressive labor groups withered away and those that 
remained had less power and fewer resources with which to confront the 
employers. Increasingly, they found traction by organizing around the protection 
of individual rights based on gender, race, and age on the job and in the unions. 
As Nelson Lichtenstein has argued, the “rights consciousness” unionism of the 
1970s virtually supplanted the historic centrality of the “labor question,” leaving 
the AFL-CIO and American workers highly vulnerable to the economic 
dislocations caused by technological change and the new era of global 
competition.251 While the failure of the labor movement to defend workers’ rights 
on the job or to articulate a social democratic alternative to corporate 
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globalization had devastating consequences, the “rights conscious” organizing of 
the 1970s that was spearheaded by the left led directly to the broader reforms 
within the AFL-CIO in the 1990s. Those reforms were a necessary for any labor-
based mass movement for economic justice. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 4: The New Left’s Labor Feminism 
 
 On January 31, 1973 an unlikely alliance of San Francisco taxicab drivers, 
data processing clerks, labor organizers, and feminist activists protested the 
Bank of America’s decision to end free taxi service for women working the night 
shift. Outside the bank’s international headquarters, women paraded around the 
building waving placards as black and yellow taxis circled slowly and honked, 
bringing Kearney Street traffic to a near halt. Concerned men in suits looked on 
from the entrance and a harried bank official explained to reporters that male 
employees had complained that the taxi service was discriminatory and that the 
Equal Rights Amendment, recently ratified by the state legislature in Sacramento, 
likely made it illegal.252  
Members of an employees association, who were leading a drive to 
unionize the bank’s computer center workers, argued that the Bank of America’s 
decision to end the taxi rides for women was an attempt to divide the workforce 
by scapegoating the male clerks. Cab drivers in Local 256 of the International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters complained that they stood to lose more than three 
hundred steady fares each night and dozens of late shift jobs. Activists from 
Union WAGE (Women’s Alliance to Gain Equality), the San Francisco Bay area 
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feminist workers group that pulled the coalition together, denounced the bank’s 
decision and argued that it illustrated the threat to workers’ rights posed by the 
passage of the Equal Rights Amendment and earlier civil rights reforms.253  
WAGE leaders recognized that the Civil Rights Act of 1964, with its 
language barring sex discrimination and provisions for creating the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), had been an essential tool for 
working women and minorities in their efforts to strike down discriminatory hiring, 
pay, and promotions practices. But employers in California and throughout the 
country had also used that same language to roll back protections for women 
and children workers that trade unionists and other social reformers had fought to 
secure over the previous sixty years. WAGE and many others in the labor 
movement believed that the ERA would deliver the final blow to protective laws 
and thus undermine the working conditions of all workers. Though not quite two 
years old, Union WAGE had made its mark on California politics by spearheading 
the campaign for a “labor ERA” that would safeguard special work rules for 
women and children by extending protective legislation to men.254 Believing that 
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the building of militant and democratic unions in which women played leading 
roles was the best guaranty of economic justice for working women, WAGE 
activists also assisted in the formation of new unions and encouraged women to 
take leadership roles in existing unions.   
Older feminists with deep trade union connections and experience initiated 
Union WAGE, but younger socialists and feminists who had been politicized in 
the antiwar, women’s liberation, and civil rights movements, gravitated to its 
program and sustained its momentum. Many of these younger women were 
college-educated and middle-class. Virtually all of them were white and they 
viewed WAGE as a vehicle through which they might organize working-class 
women.255 Some were already active on the job or in unions and found that 
WAGE provided important resources for their struggles for economic and gender 
equality. While WAGE’s most ambitious goals of revitalizing the left through a 
fusion of women’s liberation and the trade union movement was undermined by 
the economic crises of the mid-1970s and an increasingly hostile political climate, 
it nevertheless carved out an important niche advocating and agitating on behalf 
of working women in the San Francisco Bay Area.256 By the time of the group’s 
demise more than eleven years after its founding, WAGE had made major 
contributions to the State of California’s labor laws and policies. WAGE activists 
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had helped to shape the organizational culture and gender politics of several of 
the Bay Area’s largest union locals and empowered thousands of working-class 
women with whom they came into contact. 
  
Union WAGE was founded at a National Organization of Women 
conference on the University of California at Berkeley campus in March of 1971. 
After complaining that working-class women were poorly represented at the 
conference and that their issues were largely ignored by NOW, a handful of 
conferees representing various labor groups decided to form a new 
organization.257 Three women with long histories of labor activism and leftist 
party politics provided WAGE with its initial programmatic and ideological 
direction. Anne Draper, Jean Maddox, and Joyce Maupin came from socialist 
traditions that had frequently been antagonistic toward one another, but the 
women were nevertheless united in their feminism as well as their critique of the 
women’s liberation movement, much of which they found to be too oriented 
toward professional women and divorced from the experiences of the working 
class. As Anne Draper explained in the pages of the WAGE newspaper, “ongoing 
organization and movement, as distinct from mere flashes of protest, need to be 
rooted in the realities of daily life . . . and for working women the organizing 
reality is the condition of the workplace more than the home.”258  Draper 
(1917-1973) had graduated from Hunter College in 1938 before becoming an 
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organizer for the Steelworkers Organizing Committee, which was then in the 
midst of a monumental campaign to establish an industrial union in steel. During 
the war she was a shipyard welder in San Pedro, California, and later worked as 
a staff member for the United Cap, Hatters, and Millinery Workers International 
Union, and the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, for which she was 
the west coast director of their union label program. A veteran of various socialist 
organizations, she and her husband Hal served as mentors to a group of 
students at the University of California at Berkeley, many of whom had been 
active in the Free Speech Movement in 1964 and had followed the Drapers into 
the International Socialist Clubs, a left-wing offshoot of the Socialist Party of 
America.259  
WAGE’s first president Jean Maddox (1915-1976) dropped out of high 
school at 17 to become a waitress after her father was murdered. Moving from 
her native Idaho to California during the war, Maddox drove a milk truck and 
became a Teamster member—an experience that taught her “what it was to be a 
second class citizen in a union.” The night of her initiation, she and the other 
women sat in a cloak room as the men debated whether or not to accept women 
as members. “They finally agreed we could join,” she later told an interviewer. 
“But we could not attend meetings, had no voice or vote, and had to agree to 
leave our jobs as soon as the war was over.” Maddox was active in the 
Communist Party in the 1940s and 1950s, and was a rank-and-file member of 
the International Longshoremen’s and Warehousemen’s Union (Local 6) and the 
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Office and Professional Employees Union (OPEU Local 29), which was among 
the largest locals of office workers in the country at the time. When she was 
elected president of Local 29 in 1969, the union quickly developed a reputation 
for labor militancy and a commitment to left-wing causes, including support for 
migrant farm workers and the antiwar movement. As president, Maddox also led 
several successful strikes, but her leadership of the union was also marked by 
considerable friction with the international union, who attempted to undermine 
her presidency by placing Local 29 under trusteeship.260  
Joyce Maupin (1914-1998) was born into a socialist family in New Jersey 
and was swept up in the political and cultural ferment of the 1930s. In her late 
teens, she studied briefly at the Sorbonne, though she never finished her college 
studies. Returning to the states she lived in New York City, where she worked as 
a typist for Thomas Wolfe and secretary to the Marxist literary critic V. F. 
Calverton. She joined the Socialist Workers Party (SWP), contributing columns 
on women’s issues to the SWP newspaper, and standing as the party’s 
candidate for Senate in New York in 1956. Maupin was a veteran of an historic 
five-month long machinists strike at Boeing Aircraft in Seattle in 1948 and had 
also worked as a waitress, a textile worker, and a shoemaker before relocating to 
the Bay Area in the early 1960s. As a member of OPEU Local 29, she met Jean 
Maddox and admired her leadership of the union, especially her ability to raise 
women’s issues at the collective bargaining table and her efforts to draw support 
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for workers’ struggles from the area’s growing feminist movement. “This was a 
whole new departure for me,” said Maupin, reflecting on Maddox’s leadership 
many years later, “a woman president in a local union, fighting for women’s 
rights. She was raising issues like child care and maternity leave.”261  
Union WAGE’s timing was excellent. The organization drew its base from 
among the thousands of women who took advantage of the rapid expansion of 
the San Francisco Bay Area’s government services, education, retail, insurance, 
finance, communications, and health care sectors in the 1960s and 1970s.262 
New workers were animated by the era’s protest spirit and readily took 
advantage of new anti-discrimination laws and policies. Because California 
government employees gained the right to collective bargaining just three years 
before the organization’s founding, WAGE also benefited from a surge in public 
sector unionism that brought thousands of women into unions.263 The public 
sector unions initially organized women as they would male workers—
emphasizing their ability to secure higher wages and benefits. But as women 
asserted themselves on the job, the unions began to organize around women’s 
issues, such as childcare, pay equity, limited opportunities for advancement, and 
                                                 
261
 Barbara Mahan, “The Unions Wouldn’t Let Women Walk the Picketline,” Plexus, August 1982. 
On Maupin’s relationship with Thomas Wolfe, see Joyce Maupin, “Typing for Thomas Wolfe: A 
Memoir,” The Thomas Wolfe Review, Volume 26, Nos. 1 and 2, 2002.  
 
262
 The job growth in North California was indicative of national economic trends. Between 1964 
and 1979 the national economy generated nearly twenty-six million new service sector jobs, 
representing a nearly sixty-eight percent leap (see U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and 
Earnings, Vol. 53, No. 1, January 2006).  
 
263
 The Meyers Milias Brown Act of 1968 provided California public sector workers with the right 
to collectively bargain.  
 
  
160 
harassment by male supervisors and coworkers.264 Until the union’s belatedly 
caught up to their members, Union WAGE offered resources and assistance that 
even the most progressive unions were slow or unwilling to provide.  
After Draper’s death in 1973 and Maddox’s three years later, young 
feminist activists, including veterans of the southern civil rights struggle, women’s 
liberation, and the Berkeley Free Speech Movement, increasingly shaped 
WAGE’s direction.265 The younger WAGE women valued its commitments to 
internal democracy, leadership development, and direct action, and they shared 
the founders’ class critique of mainstream feminism. Moreover, they viewed the 
chance to engage in grassroots political struggles with working-class women as 
an extension of their earlier work in the Deep South, on campus, and in feminist 
collectives.  
Cathy Cade, WAGE’s semi-official photographer, was typical of the 
younger feminists who found a welcoming and supportive organizational home in 
WAGE. Before moving to San Francisco in 1970, she had been involved in the 
civil rights movement in Georgia, Mississippi, and Louisiana for the better part of 
eight years, and she was a member of one of the earliest women’s 
consciousness raising groups in New Orleans. Suffering movement burnout and 
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feeling marginalized as black separatism emerged as a dominant trend in the 
civil rights movement, Cade jumped at the chance to work with WAGE because it 
provided “access to working-class people and supporting working- class causes 
that some of us didn’t have in another way.” Cade later reflected that WAGE 
“gave us a way to participate and to support and be an ally and be active and to 
act out our working-class politics.”266 Many young WAGE activists, including 
Cade, were either lesbians or in the process of coming out, and for them, the 
opportunity to work in an all- women’s organization proved especially appealing. 
“I was being with feminist women and seeing this stronger side of me come out. I 
still had boyfriends, but when I would be with men whether they were boyfriends 
or not I would watch myself fall into old ways of relating,” she said. Though she 
and most of her WAGE sisters never adopted a separatist position, Cade 
decided she “needed a period to be away” from men, and she developed a new 
appreciation for the decision of African American activists to exclude white 
people from the black liberation movement.267  
Janet Arnold, who served as WAGE president in the late 1970s, had been 
a student activist at Cornell University in the early 1960s. By the time she 
graduated in 1965 she was a “committed Marxist” and had decided that she 
“should be in the labor movement because being a Marxist meant you were 
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supposed to get involved in working class struggle.” She took a job as a case 
worker in New York City and became deeply involved in the Social Service 
Employees Union (SSEU), which represented the city’s War on Poverty workers. 
Many of her coworkers were also recent college graduates who had participated 
in the civil rights and antiwar movements, and they brought to their jobs a good 
deal of idealism and militancy. In addition to battling for higher wages and 
manageable case loads, they supported recipients’ demands for higher benefits. 
Arnold moved to Northern California in 1969 and worked as a telephone 
operator, a delivery truck driver, and a substitute teacher as part of the 
International Socialists’ (IS) efforts to gain a foothold in the working-class. But 
after her expulsion from the party in a bitter factional fight in 1976, Arnold felt 
“defeated” and she gave up on the idea of taking a job “based on its political 
meaning.” A friend invited her to join Union WAGE, which welcomed her into the 
fold and immediately put her to work. Exhausted by the sectarian politics of the 
left, Arnold appreciated that WAGE had no ideological litmus tests and did not 
quiz her about her politics. “They assumed they knew what my politics were,” she 
later recalled. “They were correct of course, but they weren’t fighting with me 
about details.”268  
Like WAGE’s founders, most of these younger members viewed 
organizing working women as part of a larger effort to build a socialist movement. 
Nevertheless, they were critical of the factionalism on the left and as wary of its 
male leaders as they were of union bureaucrats. They took precautions to make 
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sure that WAGE did not “get bogged down in endless internal discussions which 
would prevent us from getting concrete things done” and guarded against the 
possibility of any one political tendency dominating WAGE. For some San 
Francisco Bay Area radicals, WAGE lacked sufficient ideological rigor. 
Responding to complaints from a new member that the group was not explicitly 
socialist, Joyce Maupin acknowledged that while many WAGE women 
considered themselves to be socialists, they aimed “to represent working women 
in as broad and non-exclusive a way as we can,” demanding only agreement 
with the group’s goals and constitution. Maupin added that she believed an 
organized working class was a necessary precursor to socialism, but that it was 
important to reach out to apolitical women who are ready “to take some 
immediate steps to improve their pay and working environment.”269  
That commitment to non-exclusion sometimes came at a cost. After 
several New York WAGE members were publicly identified as members of the 
International Workers Party—an organization allegedly controlled by the cultish 
political figure Lyndon Larouche—the WAGE executive board rejected calls to 
expel the women even though they acknowledged that the rumors had affected 
their East Coast fundraising capacity. The board further affirmed their 
commitment to non-exclusion and asserted that the appropriate way to deal with 
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“disruptive or otherwise . . . left tendencies who repeatedly try to alter the 
direction of Union WAGE” is “through democratic discussions and votes.”270 
 WAGE similarly negotiated the generational divisions that had frustrated 
other protest movements of the 1960s and 1970s. Over the course of the 1960s, 
older and sometimes well-meaning socialists and liberals repeatedly attempted to 
guide and direct young radicals to help them avoid tactical errors and to guard 
against alienating potential allies. But their interventions were often rebuffed by 
the youth, who believed that the Old Left had been rendered irrelevant by Cold 
War anti-Communism and found many of the older comrades condescending. 
These dynamics emerged at the symbolic birth of the New Left when a group of 
irate socialists held hearings to pressure SDS to re-write their seminal Port Huron 
statement because they felt it was insufficiently critical of the Soviet Union and 
overly critical of the labor movement.271 The same tensions plagued the African 
American freedom movement. SNCC activists squabbled with the civil rights and 
ministerial leaders of the NAACP and SCLC, whom younger activists saw as too 
cautious, too willing to cut a deal, and too quick to claim credit for SNCC work. 
For their part, the mainline civil rights leaders often found the younger activists’ 
rhetoric brash and counterproductive.  
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 WAGE women avoided these tensions by creating an organizational 
culture that was equal parts labor education program, trade union local, and 
feminist consciousness raising group. Many of the younger feminists later 
reported that WAGE’s inter-generational character was among the aspects of the 
organization they most valued, and they appreciated that the older women were 
deliberately grooming them for leadership. The older WAGE women pushed 
younger women into positions of responsibility, while encouraging them to 
develop their public speaking abilities and their organizational skills.272 For their 
part, Draper, Maddox, and Maupin were bolstered by the energy and optimism of 
their younger sisters. According to a brief biography of Maddox published after 
her death, she credited women’s liberation with “raising her consciousness about 
herself as a woman,” and “help[ing] her learn how to be open and affectionate 
with women.”273  
Programmatically, WAGE’s campaign to extend the state’s protective 
legislation to men remained the single constant of its eleven-year existence. The 
group’s strategy centered on pressuring and monitoring the California Industrial 
Welfare Commission (IWC), a quasi-legislative agency set up in 1913 to 
administer the state’s minimum wage and working standards for women and 
children workers. Under pressure from trade unionists and reformers over the 
years, the IWC had issued industry orders that provided some fifty protections to 
                                                 
272
 Several WAGE women credit Anne Draper with encouraging them to do more public speaking. 
See, for example, Diane Balser, Sisterhood Solidarity: Feminism and Labor in Modern Times 
(Boston: South End Press 1987) pp. 90-91, and Kay Eisenhower, Interview by author, 31 October 
2003.    
 
273
 Pamela Allen, Jean Maddox: The Fight for Rank and File Democracy (Berkeley: Union WAGE 
Educational Committee 1976).  
  
166 
women and minors, including: mandatory meal and rest periods, prohibitions 
against deducting tips from wages, a guaranteed minimum wage and premium 
rates for overtime and split shifts, limits on the costs of tools and uniforms, and 
standards for lighting, ventilation, rest rooms, and locker rooms. These work 
rules were especially beneficial to the eighty percent of California’s women 
workers who did not work under a union contract, and they helped men as well 
because employers often extended benefits such as coffee breaks and overtime 
pay to all of their employees.  
WAGE members continually debated whether this focus on a public policy 
matter diverted energy from their emphasis on union organizing, but they 
generally agreed that the protective laws, however inadequate, were vitally 
important for the majority of the state’s unorganized working women. Moreover, 
WAGE women believed that because of the AFL-CIO’s orientation toward white 
male trade union members, unions required cajoling from the outside to help 
them “overcome [their] historical sexism and racism and aid in organizing the 
unorganized and work on such class-wide issues as strengthening protective 
laws,” as WAGE leader Manja Argue once explained. “If the present leaders 
cannot be made to see this, they will have to be replaced.”274  
By the early 1970s, protective laws in more than twenty states had been 
nullified where they were determined to conflict with the 1964 Civil Rights Act’s 
provisions barring sex discrimination. While California had retained nearly all of 
its legislation, some of the state’s employers hoped that the Equal Rights 
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Amendment—passed by the federal government in March of 1972 and awaiting 
ratification from the required thirty-eight states—would free them from their 
obligations under the IWC work orders. The battle lines over the work orders 
were thus drawn with WAGE’s labor feminists and their allies among the 
leadership of the California Labor Federation pitted against the employers and 
Republican Governor Ronald Reagan’s business-friendly appointees to the 
Industrial Welfare Commission.275  
Just two weeks after its founding, WAGE members descended upon IWC 
hearings in San Francisco to demand that the Commissioners revisit the 
minimum wage for women, which they had set three years earlier at $1.65 or just 
five cents over the federal minimum. As several dozen women protested outside 
the State Annex Building, Anne Lipow, a young librarian recruited into WAGE by 
Anne Draper, lashed out at the antiquated budget guidelines by which the 
Commissioners set the minimum wage: “To arrive at this Minnie budget . . . you 
create a woman who in the labor force of the last 10 years hardly exists.”276 To 
survive on the California minimum wage, Lipow argued, a woman would have to 
be “illiterate, uncultured, virtually friendless . . .  and dressed in clothes that turn 
into rags soon after they are bought” because the suggested budget provided 
little money for clothes, a phone, reading material, recreation, or 
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entertainment.277 Lipow and other WAGE speakers repeated their demands for a 
$3.00 an hour minimum wage, and a 35 hour work week with double pay for 
overtime. They also demanded that the state’s household workers—maids, 
gardeners, cooks, chauffeurs, child care providers, and tutors—be included 
under the existing protections and that the lower provisions for farm workers be 
raised to those of other employees.278  
The IWC quickly agreed to revisit the work orders pertaining to the 
minimum wage, but another three years passed before it took action. The 
Commissioners, all of whom were Reagan appointees, complained that the 
governor had tied their hands by attempting to turn over their responsibilities to 
other state agencies and eliminating their budget for the hearings required for a 
wage increase.279 With the work of the Commission on hold, WAGE turned its 
attention to the state legislature, where they lobbied for the passage of legislation 
to extend the protective laws to men. The bill passed before being vetoed by 
Reagan in 1972. Under intense pressure the following year, Reagan approved a 
measure authorizing the Commission to determine wages, hours, and working 
conditions for all of the state’s workers. But instead of expanding the protections 
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and extending them to men, the IWC announced a new set of employer-friendly 
measures that bumped overtime from eight to ten hours, removed restrictions on 
the number of hours worked, and eliminated rest periods. The AFL-CIO filed an 
injunction (with WAGE offering a friend of the court brief) and won. The 
Commissioners were forced to reopen the wage orders because they had failed 
to hold proper hearings.280  
By the time the wage orders were reconsidered in June of 1975, California 
had a new Democratic governor, Jerry Brown. WAGE’s relationship to Brown’s 
appointees on the Commission was less adversarial; some commissioners even 
welcomed WAGE’s input to counterbalance the heavy pressure exerted by 
industry interests. However, after the IWC issued new wage orders favorable to 
workers in October 1976, the California Manufacturers Association and the 
California Hotel and Motel Association, among other employer groups, won 
injunctions that delayed implementation of the new rules for months. Three years 
later, they again attempted to halt new work orders that were to become effective 
on January 1, 1980. The California Supreme Court, however, reaffirmed the 
authority of the IWC and dismissed the injunctions. That decision immediately put 
into effect a new minimum wage and mandatory overtime pay for more than eight 
hours worked.281  
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Over the course of more than ten years of work on the protective 
legislation issue, WAGE’s accomplishments on behalf of unorganized workers 
were considerable. The IWC doubled California’s minimum wage between 1974 
and 1981, in no small part because WAGE focused public attention on this 
obscure state agency and relentlessly demanded what they referred to as a 
“living wage.” WAGE also successfully lobbied the IWC for night and weekend 
hearings to allow more participation from working people and recruited dozens of 
women and other unorganized workers to testify at the hearings, often providing 
them with transportation and assisting them with their testimony. WAGE activists 
succeeded in placing their members and supporters on the IWC industry 
advisory boards that helped the commissioners prepare the wage orders. Under 
pressure from WAGE, the IWC began including household workers under the 
wage orders beginning in 1974 and they equalized their protections two years 
later. Lastly, WAGE helped reduce the double standard for agricultural workers, 
whose minimum wage and work hour standards lagged behind those of workers 
in other sectors, and they achieved their initial goal of extending the IWC’s 
protections to men.282  
As impressive as their successes in the realm of public policy were, Union 
WAGE also had a deep and long-lasting impact on the local labor movement 
through its training and support of rising young leaders in the Bay Area’s major 
health care and public sector unions. Few WAGE activists exemplified this group 
of union leaders better than Kay Eisenhower, who tapped into WAGE resources 
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as she helped establish SEIU Local 616, representing employees of Alameda 
County across the bay from San Francisco. As a high school student in Los 
Gatos near San Jose, Eisenhower was active in Methodist youth programs that 
oriented her toward liberal politics and the civil rights movement.283 In 1962 she 
was expelled from Stanford University after becoming pregnant out of wedlock. 
Transferring to San Jose State College, she became involved in the civil rights 
and peace movements. Three years later, now married, Eisenhower moved to 
Berkeley with her husband as he began graduate studies while she finished her 
bachelor’s degree. It was the fall after the Free Speech Movement and the 
campus was alive with a spirit of protest and possibility. Eisenhower and her 
husband gravitated to the students and their adult mentors in the International 
Socialist Clubs, which was soon to rename itself the International Socialists (IS). 
They joined the group and worked on the newspaper, which was produced at its 
Berkeley office. Following her divorce a few years later, Eisenhower managed 
the IS office in the afternoon and the organization provided child care for her son.  
By 1971 many of Eisenhower’s closest IS comrades had left the Bay Area 
for the Midwest to take jobs in the steel, auto, communication, and transportation 
industries. Eisenhower briefly considered taking a blue collar job, but she did not 
meet United Parcel Service’s height requirement and believed that shift work 
would make it difficult to find quality childcare for her son. Moreover, Eisenhower 
was deeply immersed in the women’s liberation movement and active in the 
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Oakland Women’s Liberation Group. Though still an IS member and strong 
supporter, she “found it more comfortable to be in an all-female group.”284 With 
friends from Oakland Women’s Liberation, some of whom were also IS members, 
she began discussing the possibilities for organizing low-wage women workers in 
the service industries. Though these discussions took place in the midst of the 
IS’s drive to root itself in the working class, that strategy emphasized implanting 
members in basic industries that were thought to be central to the U.S. economy. 
Eisenhower and her comrades found that their interest in organizing women in 
the service sector was peripheral to IS’s emphasis on manufacturing and 
transportation. At about the same time, some IS women invited Eisenhower to 
join Union WAGE just as the new organization was launched. Over the next 
several years, WAGE provided Eisenhower with access to its broad network of 
labor feminists across the region as well as training on the basics of union 
structure, meeting facilitation, and labor organizing.  
Oakland’s Highland Hospital hired Eisenhower in December of 1971 as a 
clerical worker in the billing department. Within a few months, she was joined by 
two friends from her feminist study group. “We were very clear that once we got 
there and evaluated the situation, that what we wanted to do was to organize” 
women into unions, Eisenhower later said.285 Three SEIU locals represented 
county workers, but the largest group of employees—the clerical employees—
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were represented by the Alameda County Employees Association, a weak union 
that favored its professional members. The three women realized that they would 
have to undertake a long-term campaign to nurture pro-union sentiment among 
the county clerks and “to make clerks see that their image of themselves was 
one foisted on them by management.”286 They began by holding a series of 
dinner meetings aimed at identifying key issues around which to mobilize clerical 
workers and developing relationships with a group of women who would serve as 
the leaders of an organizing drive. Eisenhower and her associates succeeded in 
drawing together a diverse group from across the county and made special 
efforts to invite workers who were unlike themselves—college educated women 
with experience in the feminist and socialist movements.  
In December they launched a four-page newsletter—Clerks’ County—the 
title of which suggested the potential power of the clerical workers who made up 
a quarter of the counties employees. Clerks’ County quickly became the voice for 
pro-union clerks, a tool around which to attract supporters, and the name of the 
pro-union faction within the Association. Dignity issues were an early focus of 
Clerks’ County and “Clerks were indignant about an awful lot,” Eisenhower said, 
recalling one department where women “had to turn in a stub to get a new 
pencil.”287 Other articles focused on the limited promotional opportunities for 
older clerks, childcare, leave for sick children, and abusive and sexually 
aggressive bosses. In its effort to raise the consciousness of clerical workers, 
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Clerks’ County “hit hard” on the notion “that many women thought unions were ok 
for their husbands, but not for them” and it urged readers to support the union 
over the Employees Association.288  
The Clerks’ County group agitated for the better part of a year with the 
goal of forcing an election that would allow clerical workers to choose between 
the Employees Association and the Service Employees International Union 
(SEIU). Facing probable defeat, the leaders of the Employees Association cut a 
deal to affiliate with SEIU, thus establishing Local 616 in March of 1973. This was 
a setback for Eisenhower and her associates who had hoped for an election 
showdown with the Association and felt that SEIU had gone behind their backs 
and taken a shortcut to unionization. They declined an SEIU offer to make 
Clerks’ County the official union newsletter, choosing instead to continue it as the 
voice for a rank-and-file caucus within the local. Based on their popularity among 
the employees, several Clerks’ County activists soon became stewards and 
Eisenhower was appointed to the union’s bargaining committee. They quickly 
became the most powerful political bloc in the union and within two years were in 
control of its affairs.  
As they built Local 616 into one of the Bay Area’s most powerful unions, 
Eisenhower and her colleagues from Clerks’ County began appearing on local 
public television radio programs and they were interviewed for numerous books 
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and articles. “There were people who studied what was going on organizing in 
the workforce and knew that clerical organizing was important,” Eisenhower later 
recalled.289 Union WAGE increasingly looked to her as a resident expert on 
clerical and public sector organizing. In the fall and winter of 1974-75, 
Eisenhower organized a series of meetings for Union WAGE that brought dozens 
of clerical workers from three Bay Area county governments together with 
representatives from three competing local unions “for a sisterly exchange” of 
ideas for confronting the counties’ use of reclassification to trim budgets and 
justify low wages.290 WAGE also looked to Eisenhower as its resident expert on 
rank-and-file publications. Writing in the WAGE newspaper, Eisenhower asserted 
that “the collective experience of putting out a newsletter teaches workers many 
of the skills they need to exercise democratic control over their union structures 
and to deal effectively with arbitrary management actions.”291 Even as she 
assumed positions of leadership within Local 616 and Union WAGE and among 
Bay Area labor feminists, Eisenhower worked hard to retain her rank-and-file 
perspective. “If you allowed people to, they made me the star and the 
bureaucrats or the conservatives or whomever are always trying to relate just to 
me and I would make them relate to the whole group,” she recalled.292  
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Just as she deepened her involvement with Local 616, Eisenhower 
became a key player in WAGE’s first organizational crisis. In the spring of 1974 
she and seventeen other Bay Area WAGE members attended the founding 
convention of (CLUW) the Coalition for Labor Union Women in Chicago. The 
women left for Chicago hopeful at the prospect of forming a national working 
women’s group, and they took satisfaction in knowing that their pioneering efforts 
in California had contributed to the groundswell that led to CLUW’s formation.293 
But they returned from Chicago with mixed reviews of the conference. 
Eisenhower voiced strong objections to CLUW’s exclusion of non-union women 
from its membership, suggesting that such a policy amounted to a kind of double 
jeopardy for unorganized and unemployed women: “The necessity for CLUW 
being formed comes out of this neglect of women workers by the official union 
structure; to mirror the failure of the union movement to organize women workers 
by preventing those same women from belonging to the organization that now 
hopes to remedy that situation seems foolish at best.”294 Joyce Maupin added 
her criticisms of the CLUW leadership’s “heavy handed” use of parliamentary 
procedures to block a popular resolution in support of the Farmworkers’ Union—
                                                                                                                                                 
activist. Among her first acts as president was to rewrite the by-laws to devolve much of her 
power to the board, an action that helped institutionalize rank-and-file control. From her 
experiences in the women’s movement, WAGE and the Clerks’ County caucus, Eisenhower had 
grown to appreciate the ways in which collective decision making, though often cumbersome, 
“pulled us together and improved the skill level of the whole group” (Eisenhower, Interview by 
author, 31 October 2003).  
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a telling indication “that female bureaucrats are in every respect the equal of 
male bureaucrats.”295  
Teachers union members Anne Lipow and Gretchen Mackler, on the other 
hand, were among the WAGE leaders who argued that CLUW’s potential to be a 
“broad-based nation wide organization of trade union and working women” 
outweighed its short comings. They supported the decision to exclude non-union 
members at least initially, arguing that the alternative “is an organization 
dominated by women who are ‘friends’ of working women and who do not see 
the central importance of the labor movement—a revivified labor movement—in 
the struggle ahead.” This “would be a disaster for working women because they 
would be trapped in a sect that could have influence on neither society nor the 
labor movement.” Instead of “standing aside in helplessness and fury that ‘our’ 
movement has been stolen from us,” they argued, WAGE should disband the 
organization and focus on building their local CLUW chapters.296  
WAGE weathered the controversy, but they lost Lipow, Mackler, and a 
handful of key union members just as the organization was reaching its peak of 
influence within the local labor movement. In March and April of 1974, more than 
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15,000 striking clerks, janitors, hospital workers, sanitation workers, cafeteria 
workers, transport workers, animal keepers, and librarians in the City of San 
Francisco struck for higher wages in the face of spiraling inflation. This marked 
the city’s widest disruption in public services since the General Strike of 1934.297 
WAGE members played a leading role in the nine-day strike, especially within the 
largest of the striking unions—Local 400 of the Service Employees International 
Union, Civil Service Association, which represented the mostly female clerical 
workers.298 While building a strong base of support for the union among the 
clerks, Local 400 organizer and WAGE activist Maxine Jenkins helped frame the 
strike to the public as a response both to the cost of living crunch and to 
institutionalized gender discrimination. She explained to reporters that the city 
had long rationalized low pay for the mostly female clerical workers by comparing 
their wages to the already depressed wages of non-union clericals in the private 
sector. Jenkins berated the city for assuming that service workers’ wages were 
supplemental to those of a presumably male head of household. Increasing 
numbers of them were heads of households, she asserted, and many qualified 
for food stamps. “Wouldn’t we think it was unacceptable for a Teamster or a 
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longshoreman to qualify for food stamps after working an 8-hour day?,” Jenkins 
asked.299 
City Hall and many of the schools essentially closed. Roaming bands of 
picketers shut down the bus lines, trolleys, and trains, and an unattended water 
treatment plant spewed millions of pounds of raw sewage into the Bay and the 
Pacific Ocean. With the city on the verge of chaos, the board of supervisors 
agreed to across the board raises of about $600 a year and a pay package 
amounting to $11 million—twice as much as had been offered before the 
strike.300 WAGE members were jubilant. The strike confirmed their presumption 
that masses of women were ready to take action to improve their pay and 
working conditions. Steady organizing on the part of Jenkins and other WAGE 
leaders and associates had yielded influence within the union and the strike.  
The conservative backlash, however, was swift. The Chamber of 
Commerce responded with a lawsuit against the “illegal strikers” that delayed the 
pay raises for nearly a year. The Chamber also drafted and championed a 
proposal to forestall collective bargaining by adopting a formula to set city 
workers’ pay based on comparative wage studies. Jenkins emerged as a leading 
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spokesperson against the “Feinstein Amendment,” so named after its pro-
business sponsor—San Francisco board of supervisor’s president and mayoral 
hopeful, Dianne Feinstein. Jenkins appealed for support from the Bay Area’s 
feminist movement by recasting what was understood as a narrow public sector 
labor issue into an “anti-feminist proposition,” whose real targets were the 
thousands of low- wage clerical workers in the private sector. In a guest editorial 
in the San Francisco Sunday Examiner and Chronicle, Jenkins argued that the 
Chamber of Commerce understood that collective bargaining for city clericals 
would eventually drive up the wages of the women who worked in the “high rise 
secretarial ghettos” of the Chamber’s constituent members, including Bank of 
America, the Bechtel Corporation, and Shell Oil. “Thousands of women clerical 
workers,” she wrote “for the good of Chamber member profits, must be 
discouraged from organizing a breakthrough in sexist determined wage 
scales.”301 
As Jenkins carried on this public relations offensive, WAGE leaders made 
good use of their connections within the national women’s liberation movement. 
After receiving word that feminist writer and activist Gloria Steinem planned to 
attend a political fundraiser for Feinstein, WAGE urged Steinem to forego the 
event, warning her that she “would have to walk through a picket line of hundreds 
of women, representing many different unions and women’s groups.” Steinem 
replied to WAGE a few days later explaining that she had been unaware of 
Feinstein’s role in the matter: “I’m sure you understand, accurate information is 
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not always easy to come by from a distance; all the more so when a candidate’s 
position on issues of interest to women—and to all powerless groups—is an 
apparent change from the past.” To save Steinem embarrassment, Feinstein 
withdrew her invitation—a turnabout reported by the popular San Francisco 
Chronicle columnist Herb Caen. San Francisco voters defeated the amendment 
by a plurality of 12,000 voters in November.302 
Jenkins also faced new challenges from within her union that exposed 
some unresolved tensions regarding Union WAGE’s relationship to labor unions. 
In activating the low-wage clerical members of the union during the strike and the 
campaign to fight the Feinstein Amendment, Jenkins and her close associate 
Louise Statzer had threatened the dominance of the higher paid professional 
members of Local 400 as well as the union officers. In March 1975, Jenkins and 
Statzer, were fired on flimsy charges by Local 400 and reinstated only after rank-
and-file members and Union WAGE rallied to their defense. A few months later, 
SEIU placed the union in trusteeship and assumed control of the local’s finances 
and administration. In response, Jenkins, Statzer, and their supporters 
established the independent Union of City Employees (UCE) in July of 1975. 
WAGE members cheered the formation of the female-led union as a victory for 
women and for rank-and-file democracy. They also hoped that the UCE could 
serve as an alternative to the stifling bureaucracy and male domination of the 
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AFL-CIO. UCE appeared to be the long awaited “breakthrough to give future 
impetus to organizing women workers in private industry.”303  
The sense of optimism faded quickly in the following weeks when Jenkins 
and Statzer led their fledgling union into a short-lived affiliation with the Laborers’ 
International Union. Jenkins explained that the Laborers offered badly needed 
resources that an independent union could not provide. Moreover, the Laborers’ 
brought clout that would pay off in contract negotiations with City Hall. During the 
affiliation negotiations, however, Laborers’ officials expressed their unwillingness 
to work with Denise D’Anne, a transsexual clerical worker and WAGE activist, 
who had been groomed for leadership by Maxine Jenkins. WAGE members, who 
had previously fought Jenkins’s and Statzer’s dismissals from SEIU, felt betrayed 
and accused them of opportunism for affiliating with a union long associated with 
gangsterism and with no history of support for feminism. They accused the 
women of selling out the clerical workers, feminism, and their WAGE sister 
Denise D’Anne.304  
In the aftermath of the “betrayal,” WAGE leaders openly acknowledged 
that they deserved “some criticism in regard to our supportive attitude toward 
Jenkins and Statzer,” who, they had believed “were taking a progressive position 
by building a rank-and-file caucus and fighting for the restoration of their jobs.” 
But in their hope that “a new democratic unionism would be born, controlled by 
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the rank and file,” WAGE women had failed to sufficiently consider the 
contradictions and nuances of the labor movement: “We need to discuss 
questions of trusteeship, of dual unionism, of independent unions and union 
raiding, and how all of these are defined.”305 These discussions continued in 
meetings and in the pages of the WAGE newspaper through the fall of 1975. Had 
Jenkins’s mobilization of low-wage women workers been a genuine expression of 
her political values or was it an opportunistic play for power from the beginning? 
Some WAGE women suspected the latter, and the experience fed their growing 
sense of mistrust and alienation from the labor movement. 
Local 400 survived, but it was hurt badly. The following year, clerical 
workers opted out of a municipal strike over wages, and they were unable to 
mount a challenge to two more anti-labor ballot measures in November. Denise 
D’Anne reported that the clerks were divided and dispirited following the 
tumultuous events of the previous two years. But D’Anne also noted that 
uncertain economic conditions had stifled worker militancy. She observed that 
the clerks feared layoffs and even assumed “guilt for the current economic crisis,” 
echoing conservative talking points about driving up taxes. “There were murmurs 
about being satisfied about their present wages” and some spoke of not wanting 
to out earn their husbands, she reported.306  
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San Francisco clerical workers were hardly alone in their retreat from labor 
activism. San Francisco’s municipal strike and New York City’s fiscal crisis later 
in the year put the spotlight on the growing power of municipal unions. To much 
of the public, strong unions represented a threat to public order. As the City of 
New York teetered toward bankruptcy in the fall of 1975, the New York Times 
editorialized that San Francisco’s acquiescence to the strikers’ demands earlier 
in the year had “reinforced the conviction that unions in control of vital public 
services can compel the community to capitulate by holding a strike gun at its 
head. This is not only the road to municipal bankruptcy; it is the road to anarchy. 
It is a death knell for democracy.”307 The 1973 energy crisis and the recession of 
1974-1975 also fed the climate of fear and uncertainty. The adverse affect of 
these economic upheavals on grassroots political activity can be seen most 
strikingly in the failure of unions to respond to the post-1960s anti-union offensive 
that crippled the labor movement and a wave of plant closings and mass layoffs 
that nearly wiped out some industrial unions in the late 1970s. The job losses 
paralyzed rather than galvanized American workers and the response of labor 
leaders was pathetic.  
On top of these external challenges, Union WAGE faced new internal 
challenges as it celebrated its five-year anniversary in March 1976. The deaths of 
founders Draper and Maddox and the defection of the handful of pro-CLUW 
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women, including Mackler and Lipow, had stretched the remaining leaders thin. 
Maxine Jenkins had left during the controversy, and Kay Eisenhower and other 
women with the strongest ties to the labor movement were less available for 
WAGE work due to their increasing involvement in their own unions. In the 
WAGE internal newsletter, Jan Arnold observed that many of the group’s 
“inactive members” turn up “as the leaders and active workers in union drives, 
[and] rank and file struggles.” She noted that the “contradiction drains our core of 
WAGE, yet it gives us an incredibly rich network of resource people, news of the 
labor movement, and articles for our newspaper.”308 WAGE may have enjoyed 
an increasingly broad and influential political network, but with fewer new recruits 
joining the organization, leadership responsibilities fell disproportionately to 
women who were able to prioritize WAGE work or volunteer in the office. Many of 
them were not union members, but self-identified as allies of poor and working-
class women.  
 Tensions within WAGE that had been negotiated successfully in the heady 
and hopeful days of the early 1970s became contentious and divisive as 
organizing became more challenging. The divisions played out most glaringly in 
debates over the content and direction of the newspaper. The bimonthly 
newspaper, Union W.A.G.E., launched just weeks after the organization’s 
founding, had been the group’s public face and the vehicle through which it 
reached the broader labor left and the feminist movement. In addition to 
highlighting WAGE’s ongoing programs, the newspaper served as a primer for 
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labor neophytes, featuring instructions on Robert’s Rules of Order, the basics of 
labor law, and union organizing. Labor news outlined debates within the labor 
movement and publicized ongoing labor struggles, especially those in the area in 
which women played a leading role. For example, when twenty young women 
working in the Earring House Imports warehouse complained of receiving low 
wages and few benefits they came to WAGE to help them find a suitable union. 
WAGE activists put them in touch with organizers from SEIU Local 250 and 
within a week all twenty warehouse employees were on strike. The women’s 
charges were eventually supported by the NLRB and they were paid back 
wages. WAGE also publicized the union organizing drive of employees at Jung 
Sai (Great Chinese American Sewing Company), a subsidiary of fashion giant 
Esprit de Corps. The women at Jung Sai complained of low pay and unsafe 
working conditions and began discussions with (ILGWU) International Lady 
Garment Workers Union Local 101. When union supporter Frankie Ma was fired 
for unsatisfactory work, her coworkers went on strike for weeks. Rather than 
negotiate with the workers, Esprit chose to close down the plant, a violation of 
federal labor law. WAGE members were a consistent presence on picket lines 
throughout the Bay Area during the 1970s, and Union W.A.G.E. helped bring 
these labor protests to the larger U.S. left.309 
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 The newspaper also sought to provide working women with a usable past 
through profiles of labor heroines and pioneers such as Mother Jones and 
printer’s union leader Augusta Lewis among many others. Joyce Maupin and 
other contributors made frequent use of oral history interviews to capture the 
hidden history of local women’s working class activism as well. These historical 
offerings were more than simple celebrations of women and unions; they 
reflected WAGE’s critical support of the labor movement, and underscored the 
complexity and pitfalls of women in unions. In her profile of Lewis, for example, 
Maupin included Lewis’s observations that “it is the general opinion of female 
compositors that they are more justly treated by what is termed ‘rat’ foremen, 
printers and employers then they are by union men.”310  
 Even in its most theoretical articles, W.A.G.E. strove for accessibility. After 
receiving an unsolicited review of a book by Marxist theoretician Raya 
Dunayevskaya, the editors returned it to its author as unsuitable, explaining that 
“some of our members belong to various left tendencies but many more do not, 
and they are not familiar with Marxist terminology or ideas. They are even less 
familiar with Hegel, and terms like ‘dialectics’ or ‘negation’ would be meaningless 
to most of the women who read WAGE.” A WAGE editor acknowledged that 
although she had been a longtime veteran of Marxist political organizations, she 
knew “nothing of Hegel, Sartre or others named in your review.” She emphasized 
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that WAGE’s policy did not prevent the inclusion of “material presenting political 
ideas . . . but we do avoid the terminology used in radical papers and keep the 
language simple and clear.”311 
The process of putting together Union W.A.G.E. was as important to the 
organization as the product. The editorial team prided itself on its commitment to 
collective decision making and its successful development of new writers, 
editors, and leaders. Women learned how to write for publication by contributing 
an account of a strike, a poem, or a book review. They learned the mechanics of 
copyediting, layout, printing, and distribution. As they stood around the ping pong 
table that served as their layout space, they debated and discussed the 
newspaper articles and through those discussions developed ideas and 
strategies for responding to their own struggles at work. In a sense the 
newspaper was WAGE’s union—their model local that embodied the nurturing 
culture, democratic practices, and political vision that they wished to see more of 
in the labor movement.  
Unresolved tensions within the organization came to the surface during 
the tenure of WAGE newspaper editor Pam Allen. In 1964 Allen had been an 
exchange student at Spelman College in Atlanta when she was recruited by 
historian Staughton Lynd to work in Mississippi as a freedom summer volunteer. 
After leaving the South, Allen co-founded New York Radical Women in 1967—a 
pioneering women’s liberation organization—and moved to San Francisco the 
following year, where she helped launch Sudsofloppen, that cities first feminist 
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consciousness raising group.312 Two years later, Allen helped launch Breakaway, 
a Bay Area women’s liberation school that included courses on women’s history, 
feminist theory, and auto repair. While Allen had no direct ties to the labor 
movement, she had been drawn to working-class history through her research 
and writing on social movements.313 When a friend invited her to join WAGE in 
1974, she jumped at the opportunity and quickly became involved with the 
newspaper.   
By the time she assumed the editorship of the newspaper in May 1977, 
Allen had more than ten years of experience as an activist in the Deep South and 
on both coasts. She brought to WAGE strong ideas about building and sustaining 
grassroots organizations and she envisioned WAGE and its newspaper as a 
vehicle for uniting all women, not just those in unions. W.A.G.E. had never strictly 
been a house organ, but she felt it was too narrowly focused on wage-earning 
women and their union battles. And that emphasis smacked of elitism given the 
rising unemployment rates and an economy in which having any kind of wage 
work seemed a privilege. Allen expanded the newspaper from twelve to sixteen 
pages and began devoting more space to topical articles and special issues on 
sexual assault, women in prison, and reproductive rights.  
Readers recognized the changes immediately and their reactions were 
mixed. In a letter to the editor, a San Francisco woman applauded the shift in 
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W.A.G.E.’s direction because it provided “an overview picture of what’s 
happening to our lives, in all their aspects, so that we can confront the many 
faces of our oppression with knowledge, clarity and determination not to be 
suckered as bad as we have been—out of ignorance and narrow isolation.” She 
wrote that in her years as a clerical worker, taxi cab driver, waitress, child care 
worker and barber she had never had the privilege of joining an organizing drive, 
strike, job action, or independent caucus. So “a paper devoted to a narrow focus 
of ‘organizing’ tips and stories is about as useful to me as a brochure on how to 
invest in stocks!”314 A New York reader praised the inclusion of several articles 
on reproductive rights, asserting that it would help “build unity among women by 
breaking down barriers like union/non-union, wages/welfare, wages/husband, 
etc. that often separate us.”315 A critic, on the other hand, found the articles on 
broader themes to be too disconnected from ongoing WAGE programs: “The 
prison focus was not based in experience of the organization in prison work. As a 
result, the issue was primarily educational, instead of having the practical and 
analytical content geared toward use in ongoing work.”316 
The newspaper debates revealed some differences of opinion about the 
organization’s priorities that in better times could have been negotiated and may 
have even strengthened the group. But as their other programmatic work faltered 
and their connections to the unions grew more distant, the divisions within WAGE 
became increasingly bitter and divisive. The group’s leaders attempted to build 
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consensus regarding the organization’s future in their internal publications as well 
as in the pages of the newspaper. In WAGE’s December 1978 internal 
newsletter, Allen defended her efforts to make the newspaper more broadly 
appealing and urged WAGE sisters to be more open and honest about their 
contradictory attitudes toward unions: “WAGE should be looking clearly and 
ruthlessly at the truth: that rank and file people get corrupted or coopted when 
they are elected to office, that people who can’t be neutralized any other way are 
beaten up and even killed, and that rank and file groups tend to splinter from their 
own internal contradictions, assuming they can even get off the ground.” Allen 
concluded that she would continue to argue that “members should try to work to 
change their unions because we can learn from those struggles, not because I 
think the unions can be changed.”317 
Joyce Maupin, among other WAGE leaders, attacked Allen’s position as 
defeatist and warned against the danger of encouraging women to participate in 
union struggles in “which you don’t believe they can win” because that “creates 
demoralization” and breeds cynicism. “Workers don’t get into a union struggle for 
the experience,” she reminded Allen, “but to win something. If you do not think 
this is possible, if you do not think unions are a viable form of struggle, its is 
better to say so and not mess with them at all.” She noted that in times of crisis 
unions can change significantly as they respond to pressures from the rank and 
file. “It is comparatively easy to change a union in a crisis period,” Maupin wrote, 
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drawing on her experience during the Boeing strike thirty years earlier. “When we 
were dissatisfied with our union leadership, we burst into song at union meetings, 
a song addressed to our president, name of Gibson: ‘Gibson is our leader, he 
can be removed. Just like garbage floating on the water—he can be removed.’” 
Maupin concluded by reminding WAGE supporters that from the start the 
organization had “committed to a primary goal of organizing women into unions.” 
If the majority of members were no longer committed to that goal, she admitted 
“we certainly are in a state of confusion.”318   
In February 1979, WAGE leaders emerged from a difficult two-day 
meeting in San Francisco believing that “after months of increasing tension, 
rumors, pre-convention meetings,” and “an unbelievably difficult time planning” 
their upcoming convention, they had resolved their differences. The session 
ended and the women applauded as “it began to dawn on us that we were going 
to make it.” They adopted a modified version of a proposal by Pam Allen to 
produce four focus issues of the newspaper that, where appropriate, would focus 
on ongoing WAGE programs.319  
The sense of relief was short-lived. The divisions were never really 
resolved. During two meetings in June, the executive board agreed not to 
reappoint Allen editor. The final dispute involved a disagreement over who would 
control the contents of a special focus issue on “Third World Women.” Allen had 
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recruited African American women and Latinas to serve as guest contributors to 
the special issue, but WAGE board members demanded that they retain editorial 
control. In an editorial printed shortly before her departure, Allen charged the 
executive board with “challenging the right of Third World, unemployed and poor 
women to share their concerns and their struggles because these do not fit into a 
trade union context nor always address issues at the workplace.”320 A group of 
Allen’s supporters pledged to continue as a caucus within WAGE, but their efforts 
were short-lived and they soon left the organization.321 Other members dropped 
out because of battle fatigue, while women at the periphery of WAGE who might 
have become more active were put off by the infighting.322 
The remaining Union WAGE activists limped into the 1980s. They 
continued to provide strike support, most notably during a protracted dispute 
between hotel workers and their employers in downtown San Francisco and they 
continued to lobby the Industrial Welfare Commission. Despite the commission’s 
increasingly cooperative stance, every small advance was a struggle in the face 
of strong opposition from employers groups. In February 1980 as she testified 
before a legislative committee that was considering the future of the commission, 
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Joyce Maupin reflected on the conservative counteroffensive that threatened to 
undo much of the progress that had been made since the 1960s. “I see the 
employer attack on working standards in California as part of a general right-wing 
drive in this country to take away any of the benefits and working conditions we 
have had in the past.” She noted that the June 1978 passage of Proposition 13—
a California ballot initiative to cap property taxes—was sold to the public as an 
effort to “eliminate luxuries in government.” However, those “luxuries turned out 
to be medical care, child care, libraries and schools” and she observed that 
“efforts to repeal abortion laws, and taking Medicaid abortions away from poor 
women, are a part of this reactionary thrust” as well.323  
 
 In the early 1970s WAGE women were animated by a sense that they 
were on the verge of an era of mass organizing drives that would lead to the 
establishment of militant and democratic unions. By the beginning of the 1980s, 
they were far more sober, if not dispirited. Attendance at WAGE board meetings 
and other functions declined considerably and most of the organization’s 
chapters folded. Group discussions shifted from ongoing programs to the 
organization’s future. In a letter to supporters, WAGE leaders acknowledged that 
“many of our potential activists are too preoccupied with keeping body and soul 
together to participate in politics. Others have only a little time to spare, and they 
are using it to participate in their own union or workplace activity.” Nevertheless, 
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they vowed to persevere so that they might “feel less like victims and more like 
the proud troublemakers that we are.”324 
Finally, in the fall of 1982 the remaining WAGE leaders issued a farewell 
letter to their readers and supporters, explaining that they were experiencing “the 
larger difficulties facing women attempting to unionize.” In the early 1970s, they 
wrote, women had phoned WAGE and wrote regularly requesting advice and 
assistance in organizing unions. But the dismal economy marked by “high 
unemployment” and “worsened by government cutbacks and plant closures, 
makes rocking the boat and risking your job dangerous business.” The AFL-CIO 
had “not been daring or spirited in action” and deserved its share of the blame. 
Despite its recent vows to “renew its ties with community groups and popular 
movements” its “community relations are poor.” The WAGE stalwarts concluded 
wistfully: “The time for organizing working women must come some day. We 
hope that we have made a significant contribution to this struggle and we urge 
others to keep fighting. What matters is not the name of the organization, but that 
the fight goes on. Speaking for ourselves, we have seen ceaseless injustice 
perpetrated on working women, and we will never forget it.”325  
In their more recent retrospections, veterans of Union WAGE have 
expressed ambivalence regarding their experiences and the organization’s 
legacies. They cherish the close relationships they built and retain proud 
memories of picket lines and Industrial Welfare Commission protests. They 
                                                 
324
 Joyce Maupin and Karen Guma to Members and friends, August 1981, Box 3, Folder 3, Union 
WAGE Collection, Labor Archives and Research Center, San Francisco State University.  
 
325
 “WAGE Punches Out,” Union WAGE, 1982.  
  
196 
treasure the skills they gained working on the newspaper and organizing 
workshops that trained hundreds of women to become labor movement activists. 
They also rightfully acknowledge that in the Bay Area, they had a positive impact 
on the gender politics and the organizational culture of some of the largest 
unions in the country, including locals of the SEIU, OPEIU, AFSCME, and the 
AFT. Within those unions, Kay Eisenhower, Maxine Jenkins and many other 
WAGE activists took the lead in fighting for rank and file democracy and a host of 
reforms that benefited women workers, including pay equity, childcare, fairness 
in promotions, rigorous enforcement of health and safety rules, and protections 
from sexual harassment. The successful organization of city workers on both 
sides of the Bay were significant steps forward for women and for the labor 
movement, and at times the Industrial Welfare Commission showed promise of 
serving as a vehicle through which WAGE might fight for improved wages and 
working conditions for all California workers. But the long anticipated 
breakthrough never materialized. WAGE’s misadventure with the independent 
union of San Francisco city workers was a major disappointment. The State of 
California also proved itself sufficiently malleable to accommodate some of 
WAGE’s demands, while preventing the Industrial Welfare Commission from 
becoming a strong voice and watchdog for the interests of the state’s workers. 
The employers’ groups were too effective and powerful. Because of these 
setbacks, the heated debates over CLUW and the fight over the direction of the 
newspaper continue to cloud WAGE veterans’ memories, many of whom express 
deep bitterness over the group’s demise.326  
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Even if WAGE had reached a working synthesis among its various 
factions, it is unlikely to have found much fertile ground for organizing in the 
1980s. The level of worker militancy had subsided and the political and economic 
climate grew increasingly hostile to all forms of progressive organizing. The 
young feminists who had turned to working class organizing in the early 1970s, 
who had looked to WAGE for guidance and had provided it with much of its 
earliest leadership had by immersed themselves in their own unions by the mid-
1970s. They had less need of WAGE’s assistance and less time to contribute to 
it. Moreover, the thousands of women who continued to pour into the growing 
service producing sector in Northern California in the 1980s found their 
employers and their unions generally more responsive to their needs. And when 
they were not, they looked to the state to guarantee fairness. In the Bay Area, 
that change was due in no small part to the work of Union WAGE. 
                                                                                                                                                 
organization’s first  “reunion”—a reception for an exhibit of Cathy Cade’s WAGE photographs. 
Women from all of WAGE’s eras and all of its competing tendencies met at the Institute of 
Industrial Relations at UC Berkeley.  
 
Chapter 5: Laborers in a Smaller Vineyard 
 
 Returning from the salmon canneries at the close of the summer of 1953, 
the “Alaskeros” gathered in Seattle to rededicate their newly refurbished ILWU 
Local 37 union hall. Noting that the facility had been redesigned with an eye 
toward expanding cultural and recreational programs for young people, business 
agent Ernesto Mangaoang declared that “the answer of Local 37 to the problem 
of protecting its future is to identify itself with its community and to seek out new 
allies and win the youth of this community.” He urged his union brothers to 
“familiarize the younger generation with the necessity of perpetuating our union” 
because “the time will come when we will no longer be here” and “they will one 
day take our places.”327  
 Mangaoang’s remarks took on a special urgency as fall approached. The 
union of almost 1,500 mostly Filipino workers faced the toughest challenges of its 
twenty-year existence.328 A few years earlier, the CIO had expelled the cannery 
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workers’ national union for its alleged affiliation with the Communist Party.329 
Raids by rival unions, at times instigated by affiliates of the American Federation 
of Labor and other times by the cannery owners added to the union’s worries. 
For four years several Local 37 leaders had also labored under the shadow of 
charges by the Immigration and Naturalization Services that they were 
Communists and aliens. They expected a U.S. Supreme Court ruling on their 
pending deportations to the Philippines any day.  
 By the early 1960s, most of Mangaoang’s left-wing comrades had either 
left or been driven out of Local 37 and their conservative rivals assumed control 
of the union as it slipped into a long period of complacency and corruption.330 A 
few old progressives, however, lived long enough to work with a new generation 
of Local 37 radicals, to share in their victories and mourn their bitterest loss. 
Beginning in the early 1970s this new generation, who had been shaped 
profoundly by their participation in the New Left and civil rights movements, 
organized one of the turn to the working class’s most sustained and successful 
efforts to shape the politics and culture of a union local in the United States. Led 
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by Silme Domingo and Gene Viernes, this group of young activists within Local 
37 implemented democratic measures that broke the grip of local gangsters who 
had run the union by controlling its dispatch system. They also mobilized the 
union to fight discrimination and hazardous work conditions in the Alaska 
canneries through an intensive long haul grassroots struggle. Moreover, in line 
with the labor movement’s best tradition of international solidarity, they 
established a power base within the ILWU and the west coast Filipino community 
from which they organized opposition to U.S. foreign policy and the dictatorship 
of Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines. 
 
Since they were teenagers, Silme Domingo and Gene Viernes had spent 
their summers working in the Alaskan salmon canneries, as had their fathers and 
their uncles before them. They knew well the hazardous conditions in the 
canneries, where slippery floors, outmoded equipment, and dull knives led to 
countless injuries and occasional fatalities. Into the 1970s the salmon canning 
process remained mostly unchanged since the turn of the century introduction of 
the “Iron Chink,” a fish gutting machine so named on its United States patent 
application because of the thousands of Chinese workers it displaced. During the 
six to twelve weeks of the season, white fisherman represented by the Alaska 
Fisherman’s Union (AFU) docked their fishing vessels or tenders at the 
canneries, where the “beach gang,” who were mainly white AFU members, 
unloaded salmon by hand or water propulsion on to elevators that carried the fish 
into the fish house—the domain of the Filipino and Native American workers 
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represented by Local 37. Until the 1970s when the industry began hiring large 
numbers of white and Asian female college students—who were believed to 
possess the necessary dexterity to remove the roe for which there was a strong 
market in Japan—few white workers other than machinists and supervisors 
ventured in to the fish house. Experienced Filipino workers hand-sorted the five 
types of salmon: king, red/sockeye, silver/coho, dog/chum, and humpy/pink. The 
sorters then put the salmon in bins capable of holding up to twenty thousand at a 
time. Through elevators and troughs, the fish passed through the Iron Chink 
butchering machines where a series of rotating blades and brushes removed 
fins, scales, and guts. Though the Iron Chink processed as many as five 
thousand fish an hour, it was inexact and left plenty of work for “slimers” who, 
equipped with a knife, cutting board and cold running faucet, removed remaining 
unwanted parts by hand. After the salmon was gutted and cleaned, workers 
pushed them into feeders that cut the fish and filled empty aluminum cans. Each 
can was then weighed and inspected, lids attached and sealed, then loaded on 
racks or can catchers. Pressure cookers, or “retorts” cooked the salmon cans 
before they were cased and readied for shipment.331   
 Domingo and Viernes had friends and relatives who had been maimed in 
the canneries either through trauma or repetitive motion injuries. Drawn by the 
lure of overtime pay, fish house workers sometimes labored around the clock in 
pools of cold water and fish parts. They suffered high rates of arthritis from 
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handling fish that had been frozen or brined—kept in chilled sea water—on the 
boats. Every worker had heard stories of major accidents involving heavy 
machinery and other catastrophes such as the 1968 bunk house fire in which a 
stove exploded, trapping the sleeping men on the second and third floors, killing 
five, and seriously injuring 25 others. Survivors who jumped from the flaming 
building sustained “broken legs; back; ribs; slight burns of faces; ears; arms; and 
hairs.”332   
Domingo and Viernes also experienced first hand the discriminatory 
practices of the cannery owners. Well into the 1970s Filipino and Native Alaskan 
cannery workers spent their non-work hours in dormitories that were separate 
from and inferior to those of white workers and they ate inferior food in separate 
cafeterias. The cannery managers filled openings for machinists, carpenters, and 
administrators almost exclusively with white workers and a vague hiring and 
promotion process kept Filipinos from moving above unskilled work.333 Each 
salmon season workers barraged their union leaders in Seattle with an inventory 
of complaints about the deplorable conditions and racist employment practices in 
the canneries, but Local 37 officials rarely pressed management for 
improvements for fear of jeopardizing their comfortable relationships with the 
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cannery owners. At the New England Fish Company cannery in Uganik Bay, for 
instance, a union delegate urged the Local 37 president to address the 
deplorable sleeping arrangements in the Filipino bunk house where seven 
workers sometimes shared a room in which “many beds were double decked” in 
violation of health and fire codes. The delegate contrasted the Filipino dorms with 
the quarters for white machinists and beach gang workers: “They have the rooms 
over the store. Well constructed, modern furniture, steam heat, fully carpeted, 
spreads and drapes to match, connected bathroom with each 2 rooms.” These 
conditions and many others were inconvenient and insulting to the Filipino 
workers, others were dangerous and deadly, such as the oil barrel just outside 
one bunkhouse that “leaked oil constantly under the porch floor and really 
created a fire hazard.” Workers asked managers to install a fire hose nearby, but 
that request was ignored, while “people kept getting ill from the oil fumes from 
stoves in the rooms.”334 
 Union elections, when they occurred, were marred by fraud, despite 
prodding from ILWU international officers in San Francisco and directives from 
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the U.S. Department of Labor. In its investigation of the 1972 elections, the 
Department of Labor substantiated claims that incumbent candidates had 
campaigned on union time and that the union failed to give proper notice of 
nominations and elections. The Department also found that dozens of members 
living outside of Seattle and those working in Alaska at the time of the election 
had not received ballots. The ballot shortage, however, did not prevent the union 
voting machines from tallying more votes than the number of registered voters. 
By the time the Department of Labor forced Local 37 to adopt various procedural 
reforms, those union leaders who had engaged in fraud were in the final days of 
their terms.335 
 It might be argued without too much exaggeration that the union in the 
1970s functioned most effectively as a cover for a massive gambling operation 
that was controlled by the Tulisan, a Seattle-based gang. Heavy handed foremen 
associated with the Tulisan extorted bribes from workers in exchange for a 
dispatch from the Seattle union hall. Once in Alaska, these same foremen bullied 
members into high stakes card games that sometimes left workers deeper in 
debt than when they had left the lower forty-eight. Immigrant Filipino workers, 
who had done the bulk of canning since the 1920s when immigration laws 
reduced Japanese migration to a trickle, proved especially vulnerable to the 
                                                 
 
335
 The Department of Labor also observed that “two of four keys to each of the voting machines 
were kept in the desk of the incumbent Secretary-Treasurer, who was a successful candidate for 
reelection” (see J. Vernon Ballard to Gene Navarro, 5 December 1974, and J. Vernon Ballard, 
U.S. Department of Labor Determination, 3 December 1974, both documents in Box 29, Folder 
41, Cannery Workers and Farm Laborers Union, Local 7 Records, University of Washington, 
Seattle). 
 
  
205 
predations of the foremen.336 For years, these practices remained an open secret 
among Seattle Filipinos, the ILWU, and cannery industry managers all of whom 
looked the other way in exchange for labor peace.  
 Until the late 1950s, Local 37 had also supported left-wing liberation 
movements and independent trade unions in the Philippines, but in recent years 
it had become a source of support for the Ferdinand Marcos dictatorship based 
on a shared ethnic identity with the many Seattle Filipinos who had ties to his 
home province of Iloco Norte, as well as on Marcos’s ability to cultivate 
relationships with powerful Filipinos abroad.337 Marcos had been elected to the 
presidency in 1965 after having served in the Philippine House of 
Representatives and the Senate for many years. In September 1972, he 
declared martial law, suspending many civil liberties and giving himself dictatorial 
powers over the military and the press. There was some popular support for 
martial law among Filipinos, who believed that it was the only way to restore 
order in the midst of economic and social upheaval. But domestic and 
international opposition to Marcos grew amidst reports of massive corruption, 
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political repression, and human rights violations. Philippine authorities stationed 
at the consulate in Seattle attempted to counter the opposition and bolster 
Marcos’s position by forging close ties to the conservative leaders of the city’s 
Filipino community and within the union.338 The consular officials understood that 
a hostile ILWU, with its ability to disrupt global trade, posed a significant threat to 
the Filipino economy and they realized that Local 37 and the even larger ILWU 
Local 142 in Hawaii were among the most important Filipino-American political 
institutions in the United States and could influence public opinion and help sway 
U.S. foreign policy against Marcos.  
Both of the union’s presidents during the 1970s were strong Marcos 
supporters. President Gene Navarro traveled to the Philippines as part of the 
Balikbayan (homecoming)—a government program that aimed to polish Marcos’s 
reputation through subsidized visits for Filipinos living abroad. Navarro returned 
to Seattle and reported to Local 37 that he “appreciated the way the government 
is being administered under martial law.”339 His successor, Tony Baruso, boasted 
of his close relationship with Marcos and decorated his union hall office with a 
photograph of himself shaking hands with the dictator. Baruso was also close to 
consular officials, and was a strong supporter of their efforts to deport three 
Filipina maids who had allegedly stolen from the consulate. The incident divided 
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Seattle’s Filipino community after the maids filed for political asylum on the 
grounds that they would be persecuted upon their return to the Philippines. 
Marcos supporters demanded their deportation, while the growing opposition to 
Marcos supported their petitions for asylum.340 
By the late 1960s, the local was a shell of the militant left-wing union that 
had been organized in the 1930s as Cannery Workers’ and Farm Laborers’ 
Union Local 7 of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO). The roots of the 
union’s descent can be traced to the years after World War II, during which it 
fended off attacks from the cannery owners, rival unions, organized crime 
elements, and the federal government. In 1950 government agents arrested 
some thirty Local 37 members, including the local president and business agent, 
and charged them with failing to register with the attorney general as communists 
under the recently passed McCarran Internal Security Act. Paralleling the 
government’s campaign against the Australian-born ILWU president Harry 
Bridges, the arrests and threatened deportation of Local 37 members continued 
for several years until union lawyers won a U.S. Appeals Court ruling, 
subsequently confirmed by the Supreme Court, that prevented the deportation of 
Filipinos who had migrated before 1934 when the Philippines was still a U.S. 
territory.341  
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Longtime Local 37 member Terri Mast believes that Cold War anti-
Communism crippled the union’s effectiveness: “The officers spent a lot of time 
defending themselves and got away from running the union.” As a result, she 
believes that the union never transitioned from the tumultuous campaign to 
establish and defend itself against government attacks to the more mundane, but 
critical project of sustaining a union that would protect workers on the job and 
negotiate favorable contracts. In getting to know the early leaders of the union, 
Mast also saw up close how the years of repression wrought havoc on their 
families and personal relationships as several of the union’s pioneers succumbed 
to alcoholism. Though Local 37 had once been preeminent in Filipino political 
and civic affairs, it lost some respect within the Filipino community in the 1960s 
due to its Communist taint and the personal failings of some union leaders.342  
Viernes, Domingo, and other U.S.-born cannery workers of their 
generation were unwilling to tolerate the exploitation of the canners and the 
complicity and corruption of their union officials. Their politics were shaped by a 
growing spirit of dissent in the late 1960s and early 1970s, as well as their 
participation in Seattle protest movements. Silme Domingo was born in 1952, 
raised in the predominantly white Seattle neighborhood of Ballard, and graduated 
with honors from the University of Washington, where he participated in Seattle’s 
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Asian movement—a largely youth-based effort to fight discrimination and 
promote Asian cultures and identities. Through his father’s connections Silme 
worked summers at the New England Fish Company Uganik Bay cannery.343 His 
older brother, Nemesio was also a cannery worker, and had been a member of 
SDS, the Washington Peace and Freedom Party, and the Venceremos Brigade, 
which brought radical students to work in Cuba to learn about the revolution’s 
achievements. Nemesio Domingo later recalled that during off hours the younger 
workers gathered to discuss grievances and plan strategies for making work fair 
and tolerable. He and Silme quickly emerged as leaders, he remembered, 
because “we were always speaking our piece.”344  
Others who became involved in the cannery workers movement had 
similar histories of activism. David Della became an activist while still a student at 
Cleveland High School—where he came in to contact with slightly older Asian 
radicals, including teaching assistant Nemesio Domingo Jr. As a college student 
at the University of Washington, Della fought for low-income housing in the 
International District and the expansion of bilingual social services.345 Before she 
was swept up in the Filipino movement though her friendships with several of its 
key leaders, Terri Mast participated in antiwar demonstrations and women’s 
liberation. Mast, who grew up in a white working-class family in Seattle, spent 
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much of her young adulthood in the University District, which was a hotbed of 
leftist politics in the late 1960s and 1970s. It was there that Mast, recalls Black 
Panthers lecturing the counterculture youth about the need to take politics more 
seriously.346 Bruce Occena, who played a key leadership role in the later years of 
the cannery worker reform movement, helped supply the Native Americans who 
seized Alcatraz Island in 1969 and was among the early leaders of the battle to 
save San Francisco’s International Hotel from the demolition that led to the 
displacement of hundreds of low-income residents. As a student at Berkeley in 
the late 1960s, Occena participated in communist study groups led by Chinese 
graduate students, and like Nemesio Domingo, he had traveled to Cuba on a trip 
sponsored by the Venceremos Brigade.347  
At the end of 1971, Silme Domingo and ten of his coworkers were 
dismissed for “agitating the crew.” When Local 37 declined to intervene on their 
behalf, they drew upon their extensive contacts among Seattle progressives to 
launch the first of several discrimination lawsuits with the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC). Civil rights and labor activist Tyree Scott of the 
United Construction Workers Association (UCWA), encouraged the cannery 
dissidents to form an organization that could publicize the suits, gather 
information to build strong cases, and recruit additional plaintiffs from among the 
workers. Scott’s organization, which used direct action and legal strategies to 
secure jobs for African Americans in the construction industry, provided a small 
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grant to launch the Alaskan Cannery Workers Association (ACWA) in the 
summer of 1973.348   
A few weeks later, posing as University of Washington business students 
conducting industry research, Domingo and his associate Michael Woo traveled 
to Alaska to gather evidence for the lawsuits. But the word spread among the 
cannery operators about the two suspicious “students,” and Woo and Domingo 
found themselves shut out of the fish camps. They were forced to end their trip 
after a few days, but before leaving Alaska they interviewed a few workers who 
shared their anger at the deplorable conditions in the canneries and their 
frustrations with the union. Among those workers was Gene Viernes, a slimer at 
Ward’s Cove in Ketchikan Bay. He became one of their best informants and most 
reliable allies.349  
Viernes grew up in Wapato in the Yakima Valley east of Seattle, and spent 
his first summer in the canneries in 1966 at Ward’s Cove. Like Domingo, Viernes 
secured a position with his father’s bribe to a foreman. Though Viernes was not 
an activist during his first several summers in Alaska, he and a group of young 
cannery workers began speaking out against the miserable conditions in the 
summer of 1971. His childhood friend and coworker Andy Pascua later 
remembered that the cannery workers reached their breaking point over the 
mistreatment of their uncles and fathers. “We first got upset over the treatment of 
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the old men there, the way [management] treated our fathers. The old men 
couldn’t even talk back to the foremen. We weren’t used to that. We were used to 
farm life where everyone works together, not this very structured work with all the 
power in the foreman. It really hurt us to see the old men treated this way. We 
had grown up with them. That was the catalyst for action.”350 Another sore spot 
for Viernes and other non-white workers was that they were served lower quality 
food than their white counterparts. Knowing that the union would not file 
appropriate grievances, Viernes organized a series of disruptive hunger strikes 
that led to improvements in the cafeteria offerings. By the fall of 1973, shortly 
after meeting Silme Domingo, Viernes too was fired and both men found 
themselves blacklisted from the canneries and the union. 
 With its core group consisting mostly of blacklisted workers, the Alaskan 
Cannery Workers Association focused on recruiting support from working union 
members and inviting them to join as plaintiffs in the lawsuits. They appealed to 
some frustrated young workers who felt alienated from the union’s aging leaders, 
many of whom had not worked in the canneries for years. Many other workers 
viewed the Association with suspicion and sympathized with the leaders of Local 
37 who accused the young radicals of being communists and of creating a dual 
union. When they got wind of the upstart organization’s formation, Local 37 board 
members had been outraged. Union vice president Tony Baruso urged members 
to “open our eyes and always be aware in protecting the interests of our 
members from outside interference.” Other board members vowed to “counteract 
                                                 
350
 John Stamets, “The Cannery Murders,” Seattle Sun, 10 August 1982. 
  
213 
their move and destroy their growth.”351 Association leaders responded to the 
charges of outside interference by emphasizing that each of their staff and board 
members “is or has been employed in the industry.” Nevertheless, early on in 
their efforts they struggled to overcome the cannery workers’ deep feelings of 
resignation and understandable fear of being blacklisted for challenging the 
union.352 
 After two years outside of the official union structure, however, ACWA 
members began to question their over-reliance on a legal strategy rather than a 
grassroots organizing approach that would challenge Local 37’s entrenched 
leadership. Their attitude towards Local 37 had been partly a reflection of their 
New Left sensibilities. Many in the student movement, especially, had dismissed 
unions as hopelessly reactionary and had written off union leaders as labor 
bureaucrats.353 But as long as the Local 37’s “leadership was corrupt or allowed 
to be lazy,” Association leaders eventually concluded, their effort “would have no 
real tools to fight . . . . against the company for better wages, better health and 
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safety, and improved living conditions.”354 Moreover, some Association activists 
feared that they were growing disconnected from the realities of cannery work. 
Association leaders understood that the lawsuits and the formation of an 
organization independent of Local 37 were useful and probably necessary initial 
strategies given that members had been blacklisted from the industry and the 
union, but the legal strategy had been pursued to the exclusion of the more 
rooted issue of union reform. Once they decided to return to the canneries, Bruce 
Occena later recalled, “we had the very difficult task of reversing and going back 
into the union.”355 
 Shifting gears in 1975, ACWA began encouraging supporters to re-enter 
the union and refocus their efforts on union reform even as their lawsuits worked 
their ways through the courts. To bypass the tremendous suspicion and hostility 
of the union’s officers, ACWA members used family ties and other personal 
connections to once again secure dispatches to the canneries. Silme’s father 
Nemesio Sr., who had worked in the canneries from 1927 to 1942, drew upon his 
extensive networks in the canneries and persuaded a corrupt foreman to 
dispatch his sons to Alaska. Tony Baruso, who had become president in the 
wake of Navarro’s death in the spring of 1976, objected, but an ILWU lawyer 
informed him there were no grounds for excluding the Domingos from the 
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union.356 By the salmon season of the following year, the Domingo brothers, 
Viernes, and several of their ACWA supporters were back at work in Alaska and 
had formed a union reform caucus, the Rank and File Committee of Local 37. 
In adopting the name Rank and File Committee (RFC), they drew 
strategically on an enduring bit of Local 37 laborlore. As the story goes, twelve 
hundred cannery workers were crowded onboard the Alaska-bound SS Santa 
Cruz on a hot summer’s evening in 1946. The men were angry at the canners for 
herding them on to a filthy ship with inadequate provisions, and incensed at their 
union for allowing it to happen. They gathered below deck, vowed to take over 
their corrupt union, and elected a committee to lead the fight. Their anger boiled 
over into rage after the ship ran aground, leaving them exposed to brutal cold 
and dire hunger for three days and nights. Upon their return to Seattle at the end 
of the summer and true to their pledge, they reconvened and named their 
movement the Rank and File Committee. This first Rank and File Committee 
soon became the driving force within the union; committee leaders led Local 37 
through the years of the Red Scare. The Local 37 creation narrative was well-
known among old timers, as well as the young radicals of the 1970s and any 
cannery worker who was interested in the union’s history. The reconstituted Rank 
and File Committee took every opportunity to retell the story, incorporating it into 
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their public presentations and publishing versions in their newsletter and the 
International Examiner, a local newspaper they published.357  
Even before they had been readmitted to Local 37, 1970s version of the 
Rank and File Committee adopted a blueprint for transforming the union. Once 
reestablished within the union they planned to form a caucus that would identify 
key individuals to back for union elections. They would couple these electoral 
efforts with “administrative and legal actions . . . to force union resignations” and 
provoke ILWU International intervention. They also committed themselves to 
joining key union committees and immersing themselves in the details of labor 
law and health and safety standards.358  
Over the next several years, the Rank and File Committee put those plans 
into action. They used a combination of parliamentary rules, recall campaigns, 
union elections, and member education and training to build a movement to 
challenge the union’s old guard. Gene Viernes initiated a program to train shop 
stewards, and he and other Rank and File Committee supporters sought election 
as union delegates so that they might aggressively pursue grievances.359 Silme 
Domingo joined the negotiations committee and successfully pushed the union to 
adopt a policy whereby no workers would be dispatched without a contract 
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ratified by the membership.360 He also helped reinvigorate the union’s organizing 
efforts by spearheading an ambitious drive to organize non-union canneries 
under the auspices of the ILWU’s All-Alaska Council. Still other reformers waged 
a kind of low-intensity warfare to keep union president Tony Baruso and his allies 
off balance by holding them narrowly to the union’s policies and procedures. 
They contested, documented, and reported slight infractions such as cancelled 
meetings and poor accounting practices as they built their case that the union’s 
leaders were corrupt and incompetent.361  
Women played key roles in the reform effort. In the early 1970s the 
canneries began hiring increasing numbers of women, especially college-age 
white women from the West Coast. The cannery owners did so in response to 
the growing Japanese demand for salmon roe, the harvesting of which was 
considered women’s work. The inclusion of these new workers gave the canners 
an opportunity to undermine the union’s base among Filipino men. However, the 
newly hired women often demonstrated a similar willingness to exercise their 
rights at work not unlike the San Francisco Bay Area women who were 
transforming the political culture of the region’s public and service sector unions 
in the 1970s. Once informed of the Rank and File Committee’s efforts to fight 
discrimination and union corruption, they often proved to be sympathetic. 
Committee members Emily Van Bronkhorst, Terri Mast, and Silme’s sister Lynn 
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Domingo recruited dozens of women into the reform movement who might not 
have responded to similar appeals from Asian men. 
Bruce Occena, a key Rank and File Committee strategist observed that 
the female leaders also provided a buffer in the male-dominated and gangster-
dominated world of the canneries: “We were fighting a culture battle where the 
guys who were the stewards were the same guys who ran the gambling, and 
their lieutenants were these Tulisan, this gangster element. . . . We basically 
were trying to create another culture.” Women “could actually get away with 
saying things . . . that the males could not because the males would be more 
easy targets. So we tried to use whatever bogus chivalry existed, but what it 
meant is putting incredibly scary and big responsibilities on the shoulders of the 
women organizers.”362    
 Along with their campaign for union democracy, the reformers carried out 
an ambitious program of agitation and education regarding the situation in the 
Philippines. In 1974 Domingo and Viernes and several other Filipino cannery 
workers joined the Union of Democratic Filipinos (Katipunan ng mga 
Demokratikong Pilipino/KDP), a newly formed organization to fight for democracy 
in the Philippines and democratic rights for Filipino Americans. Among the KDP’s 
founders were radical Filipino-Americans, such as Occena, as well as movement 
veterans from the Philippines. In the spring of 1970 a series of mass protests in 
Manila, known as the First Quarter Storm, threatened to topple Marcos. The 
movement was brutally suppressed by the military, and the worried parents of 
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middle-class students sent their activist children to the United States for safety. 
Many of these young expatriates continued with their political work, providing the 
KDP ties to the Maoist Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its military 
wing the New People’s Army.  
 The KDP also developed close ties to the New Communist Movement in 
the U.S. Contrary to the practice of many New Communists who were hostile to 
the CPUSA and unwilling to work with the “revisionists” who they alleged had 
abandoned Marxism-Leninism, the Seattle KDP members sought support from 
local CP members and former members, some of whom had worked in the 
canneries decades earlier. Terri Mast recalled that she and Silme Domingo 
learned much of what they knew about the union’s history and politics by 
spending time with Chris Mensalvas, a retiree who had been both a Communist 
Party veteran and the former union president. “[We] were able to build on things 
that had been created before,” Mast recalled. “And a lot of that really was the CP 
and I think a lot of people don’t give credit to the early years and the work they 
did.”363 Other union pioneers provided strategic advice, as well as a level of 
legitimacy and seriousness that appealed to older and moderate union members 
and the larger Filipino community. For instance, the Rank and File Committee 
recruited to their ranks Leo Lorenzo, who had first worked in Alaska in the late 
1920s and was a cofounder of the first Rank and File Committee. They later 
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tapped Lorenzo to serve as union vice president, a position he had first held in 
1946.364  
 For the rest of the 1970s and the early 1980s, the KDP provided the 
Seattle union reformers with organizers, strategic assistance, and access to its 
international network of activists. From the beginning the KDP leaders within the 
Rank and File Committee were careful to separate the issues of union 
democracy and the overthrow of Marcos. Bruce Occena recalls that they “were 
clear pretty much from the beginning that you could work with someone who was 
ambivalent about Marcos or supported him” because “the issues of the trade 
union reform . . . gave you lots to talk to that person” about. Their interest in 
reform indicated that even pro-Marcos workers held a “basic democratic 
impulse,” and that was enough to build upon.365 
 Rank and File Committee success was rooted in its ability to build a 
dynamic and supportive movement culture that drew upon its members’ 
experiences in Seattle’s civil rights and student movements, the traditions of the 
Filipino-American community, the union culture of Local 37, and the intellectual 
rigor and organizational discipline of the KDP.366 This movement culture allowed 
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reformers to undertake long hours of organizing and study and to participate in a 
host of community initiatives and program, while providing social networks and 
ample opportunities for friendships and romantic relationships. Committee 
leaders attended study groups to read Marx and Lenin and documents from the 
struggle in the Philippines. They enrolled in labor studies classes and held 
retreats intended to clarify strategy and solidify relationships. Street dances 
provided an opportunity to distribute literature and deliver speeches explaining 
the organization’s purpose.367 Staff members survived on small grants from 
religious and progressive foundations, as well as private donations and some 
additional cash from a parking lot that was maintained by the organization.368 
They also controlled costs by living in collective housing such as the KDP 
headquarters on Beacon Hill, where they shared cooking, cleaning, and child 
care responsibilities. The members of these collectives constantly changed as 
                                                                                                                                                 
culture through their parents community activism. Three of Silme’s siblings Nemesio Jr., Lynn, 
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activists visited from out of town and workers left for the canning season or 
perhaps returned to school.369  
 Reform movement leaders traveled to Alaska, the Yakima Valley, the San 
Francisco Bay Area, and the San Joaquin Valley in order to meet with Local 37 
members; through the KDP their activist networks extended across the country 
and even to the Philippines. But the center of their world was Seattle’s 
International District, home of their rented storefront office at 416 Eighth Avenue 
South, less than two miles from the union hall and the KDP house, and 
conveniently located across from the Four Seas, a landmark Chinese restaurant 
and bar. Nestled next door to the Wing Luke Asian Museum, at the time a 
fledgling art and history museum, the Rank and File Committee headquarters 
served as both a strategy center and editorial production office for the group’s 
publications, including the International Examiner, a community newspaper they 
purchased in 1975 for a dollar.370  
 Ron Chew, the longtime editor of the Examiner, later recalled the 
building’s “high ceilings that dripped all the time from overflooded toilets in the 
apartments up above” and trash cans “strategically positioned in about a half 
dozen spots on the floor to catch the water before it had a chance to soak its way 
into the carpet.” In the front room “people worked at desks and chatted with drop-
in visitors or sometimes held organizing meetings for street demonstrations.” A 
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loft provided space for “smaller, more private conversations” and a back office 
served as storage for “left-over newspapers and picket signs and old leaflets,” 
while a “cheap offset printing press, used to print fliers for demonstrations, 
sometimes rumbled on for hours.” Nemesio Domingo Jr. acted as publisher, 
“watching over the paper’s meager finances and doling out, during good months, 
token checks of $10 to individuals for contributed stories and articles. During bad 
months, everyone was just a volunteer,” according to Chew. Poor heating drove 
most of the staff home early in the winter, except for the “diehards—Gene, 
Nemesio, Terri Mast and Julia Laranang,” who “stayed in the front area” and 
worked in their coats.”371  
 Under the leadership of the cannery worker reformers, the Examiner gave 
voice to the concerns of young Asian Americans. It covered stories that were 
often overlooked by the Seattle daily newspapers, including the fight for low-
income housing in the International District, the campaign for bilingual social 
services, and historic preservation efforts. Early in his tenure with the Examiner, 
Chew helped produce a seven-part series on the history of Asians in the 
canneries researched and written by Gene Viernes. The series made the larger 
community aware of the history of the cannery workers, while giving the 
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dissidents a usable past that put their efforts in the context of nearly a century of 
political struggle. Among the stories Viernes included in the series was that of the 
cannery union martyrs, Virgil Duyungan and Aurelio Simon who were 
assassinated in December 1936, as they attempted to wrest control over the 
hiring process from crooked labor contractors. After being shot over dinner at 
Seattle’s Gyoken Restaurant, Duyungan returned fire and killed his attacker who 
turned out to be a contractor’s relative. Thousands of maritime workers attended 
the men’s funeral march, and the murders stiffened the cannery workers resolve 
to establish a union.372  
 In short, the Rank and File Committee became a way of life for its leaders. 
For those like Domingo and Viernes who also immersed themselves in KDP, the 
work was all the more intense. San Francisco-based activist Estella Habal later 
described her involvement with the KDP as a “most concentrated political, social, 
and ideological transforming experience.” She recalled gaining a sense of 
“empowerment, optimism and destiny” and feeling as if her “individual energy 
and power were doubled, quadrupled” by her involvement in the movement. 
Habal’s reflection’s capture the sense of exhilaration that the KDP organizers 
experienced, but the frenetic pace of activity and the demands of party discipline 
also took their toll. Habal was among many who eventually faced burnout. Few 
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young radicals could sustain such a high level of activity for too long and the 
pressures only grew stronger and the stakes higher as the reform movement 
gathered steam.373    
 By the fall of 1978 the Rank and File Committee had built enough of a 
presence within Local 37 to run a slate of candidates that included Domingo for 
Dispatcher and Viernes for Secretary-Treasurer—the two positions they identified 
as the keys to ridding the union of corruption and incompetence. Both finished 
third, although several other reformers on their slate were elected to the union’s 
board of trustees. Nevertheless, the reformers considered the campaign a defeat 
and, setting their sights on the 1980 elections, vowed to more aggressively 
organize workers in Alaska, especially the growing minority of white college-age 
women.374 But months before the election, agitation on another front paid off 
when the committee led the successful recall of secretary-treasurer Ponce Torres 
for incompetence during the spring and summer of 1979. Rank and File 
Committee members had identified Torres as being weaker than union president 
Tony Baruso, and they drove a wedge between the two men. The recall chipped 
away at Baruso’s power, put him on notice, and most importantly created a 
vacancy for the secretary-treasurer position. After Baruso’s choice for a 
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replacement died after just six months on the job, Silme Domingo assumed the 
role in March 1980 backed by a growing base of supporters who appreciated his 
candor, charisma, and intelligence.375 
With their revised electoral strategy for the 1980 elections, the Rank and 
File Committee set its sights on the dispatcher’s position, nominating Gene 
Viernes for the job. Just weeks before the election, Viernes discussed his goals 
in the caucus newsletter. He observed that coworkers had asked him to 
remember them after the election and that some had jokingly demanded that he 
buy their vote. Others promised him their votes because they came from his 
father’s home province. Viernes rejected “such joking remarks” because they  
“reveal[ed] the deep-rooted backward practices our union has developed over 
the years.” He explained that “vote buying and reliance on the ‘compadre’ and 
‘Kababayan’ system” had corrupted Local 37’s elections over the course of the 
years. “For those who honor me by calling me a compadre (one who is a friend 
who will remember them) or a Kababayan (one who is of the same blood or 
town), I respect them for carrying on such a tradition. Without these cultural 
traditions many of our fathers who came to America during the depression would 
have starved to death.” But for a union election, he and the Rank and File 
Committee agreed “there is no place for such practices.” The very traditions that 
had promoted survival and solidarity among the Filipino cannery workers had 
been co-opted and perverted by management and their gangster allies among 
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the union’s leadership. Favors and bribes had trumped fairness and seniority, 
according to Viernes.376  
The Rank and File Committee won eleven of seventeen positions on the 
executive board in the October 1980 election; Silme Domingo was reelected 
secretary treasurer and Gene Viernes became dispatcher.377 Though the 
committee had decided against challenging Baruso for the presidency, it now 
controlled the union. Their reform efforts, especially changing dispatch practices 
to respect seniority rights, moved ahead at full speed. They also revisited their 
role as a dissident caucus. In a meeting shortly after the election, Silme Domingo 
explained that their first goal, “holding the Union officers accountable for dealing 
with the basic fighting capacity of the Union” had been achieved. It was now up 
to them to “build the Union strong from the inside . . . and educate and organize 
the membership.” Domingo argued that the committee should encourage union 
members to take progressive stands on broader issues such as discrimination on 
the job and racism in Seattle. He also recommended that the committee consider 
using the ILWU International’s resolutions process as a means for conducting 
                                                 
376
 Gene Viernes, “Dispatcher Candidate Speaks Out,” Alaskero News, August 1980, Box 33, 
Folder 45, Cannery Workers and Farm Laborers Union, Local 7 Records, University of 
Washington, Seattle. 
 
377
 The Rank and File Committee had earlier succeeded in having David Della appointed to chair 
the election board, thus ensuring the integrity of the 1978 and 1980 elections. This is but one 
example of the movement’s ability to achieve significant reforms built on smaller successes. For a 
report on the improved elections procedures, see 1980 Election Board, Final Report of 1980 
Elections, [September/October 1980], Box 29, Folder 45, Cannery Workers and Farm Laborers 
Union, Local 7 Records, University of Washington, Seattle.   
 
  
228 
popular education on international human rights issues “such as the embargo of 
military shipments to the El Salvadorean junta.”378  
 With the support of the KDP, Viernes spent five weeks in the Philippines 
beginning in March 1981. This marked Viernes’s first trip to the Philippines and 
he seized the opportunity to meet his deceased father’s extended family. But 
there was work to do as well and much of it was quite dangerous. The KDP 
organized this trip around the goal of assessing the level of repression against 
trade unions and reporting back to the U.S. labor movement.379 Viernes attended 
a May Day planning convention where he met Ernesto Arellano, the General 
Secretary of the KMU (May First Movement), a new free trade union movement. 
Arrelano had recently been released from prison for organizing a demonstration 
for the right to strike. Viernes also met Bert Olalia, a labor movement pioneer 
who began organizing in the 1920s and was once the head of the Philippine 
Congress of Labor Organizations. The year after Viernes’s meeting with Olalia, 
Marcos imprisoned him during a crackdown on labor activists; he died a few 
months later at the age of 80. As later events would reveal, the Philippine 
authorities closely tracked Viernes’s movements, including his visit to the 
countryside to meet guerilla leaders of the New People’s Army.380 
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 Viernes flew directly from the Philippines to Honolulu for the annual ILWU 
convention at the end of April. In Hawaii, he and Domingo crafted a carefully 
worded resolution condemning the repressive labor policies in the Philippines 
and recommending that the ILWU send an investigative team there to gather 
information regarding “trade unions, working conditions, and civil liberties.” Also 
attending the convention, Tony Baruso attempted to play both sides of the issue. 
Realizing that it would pass, he stood before the delegates and attempted to soft 
pedal the resolution. He explained that it “has and never will in any way attempt 
to condemn the Marcos regime as martial law. To the contrary, [it respects] the 
wishes of the majority of the 42 million people in the country for accepting martial 
law, which the majority is enjoying now.” Appealing to a long tradition of U.S. 
labor movement paternalism where international affairs are concerned, Baruso 
asserted that the measure would merely enable the union to “have a look-see, 
and maybe we could help with our expertise of this Union, the suffering brothers 
and sisters back home.”381 Gene Viernes took the podium and reminded the 
delegates of the ILWU’s historic links to the liberation movements and 
progressive trade unionists of the Philippines. He discussed his recent meetings 
with KMU leaders, and explained that the Filipino activists had “expressed the 
need for international support” and had provided him with a letter “conveying a 
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call to solidarity.” After some back and forth regarding the resolution’s meaning, it 
passed overwhelmingly.382  
A few weeks after the ILWU convention, Viernes and Silme Domingo were 
back in Seattle to prepare for the season’s dispatch, which would be the first 
under the reformed procedures. Tensions mounted at the union hall in the last 
week of May as the industry floated rumors of a slow season and cannery 
workers jockeyed for the available jobs. The foremen used all of their 
connections and powers of persuasion to retain the privilege of selecting their 
crews, but their lobbying efforts fell upon deaf ears as the new dispatcher 
Viernes and other Rank and File Committee leaders explained that the dispatch 
would respect seniority. One gang leader Tony Dictado confronted Viernes in his 
office, demanding that his favored Tulisan gang members be dispatched. A 
heated argument erupted before Dictado turned away shouting a threat in Ilocan, 
a Filipino dialect that Viernes did not understand.383  
A few days later at about 4:30pm on Monday June 1, two Tulisan 
members shot Gene Viernes and Silme Domingo as they worked alone in the 
union hall. Viernes died instantly—an unfinished letter remained in his typewriter. 
Domingo survived long enough to crawl to the street for help and to name the 
assailants. A bystander told reporters that he had been standing on the sidewalk 
near the union hall and “looked over and the guy looked like a drunk. But then I 
                                                 
382
 ILWU, Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth Biennial Convention, Honolulu, Hawaii, 27 April 
1981, Ann Rand Library of the International Longshore and Warehouse Union, San Francisco, 
CA. See also, Nemesio Domingo and Alonzo Suson to Titled officers and members, 8 March 
1982, Box 27, Folder 16, Cannery Workers and Farm Laborers Union, Local 7 Records, 
University of Washington, Seattle. 
 
383
 Jack Hopkins, “Witness Says Dictado Talked of Killing Cannery Union Dispatcher,” Seattle 
Post-Intelligencer, 7 May 1982.  
  
231 
saw all the blood on his stomach. He was waving his arms and saying: ‘Can’t you 
see me? Help me.’”384 Viernes, twenty-nine, was single; Domingo, also twenty-
nine, left his wife, Terri Mast, and two young daughters. 
Over the following weeks, the Rank and File Committee’s struggle 
developed along two fronts—they moved to solidify their union reform effort and 
they initiated a campaign to bring the murderers to justice through the 
establishment of a Committee for Justice for Domingo and Viernes (CJDV). On 
both fronts, this work was bolstered by an influx into Seattle of KDP activists and 
supporters from the Line of March (LOM), a network of Marxist-Leninist groups 
with which KDP was affiliated.385 Two days after the killings, three hundred 
people marched through the International District to the union hall in Pioneer 
Square for a memorial service for Gene Viernes. “The reason they had to shoot 
Gene was because they couldn’t change him,” said Andy Pascua, a friend and 
coworker from his hometown. “He was totally dedicated, totally uncorruptible.” 
David Della called for the “tragic murder to release a floodgate of outrage,” while 
union president Tony Baruso, who had often derided Domingo and Viernes as 
communists, pledged to continue the reform movement, for which he gallingly 
took credit. “Maybe somebody is going to shoot me in the head, too,” he 
declared. “But we will not be stifled or changed. We are not going to give up our 
values.”386 A few days later, five hundred friends and comrades gathered at the 
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Filipino Community Center to say the Rosary for Domingo, and an honor guard 
from the Caballeros de Dimas Alang, a Filipino fraternal organization that he had 
joined two years earlier, read the official burial ceremony. Other friends and 
supporters held services in San Francisco and Honolulu in the following days as 
well.387 
Within six months the two gunmen Domingo had named as his assailants 
were rounded up, arrested, tried, and sentenced to life in prison and Tulisan 
gang leader Tony Dictado was convicted a few months later for having directed 
the murders. Just weeks after the murders, union president Tony Baruso was 
also arrested at his home after it was discovered that he was the owner of the 
murder weapon—a revolver that had turned up in a West Seattle trash can.388 In 
his absence the union’s executive council held an emergency meeting during 
which Silme’s widow, Terri Mast charged Baruso and another union official with 
conducting a fraudulent election for ILWU international officers. The council 
agreed to form a trial committee to consider the allegations that Baruso had 
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falsified ballots and mailed them to the International union without informing the 
membership of the election.389 
A few days later, Baruso was released from jail when prosecutors decided 
there was insufficient evidence to connect him to the murders. The Rank and File 
Committee members, however, began demanding his resignation as evidence 
mounted over the next several weeks that the cannery owners were taking 
advantage of the murders and the arrest to flaunt their contracts and thwart new 
organizing. One ILWU official reported to local members that the union had lost 
elections in Cordova and Dutch Harbor because “rumors have spread that Local 
37 was gangsterous.” He strongly urged them to “clean these rumors up.”390 
Local 37, wanting nothing more than to clean the union up, looked to the 
ILWU office in San Francisco for assistance, requesting that the international 
supply an armed guard for meetings and provide them access to union lawyers. 
When these requests were denied, Terri Mast and other reformers blasted the 
International executive board members for their lack of support and accused 
them of falling victim to a new wave of anti-Communism. “To the extent our 
broader views are a factor in your vacillation, it would be far better to open up 
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frank discussions on this point,” they wrote. “However, we should be judged on 
the basis of our work and track record in the union. Baruso is certainly giving 
every indication that he will use the ‘red scare’ to hold the presidency. The 
International is well advised to not jump on that bandwagon.”391    
The Communist Party USA had historically wielded influence within the 
ILWU, and CP members among the union’s leaders were likely suspicion of the 
Seattle radicals association with the New Communist Movement, much of which 
was hostile to the CP and the Soviet Union. But not all of the international’s 
seeming indifference was politically motivated. Local 37 had long complained of 
the lack of attention from the International, attributing it to the seasonal nature of 
cannery work and high levels of workforce turnover in the industry. Longstanding 
disputes over requirements that members pay half-year union dues, though the 
season was only two months long, predated affiliation with the ILWU in 1950.392 
Moreover, the international was guided in its response by the ILWU’s 
commitment to local autonomy and did not “really have a lot of powers at the 
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International level to go barging in and taking over locals,” as one official who 
worked closely with Local 37 later explained.393   
These tensions eventually subsided after ILWU president James Herman 
directed two regional officials to investigate Mast’s allegations of election fraud 
against Baruso.394 The international officers and the Local 37 trial committee 
substantiated Mast’s charges, though the membership rejected the committee’s 
recommendation that Baruso be fined, an indication that he continued to enjoy 
significant support within the union.395 That fall the Rank and File Committee 
launched a recall campaign patterned after their successful effort against Ponce 
Torres. Activists in each of the canneries carried lists of union members upon 
which they graded workers’ attitudes toward the recall and recorded whether or 
not the individual had already voted. Another forty Seattle-based Committee 
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members worked a phone tree to urge members to support the recall and 
followed up with one-one-one conversations.396  
On December 4 a Local 37 committee and an ILWU international 
representative certified that Baruso had been recalled by the membership by a 
vote of 323 to 170. Upon Baruso’s return from Acapulco, where he had been 
vacationing, the executive council informed him of the tally. He protested, but 
handed the gavel to Silme’s father, Nemesio Domingo Sr. In a special issue of 
Alaskero News trumpeting the results, Dave Della proclaimed that “this blow was 
landed not by a small group of ‘dissidents’ but by a conscious and organized 
movement of the rank and file. This movement, moreover, didn’t appear 
overnight. Rather, it was a result of the long reform campaign begun by Silme, 
Gene and the Rank and File Committee five years ago. During the referendum, a 
broad network of union membership up and down the coast participated in a ‘get-
out-the-vote’ effort that reached hundreds of union members.”397 Committee 
gains were solidified during elections the following year when Terri Mast was 
voted president and reformers swept all of the remaining executive board slots. 
Mast became the first woman to serve as Local 37 president and the members 
elected the youngest executive council in the union’s history—many of them 
being in their 20s.   
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Though Tony Baruso had been implicated by witness testimony and his 
ownership of the murder weapon, no criminal charges against him in connection 
to the murders appeared to be forthcoming. With the cooperation of the Rank 
and File Committee, however, federal authorities had been building a corruption 
case against him that culminated in February 1984 with a conviction and three-
year sentence for embezzling union funds and mail fraud. While serving as 
president Baruso had bilked the union out of more than $5,000 by reimbursing 
himself for travel expenses already paid by other organizations. He had also filed 
fraudulent medical claims that netted him another $16,000.398 
Though many law enforcement officials and other observers considered 
the murders to be an internal union dispute turned violent, Committee for Justice 
activists consistently voiced their suspicions that a much larger conspiracy had 
taken place—a murder plot involving issues and individuals extending far beyond 
the International District. With the discovery of Baruso’s gun, Committee for 
Justice attorney Michael Withey later explained to a reporter “the dispatch theory 
goes out the window, because why would Baruso kill somebody just because 
Dictado wanted to get his boys dispatched?”399 While the Committee, led by 
Silme Domingo’s sister Cindy, was very careful to make sure that their theory of 
a deeper conspiracy did not undermine the ongoing criminal investigations, for 
which there was broad popular support, they began making bolder assertions 
regarding the political forces beyond Seattle who benefited from the murders. 
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Just over a year after the murders, the Committee for Justice filed a lawsuit in 
federal court accusing Ferdinand Marcos and U.S. government officials of 
complicity in the murders.400 Central to their case was a series of 1979 articles 
written by columnist Jack Anderson that exposed the “Filipino infiltration plan,” an 
effort by the Philippine government and U.S. spy agencies to penetrate and 
neutralize Marcos’s American opposition.401 These allegations were immediately 
dismissed as paranoid and conspiratorial and a district court judge quickly 
excluded the governments of the Philippines and the United States as 
defendants, citing national security concerns and the suit’s lack of specific 
evidence. These were very difficult years for the justice campaign as Marcos and 
U.S. President Ronald Reagan cemented their relationship in the early years of 
the Reagan administration. 
 But change came in 1986. As Reagan was being forced to account for the 
events related to what would come to be known as the Iran-Contra scandal, the 
Marcoses fled the Philippines for Hawaii under intense political pressure. Cindy 
Domingo and Mike Withey traveled to Honolulu to depose the exiled dictator. 
Marcos took the fifth amendment in response to their most direct questions, but 
he acknowledged that he was concerned by links between the two countries’ 
labor movements and recognized that the ILWU had the capacity to impede trade 
to the United States. He also admitted to monitoring Viernes’s trip to the 
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Philippines, but scoffed at the notion that he would order the murders, dismissing 
Viernes and Domingo as “laborers in a smaller vineyard.”402 
 Using the Freedom of Information Act, the Committee for Justice began 
acquiring documents to build their case. They discovered that shortly before 
Viernes’s trip, U.S. intelligence agents had monitored his movements and 
warned Philippine authorities that he was carrying nearly $300,000 with him to 
distribute to the opposition. KDP, which raised money openly for the New 
People’s Army, acknowledged that Viernes had withdrawn about $3,000 from an 
organizational bank account shortly before leaving. But they explained that the 
purpose of his trip was not to raise money for the rebels and asserted that the 
documents proved a link between the governments. Even more damaging to 
Marcos was the discovery of papers that documented his payments to a 
shadowy corporation in San Francisco he had used to fund his U.S. spy and 
intimidation network. The documents revealed that through intermediaries 
Marcos had paid $15,000 for a “special intelligence project” to Local 37 president 
Tony Baruso. With this new evidence, a federal judge reinstated the Marcoses as 
defendants.403 
This civil court case went to trial in the fall of 1989 just weeks after 
Ferdinand Marcos’s death. The attorney for the Marcos estate argued that the 
murders were the result of an internal labor dispute and cast doubt on the notion 
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that the late dictator would be concerned with the leaders of an obscure cannery 
union in Seattle. The jury disagreed. On 15 December 1989, they delivered a 
unanimous verdict finding Marcos guilty of conspiring to kill Gene Viernes and 
Silme Domingo. The victims’ families and their supporters burst into tears as they 
learned that the jury had awarded them $15 million, though that amount was 
reduced substantially after the families reached an agreement with Marcos’s 
widow, Imelda.404 With the momentum from the civil trial, prosecutors in Seattle 
rearrested Tony Baruso in 1990. This time he was tried, convicted, and 
sentenced to life without parole.405 
   ************ 
 
Much of what Local 37 reformers fought for and won has been under 
attack since the 1980s; new political and economic developments have 
threatened or eliminated the cannery workers’ successes and obscured their 
legacies. Two of the three Alaskan Cannery Workers Association discrimination 
lawsuits ended in settlements for the Filipino and Native Alaskan cannery 
workers, but in 1989 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled 5-4 against the plaintiffs in 
the last of the suits, Wards Cove Packing Company v. Antonio. While remanding 
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a few peripheral issues to the lower courts, the high court shifted the burden of 
proof in Title VII civil rights cases from the employer to the employee, and it 
barred the use of company workforce comparisons to establish disparate impact. 
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Harry Blackmun denounced the majority for 
raising the burden of proof so high as to make it seldom attainable. In 
considering the facts of the case, Blackmun said he was reminded of “a kind of 
overt and institutionalized discrimination we have not dealt with in years: a total 
residential and work environment organized on principles of racial stratification 
and segregation, which, as Justice Stevens points out, resembles a plantation 
economy.” He branded the canner’s policies as “discrimination of the old-
fashioned sort” and blasted his brethren for a ruling that would “essentially 
immunize these practices” from legal challenges. Blackmun glumly concluded 
that his colleague’s decision “comes as no surprise,” and he wondered “whether 
the majority still believes that race discrimination—or, more accurately, race 
discrimination against nonwhites—is a problem in our society, or even 
remembers that it ever was.”406  
Thirteen years later, the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the 
remaining issues that had been remanded from the Supreme Court. “For 27 
years, cannery workers fight a battle from another era,” announced the Seattle 
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Times headline after the December 2001 decision was handed down.407 
Nemesio Domingo Jr. suggested that civil rights activists might do better to take 
future struggles to the streets, and he noted that federal courts had allowed the 
civil rights gains of Reconstruction to erode before 1900, just as today’s judiciary 
has done to the gains of the 1960s and 1970s. “We are going to have to mount a 
third reconstruction of civil rights,” he told a reporter.408 
The availability of cheaper Chilean, Norwegian, and farm-raised fish 
ravaged the Alaskan seafood industry during the 1980s and 1990s. Thousands 
of salmon industry jobs were lost. Many additional jobs disappeared as canneries 
shifted from canning to the less labor intensive production of frozen fish. In the 
mid-1980s, Local 37, like much of the American labor movement, was forced by 
employers into concessionary bargaining. Facing declining membership and 
escalating operating costs, Local 37 affiliated with the Inland Boatmen’s Union 
(ILWU) in 1987.  
These historical dislocations have been reinforced by drastic changes that 
have befallen the movement’s physical environment, making it more difficult to 
even remember the cannery workers’ struggles of the 1970s. Dozens of 
canneries where Alaskeros chopped fish for seventy-five years sit idle; their 
rotting dormitories and fish houses dot the Southern Alaska coast. Some of the 
old Filipino bunkhouses are getting long-overdue renovations as private 
developers convert shuttered canneries into fishing resorts. The Waterfall 
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Cannery, site of the 1968 fire that killed five workers, is among those that have 
been made “comfortable for tourists without sacrificing the rough-hewn character 
of the cannery.”409 Different changes have transformed the reformers’ Seattle 
organizing turf—the International District and Pioneer Square. Residents and 
workers in the ID have long struggled to retain its affordability and character in 
the face of urban renewal schemes and stadium and highway construction 
projects. A new wave of redevelopment proposals threatens to raise rents and 
drive out longtime residents, many of whom are elderly and poor. The empty 
union hall on Main Street in Pioneer Square faces the wrecking ball; the union 
vacated in 1986 because the crumbling building was unsound and too expensive 
to renovate. 
Despite these dramatic rollbacks, some of the reform movement’s 
legacies have survived, just as they survived the Cold War. Those canneries still 
in operation were forced to eliminate their segregated dormitories and cafeterias. 
They have opened up supervisory, skilled, and technical jobs to women and 
nonwhites. IBU Region 37 continues as a model of union democracy and 
workers are dispatched through a system that respects seniority. The union has 
taken a leadership position in current battles regarding immigrant rights and was 
among the most active local unions involved in the massive protests against the 
policies of the World Trade Organization in 1999.   
Terri Mast and former Rank and File Committee member Richard Gurtiza 
continue among the union’s leaders. Three of Silme Domingo’s siblings have 
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remained active in LELO (Legacy of Equality, Leadership, and Organizing), a 
grassroots labor and civil rights advocacy group that was an outgrowth of the 
cannery and construction workers’ struggles.410 David Della worked for the union 
in the 1980s and currently serves on the Seattle City Council with the support of 
many of the city’s progressive forces. Other former cannery worker activists 
continue as labor organizers and staff members in Seattle and the San Francisco 
Bay Area.  
While popular images of the labor movement during the 1970s revolve 
around the curmudgeonly television longshoreman Archie Bunker or perhaps the 
hard hat construction workers in Manhattan who beat up antiwar demonstrators, 
the story of Domingo, Viernes, and their comrades reminds us of a parallel 
tradition. In carrying out their struggle for ten years (many more when the legal 
cases are included), they rediscovered and revived the labor movement’s 
commitments to new worker organizing, union democracy, labor feminism, and 
international working-class solidarity. Their work represented what Dana Frank 
has referred to as the “moveable feast” of labor’s global politics—the flow of 
ideas and strategies, energy and personnel, back and forth across national 
boundaries.411 Inspired by the social movements of the 1960s, the cannery 
worker reformers committed to a grassroots organizing project that had a 
tremendous impact on the vitality and culture of a union local and an industry, 
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while making significant contributions to the campaign to bring down the Marcos 
dictatorship and advance democracy and human rights in the Philippines.412  
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 Two months after the murders of Silme Domingo and Gene Viernes in 
Seattle, 400 New York-area workers, including firefighters, longshoremen, 
autoworkers, and garment workers paraded around a control tower at Kennedy 
International Airport to protest President Reagan’s dismissal of more than 11,000 
members of the (PATCO) Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization for 
having taken part in an illegal strike.413 “Any self-respecting trade unionist should 
be here supporting PATCO because the Administration’s attack on PATCO is a 
threat to all unions,” one New York transit worker explained to a reporter. “We 
may all have to fight for our existence, and if we don’t support them we can’t 
expect them to support us.”414  
 Labor historians debate whether Reagan’s decision to fire the air traffic 
controllers and hire replacement workers marked the start of a stepped-up 
employer offensive or the culmination of longer-term anti-union trends aimed at 
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rolling back labor’s gains since WWII.415 There is no question, however, that the 
PATCO defeat has come to symbolize the labor movement’s dramatic decline 
over the past thirty-five years. The litany is familiar. The percentage of private 
sector workers who are union members has dropped to 7.4—a lower level than 
at any time since the Great Depression.416 The number of union members in the 
United States is equal to that of 1952 when the workforce was half its present 
size. Over the past five years, the United States has averaged 18 major strikes a 
year compared to 424 in 1974 and an average of 289 throughout the 1970s. 
Unions have routinely accepted contract concessions, including drastic pay and 
benefit cuts and union-busting two-tier wage schemes that provide lower wages 
to newly hired workers; many unionists have watched as their jobs are 
outsourced to non-union operations in the other parts of the U.S. and abroad, 
and millions of American workers have been forced to adjust their retirement 
plans as negotiated pensions were unilaterally reduced or even eliminated. The 
lifeblood of the labor movement—the workers’ ability to organize unions—has 
been undermined by the steady erosion of the National Labor Relations Act and 
the increasingly aggressive attempts by employers to remain union free. Workers 
attempting to organize unions are consistently subjected to harassment and 
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discipline for exercising their rights. A recent study found that thirty percent of all 
employers facing organizing campaigns fire pro-union workers.417  
 None of the young radicals and intellectuals who made the turn to the 
working class in the 1970s could have predicted the depths to which the labor 
movement has plummeted. They watched appalled at the combination of 
economic and political developments that began emerging in the mid-1970s—
deindustrialization and the relative quiescence of American workers and their 
unions; white working-class support for Reagan; the growing anti-union climate; 
and the dismantling of the welfare state with strong popular support. These 
trends forced radical activists to reevaluate how best to organize workers. Those 
who had looked at the late 1960s and early 1970s wildcat strikes—including 
those of black workers in Detroit and Atlanta—as harbingers of the kind of mass 
upsurge and labor militancy that had pushed the Democratic Party to the left in 
the 1930s were forced to decide whether remaining in the labor movement made 
sense politically when the broader protests failed to materialize. Those who 
continued on the job and in the unions found promise and meaning in the 
democratic struggles for inclusion such as fights over gender and racial equity in 
older exclusive trades as well as jobs in the growing sectors of the economy. Still 
others viewed union democracy as the necessary first step to building a mass 
movement of the rank and file. Those efforts bore fruit in the Seattle cannery 
union and in some of the San Francisco Bay area service unions. Battles for 
                                                 
417
 The study also found that 49 percent of employers threatened to close or relocate parts of the 
business if workers voted for the union, and that 82 percent hired anti-union consultants (see 
Center for Urban Economic Development, University of Illinois at Chicago, “Undermining the 
Right to Organize: Employer Behavior During Union Representation Campaigns,” December 
2005). 
  
249 
union democracy also helped re-shape the cultures of many of the nation’s 
largest national unions, including the International Brotherhood of Teamsters. 
The more than twenty-year fight for Teamster reform contributed directly to the 
successful United Parcel Service strike in 1997—a campaign that marked a 
major victory for labor’s battle with employers’ over their use of contingent 
workers to undermine union strength. The Teamsters forced UPS to bundle 
existing part-time jobs to create ten thousand new full-time positions.418  
 Countless other labor radicals never had the choice of retooling their 
organizing strategies. They lost their jobs in mass layoffs and plant closings and 
failed to find new working-class jobs in the 1980s. Some returned to school for 
advanced degrees or resumed professional careers. For Ann Arbor student 
radical turned autoworker-activist Rich Feldman, the plant closings in the 1980s 
and the failure of the radical groups with which he was associated to gain traction 
among his coworkers prompted second thoughts regarding his commitment to 
organizing workers as a means of establishing a new socialist party. After 
“romanticizing the working class, after thinking I had the answers with Marxism-
Leninism, I came to the point that I didn’t have enough answers,” Feldman 
recalled. In the mid-1980s, he began conducting oral history interviews with his 
coworkers at Ford’s Michigan Truck Plant outside of Detroit. Those interviews 
provided the basis for the book End of the Line, in which workers reflect upon 
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their jobs and families and the impact of plant closings and mass layoffs.419 “I 
wrote the book as a way to say maybe if you just dialogue through this 
discussion with people, a new birth of ideas will emerge,” said Feldman. With its 
moving portraits of coworkers with whom he had worked for seventeen years, 
Feldman came to view the book as “a going away present, a way to sum up a 
certain part of my life.” After a promotional tour for the book during which he had 
the opportunity to talk to workers across the country, he decided to stay at Ford 
where he was elected plant chairman before working on the UAW staff.420 
 General Baker and Marian Kramer find themselves in the kinds of 
struggles for survival that had first motivated them to become activists in the 
early 1960s. During their years in the League of Revolutionary Black Workers, 
they had believed that young black workers in Detroit would be key agents for 
bringing about a radical reordering of the social and economic structure. They 
maintained that faith long after Baker’s dismissal from Chrysler during the 1968 
wildcats, and as Kramer immersed herself in work with welfare recipients in the 
National Welfare Rights Union.421 But today they find themselves fighting to 
provide water to many of those workers and their children and grandchildren. 
After a neighbor sheepishly asked to borrow her water hose a few years ago, 
Kramer learned that the water departments in Detroit and Highland Park—an 
industrial suburb within Detroit’s city limits—had shut off services for tens of 
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thousands of customers who could not pay their bills. The city of Highland Park 
mulled plans to privatize its water services, contracting with a company that 
would generate revenue by selling bottled water. Kramer and Baker sprang into 
action. They pulled together a broad-based coalition—including victims of the 
water shut-offs—and forced the cities to implement water affordability plans for 
those who had fallen behind in their bills. Kramer argued that the potential for a 
public health crisis outweighed the right of the water departments to shut off 
water. Denying water to people who lived adjacent to the largest supply of fresh 
water in the world was “just plain wrong!”422 The incident served as another 
reminder for Kramer that “the fight in Highland Park is the fight in Benton Harbor, 
in Flint, in Johannesburg, South Africa, in China and all the places when it comes 
to a question of water. It becomes a global problem.”423  
The 1995 election of John Sweeney as president of the AFL-CIO over 
incumbent Lane Kirkland provided a sliver of hope for a new direction for the 
labor movement. Sweeney, who had been president of SEIU, promised to 
organize new workers, reestablish labor power within the Democratic Party, and 
oppose the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Scholarly and 
popular observers noted some signs of revitalization within the U.S. labor 
movement in the years that followed his election. The Federation and many of its 
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constituent unions committed substantial resources to organizing new workers.424 
Steelworkers and chemical plant workers formed fragile alliances with 
environmentalists in efforts to protect jobs and promote healthy communities, 
while unionized government employees joined community-based campaigns to 
secure a “living wage” for all of those working under municipal contracts. 
More skeptical observers suggested that these developments probably 
arrived years too late. A handful of organizing successes, though remarkable 
given the barriers to forming unions, cannot make up for the loss of thousands of 
members through plant closings, layoffs, downsizing due to mechanization, and 
decertification drives.425 In September 2005, Sweeney’s successor at SEIU, 
Andy Stern, led that union and several others out of the AFL-CIO and into a new 
umbrella group, the Change to Win Federation.426 The seven unions in the 
Change to Win Federation accused the AFL-CIO of failing to commit the 
resources necessary to organize new workers. They also argued for the 
consolidation of smaller unions into larger unions that would presumably have 
more bargaining power.  
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 Despite the internal divisions, the energy emanating from the labor 
movement since 1995 captured the imagination of a new generation of young 
activists. Students at dozens of colleges and universities drew attention to the 
exploitation of sweatshop workers by U.S. corporations and supported campus 
workers struggling for higher pay, better working conditions, and union 
recognition. The more committed among them served as AFL-CIO Union 
Summer interns or enrolled in the Organizing Institute, a Federation-sponsored 
organizer training school that places its graduates with unions in the midst of 
organizing campaigns.  
Kay Eisenhower, a Union WAGE activist and longtime leader of SEIU 
Local 616 in the Bay Area, has been encouraged by the vitality and interest of 
young people, but she worries that it may not be enough: “We don’t have 
anything that has the iconic status of the civil rights movement for example, and I 
worry about that just because I think it made such a big difference to so many of 
us.” The civil rights movement, she argues, gave activists of her generation “a 
sense of perspective and purpose. . . . Whereas a lot of these newer smaller 
movements are more narrow in scope. They don’t have the same broad picture 
scope.” She has also observed that many of the young labor activists take jobs 
as paid staff members and is disappointed that few consider the possibility of 
organizing as rank-and-file members. “If your group believes in socialism from 
below and union power from below and transforming the labor movement from 
below, you don’t go about that by becoming a union staffer,” she said. “I think to 
know what it’s like from the ground floor is really important. Otherwise I think 
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people, particularly leftists who are often better educated than some of the 
people they are working with, are going end up just substituting themselves” for 
the working class.427  
The belated retooling of the AFL-CIO’s Cold War foreign policy, which had 
once bolstered right-wing anti-labor regimes and organizations abroad has been 
another positive sign. A handful of unions have been at the forefront of forging 
the kind of international linkages that will be necessary for confronting the new 
realities of economic globalization. The latest development has been especially 
satisfying for Terri Mast, who, after Silme Domingo’s murder, struggled with 
being a thirty-one-year-old widow with two children while keeping ILWU Local 37 
together through the decline of the Alaska salmon canning industry. In November 
1999, as Seattle moved to the forefront of a new movement for global economic 
justice, Mast practiced the same brand of labor internationalism that had 
animated her and her associates in their efforts to secure justice in the 
Philippines. She initiated a labor coalition to take part in the historic protests 
during the World Trade Organization meetings in Seattle. “Transnational 
corporations are attempting to create a global nightmare for workers to live 
under,” Mast said upon announcing the formation of a labor-WTO mobilization 
committee. “But we in the labor movement reject that nightmare. Right now we 
have a unique, historic opportunity–a chance that may never come again–to 
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confront anti-worker trade policies and fight for our vision of a different kind of 
future.”428 
 Nineteen sixty eight did not mark the end of an era of protest for Marian 
Kramer, General Baker, Kay Eisenhower or any of the other radical activists and 
intellectuals who made the turn to the working class. The challenges they faced 
at the end of the 1960s were often disheartening, but they also opened up new 
possibilities for organizing in the 1970s. Those new possibilities led them to 
engage workers across the country to build a broad-based movement for social 
change. Their efforts were complicated and contradictory, and they ultimately 
failed to achieve their most ambitious goals. Nevertheless, those labor radicals 
who remained active over the long haul helped the American labor movement 
rediscover and put into practice its best traditions of union democracy, global 
internationalism, civil rights unionism, feminism, and a commitment to organizing 
new workers. As the labor movement grapples with the impact of economic 
globalization, those traditions will be essential building blocks in the ongoing 
struggle for democracy and economic justice.  
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